


**THE CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF GOVERNMENT OF
AFGHANISTAN UNDER PROFESSOR BURHANUDDIN RABBANI
(Afghanistan from Geneva Accords to the rise of Taliban (1988-96))**




AHMAD NOOR

**DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR
DECEMBER 2007**

**THE CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF GOVERNMENT OF
AFGHANISTAN UNDER PROFESSOR BURHANUDDIN RABBANI**

(Afghanistan from Geneva Accords to the rise of Taliban (1988-96))



*A dissertation Presented to the Department of International Relations,
University of Peshawar in Partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
Doctor of Philosophy*

By

AHMAD NOOR

DECEMBER 2007

Declaration

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of my individual research, and it has not been submitted to any other University for any other Degree.

Date: 10th December 2007

AHMAD NOOR

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am extremely grateful, first of all, to **Professor Dr. Taj Moharam Khan** Chairman Department of Political Science, and **Dr. Nasrreen Ghufra** Asst: Professor, Department of International Relations University of Peshawar, my Supervisor, and co-supervisor respectively, under whose kind guidance, I have been able to complete this work.

I am also grateful to **Professor Dr. Adnan Sarwar Khan**, Professor and Chairman and **Dr. Ijaz Khan**, Asstt. Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar for their encouragement and support. Their analyses helped me a great deal in improving the quality of this dissertation.

Moreover, I am sincerely thankful to my friends **Shoaib Mohammad** and **Qaswar Abbas** for their unwavering support throughout my study. Their personal support and encouragement and helpful suggestions were of great use. They assisted me in collecting data as well as conducting the interviews.

Most important, I would like to thank my family specially my brother **Ahmad Khalid Aakhunzada** for his support throughout this demanding process.

Needless to say, despite all my efforts and the assistances of all concerned, this work would have not seen light of the day without the blessings of **Allah**, the Almighty.

AHMAD NOOR

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION	I
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	II
TABLE OF CONTENTS	III
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	VII
MAP OF AFGHANISTAN	IX

INTRODUCTION	1
---------------------	----------

Objectives of the Study

Importance of the Study

Methodology of the Study

Chapters Structure

CHAPTER 1

AFGHANISTAN ON THE PATH TO CRISIS	7
--	----------

1.1	Growth of Communism	7
1.2	Sour Revolution	14
1.3	Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan	17
1.4.1	Genesis of the Resistance	24
1.4.2	Ideology of the Resistance Group	31
1.4.3	Unity and Disunity of the Resistance	38
1.4.4	Strength and weakness of Resistance	48
1.5	The Geneva Accords and Soviet withdrawals	58

CHAPTER 2

THE FALL OF NAJIBULLA AND ESTABLISHMENT OF RABBANI GOVERNMENT 55

2.1	The Peshawar Accord	57
2.1.1	External Factors	59
2.1.2	Concerns of western Countries	61
2.1.3	Accord Talks Begin	62
2.1.4	The Peshawar Accord and Related Developments	65
a)	The Benon Sevan Plan	66
b)	Power Vacuum After Najibullah	68
c)	Masood-Hekmatyar Rivalry	69
d)	Hekmatyar's U-Turn	71
e)	The Post-Accord Developments	75
f)	Non-Pushtuns in Charge	75
2.2	The Islamabad Accord	91
2.3	The Jalalabad Accord	93
2.4	UN failed role	96

CHAPTER 3

DIFFICULTIES FACED BY RABBANI AS PRESIDENT 101

4.1	Rabbani Government's Relations with Jumbish-e-Mili and the situation of Mazar Sharif	102
4.2	Rabbani Relations with Hizb-e-Islami Hikmatyar and Hizb-e-Wahdat	115
4.3	Peace Efforts by Pakistan Saudi Arabia and Jalalabad Shura	119
4.4	Kabul was divided between warring parties	122
4.5	Rabbani Government and the situation in Provinces	124
4.6	Problems for Rabbani in Shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-aqd	131
4.7	Rabbani and the Problem of election of Prime Minister and formation of a Cabinet	138

CHAPTER 4	
CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF RABBANI GOVERNMENT	142
5.1 Internal Causes	142
5.1.1 Afghanistan was divided between different war lords	142
5.1.2 Fighting for control of Kabul	147
5.1.3 Hizb Wahdat, Ittihad Islami and Jamiat Islami in West of Kabul	147
5.1.4 Rocketing and Shelling by Hezb-e-Islami Hikmatyar	150
5.1.5 Violations of International Humanitarian Law by all warring groups	164
5.1.6 Economic Policies of Rabbani Government	178
5.1.7 Internal Opposition to Rabbani	180
5.1.8 The System of Government was shattered	182
5.1.9 Out of Control Armed forces	183
5.1.10 Dissident Jihadi Groups	190
5.1.11 Obscene situation in the Kabul	192
5.1.12 Problem of Leadership	193
5.1.13 Indifference towards spiritual leaders	194
5.1.14 No Proper Preparation for Running the Government	195
5.1.15 Policy Making Bodies of the Government	197
5.1.16 Unmanageable National Problems	198
5.1.17 Abandonment of the Slogan of the Resistance Time	199
5.1.18 Failure of Rabbani to have support of Moderate Pushtuns	199
5.1.19 Rapprochement of Rabbani and Hekmatyar	200
5.2 External Factors	201
5.2.1 Rivalry Between Neighboring Regional and International States	201
5.3 Impact of Civil war on Afghan state and society	211
CHAPTER 5	218
CONCLUSIONS	218

APPINDIXES	228
<i>Glossary</i>	228
<i>Major Actors in Afghan History</i>	232
Text of Geneva Accords	244
Text of Peshawar Accord	259
Text of Islamabad Accord	261
 BIBLIOGRAPHY	 267
Books	267
Articles	270
Unpublished Sources	272
Personalities Interviewed	272
Newspapers	273
Websites	273
Pictures of leaders	274

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIC	Afghanistan Information Center
ARC	Afghan Refugees Commissioner ate
ASC	Afghan Study Center
CAR s	Central Asian Republics.
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (US Intelligence Agency).
DRA	Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
GRU	Glavnoys Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye
HIA	Hizb-e-Islami (Hikmatyar Islamic Party) Afghanistan
IIH	Ittehad-e-Islami-Afghanistan
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan Army's intelligence Agency).
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons.
JIA	Jamiate-e-Islami Afghanistan
KHAD	Khidamat Atilaat Daulti Afghan (Afghan Intelligence Agency).
NRC	National Revolutionary Council.
OIC	Organization of Islamic Conference.
PDPA	Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan.
RDF	Rapid Deployment Force.
NFF	National Fatherland Front
ISA	Refers to the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the Rabbani-led government.

AFGHANISTAN AND ITS NEIGHBORS



Source: www.mapsafghanistan.com

INTRODUCTION

Soviet Union's armed intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 may be called as the most important event of the twentieth century. The Soviet's Army march into Afghanistan disturbed the international balance of power that had been established in the post 1945 world order, following the Yalta Conference. The patriotism, unity and bravery demonstrated by the Afghan people compelled the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan.

The signing of the Geneva Accords which facilitated Russian withdrawal was one of the historic events of the 20th century when a political solution to a long drawn war was amicably reached between the two contending super powers of the time. The patriotism, solidarity and unity, which the Afghan nation displayed during the resistance against the Soviet occupation, made observers feel that an era of peace, unity and massive restructuring would be ushered in Afghanistan. It looked as if after the Soviet withdrawal, the bad days for the Afghan nation will come to an end. Instead the stage was set for another battle ground in Afghanistan, which lasted for almost a decade of infighting.¹

The Afghan tragedy has its roots in the Soviet invasion of the country in 1979, which occurred 18 months after the pro Soviet Communists had taken over the government in a bloody coup known as Sour Revolution. The Afghans, with support from the United States, Pakistan and other Muslim States, resisted the Soviet occupation and made them to withdraw following eight years of brutal fighting. In late April 1992, the disintegration of the Soviet-installed Dr Muhammad Najibullah government in Kabul and the success of the Mujahedeen led by Commander Ahmad Shah Masood and Gulbudin Hikmatyar, opened a euphoric yet painful phase in the history of Afghanistan.²

¹ Barnett Rubin, *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p.91

² Vartan Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, California, Stanford University Press, 1969, p.11

The Mujahedeen takeover was welcomed by Afghans in the expectation of returning their war ravaged country to peace and order. However, their expectations were soon to be confounded, for the Mujahedeen victory quickly turned sour, making their rule a continuation of the warfare of the preceding thirteen years, with further tragic losses for the Afghans.³

The civil war had a profound effect on Afghanistan. It changed the balance of power, which had previously favored Afghanistan's dominant ethnic group, the Pushtuns. Traditionally, the Pushtuns dominated Afghanistan's armed forces and as a community too, were well armed. During the civil war, other ethnic groups such as the Tajiks, the Uzbeks, and the Hazaras became armed and developed well-organized groups. The Pushtuns also became politically fragmented as a result of the emergence of several Pushtun resistance groups to fight the Soviets.⁴

The war also profoundly affected Afghanistan's neighbors and the broader Islamic world. Pakistan and Iran acquired considerable influence in the region. The war also increased the influence of Arab Islamic groups who sent volunteers and money to likeminded parties. These groups had formed networks during the Afghan struggle against Soviet occupation (1979-88). With Soviet departure, the United States lost interest and disengaged. The agreement on the soviet withdrawal left unresolved the issue of what government would take power in Afghanistan.

By the end of 1991, with the failure of the Soviet Coup and the breakup of the USSR, one of the superpowers had disappeared and the other had disengaged. The Afghan problem was turned over to the U.N. Secretary General's office, but good offices alone, were insufficient to resolve a conflict among heavily armed forces with different ethnic and regional bases.⁵

³ William Maley [Ed.], *Fundamentalism Reborn? : Afghanistan and the Taliban*, Lahore, Vanguard, 1998, p.7

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ William Maley [Ed.], *Fundamentalism Reborn? : Afghanistan and the Taliban*, Lahore, Vanguard, 1998, p.9

To facilitate the formation of the government, Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif went to Peshawar on 24 April 1992 and invited the Afghan leaders for talks, Six Mujahedeen groups, led by Sibghatulla Mujaddadi, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf, Pir Sayed Ahmad Gillani, Nabi Muhammadi and Moulavi Younis Khalis attended. The proceedings were, however, boycotted by Gulbudin Hekmatyar.

The talks resulted in an agreement providing mechanism for a peaceful political transformation. This agreement was called as The Peshawar Accord. Under the provisions of the accord, Sibghatulla Mujaddadi became president for two months on (28 April 1992) and Burhanuddin Rabbani succeeded him (on 28 June 1992) as President of Afghanistan.⁶

This study is an attempt to analyses the causes of the failure of the government of Afghanistan under Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, and will cover the important events from Geneva Accord to the Rise of Taliban (1988-96).

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The objectives of this study are specific; it is to focus on what went wrong with the government of Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, which assumed power in June 1992 until it was forced by Taliban to retreat to north of Afghanistan in September 1996. The study will be thematic in approach and will argue its case by focusing on problems of political legitimacy which dogged the government, party rule and intra party conflict, role of other groups which had control over major parts of Afghanistan. Lack of leadership, lack of political will and foreign intervention especially by regional powers, which from the very beginning distrusted Burhanuddin Rabbani government.

⁶ Iftikhar Murshed, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years, London Newton Printing, 2006, p.38

In short, the following may be stated as the main objectives of this study:

- To determine the causes of failure of the government of Afghanistan under Professor Rabbani;
- To highlight the core causes of differences among freedom fighters that led to civil war;
- To evaluate the role and designs of regional powers in Afghan affairs during Burhanuddin Rabbani period;
- To pinpoint the attitude of super powers towards Burhanuddin Rabbani Government;
- To identify the impact of civil war on the future course of events in Afghanistan.

IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

Certain studies focusing on the developments inside Afghanistan from 1988 to 1996 have already appeared, the issue under consideration has not yet been taken up so far; therefore an in-depth research on the question is required. Oliver Roy's "Islam and the Resistance in Afghanistan", (New Book, New York, Cornell University Press, 1995) and R.B. Robbin, "The Fragmentation of Afghanistan", (Vanguard Book, 1996). William Mely's "Fundamentalism Reborn", (Hurst and Company, London, 1988). Rasul Bakhsh Rais, "War without Winners"; (London, Oxford University Press, 1994) and Goodson Plarry, "Afghanistan's Endless War" (University of Washington Press Seattle and London (2001),. Very little is found on the topic under reference.

As an Afghan, the researcher is confident that the research will be a useful and timely contribution to the examination of Afghanistan affairs during the period under reference.

METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

The research has been conducted in two major parts; the first is to read as extensively as possible, all available literature and materials on the subject, both on the period (1988-1996) and from signing of the Geneva Accord to the rise of Taliban. Further, the study focuses on the post Burhanuddin Rabbani period. In this connection, various libraries and institutes were visited. The second part of the research consists of interviews with experts and officials. The author failed to interview some prominent Afghan leaders and Pakistanis who, otherwise, could have been a source of valuable information.

This deficiency was, however, met through activating alternative sources such as “Facts on File”, “Reports and Dispatches” on Afghanistan, and the policy statements in the “Foreign Affairs Pakistan.”

CHAPTERS STRUCTURE

The study is spread over five chapters, Starting with, ‘INTRODUCTION’, The introduction consists of a precise introduction about the dissertation, objectives, importance of the study and chapter structure of the dissertation.

Chapter one titled ‘AFGHANISTAN ON THE PATH TO CRISIS’, is a precise historical background of Afghanistan wherein growth of Communism, Sour Revolution, Soviet invasion and background of the resistance have been discussed in details.

Chapter two titled ‘THE FALL OF NAJIBULLA AND ESTABLISHMENT OF RABBANI GOVERNMENT’, deals with circumstances that led to the rise and fall of Dr. Muhammad Najibullah, establishment of Mujahedeen Government, first Professor Sibghatulla Mujadidi and then Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, Afghanistan’s situation during Rabbani rule have been evaluated in this chapter.

Chapter three titled 'DIFFICULTIES FACED BY RABBANI AS PRESIDENT', analyses problems of Rabbani government, as for example, Rabbani's relations with different warring groups, situation of Kabul and provinces etc.

Chapter four titled 'CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF RABBANI GOVERNMENT', takes into account the internal challenges of Rabbani government and external threats, role of regional powers and lack of interest of international powers in restoring peace and stability of Afghanistan.

Chapter five titled, 'CONCLUSIONS' this chapter consists of an overall summary of the whole study.

The study, therefore, might turn out to be of academic importance and practical value for all those interested in Afghanistan's Affairs. This piece of research work, which is not a conclusive work on the subject, may, perhaps, provide a food for thought to the researchers to conduct more studies on the subject from other angles.

CHAPTER 1

AFGHANISTAN ON THE PATH TO CRISIS

1.1 Growth of Communism

The birth of Communism in Russia in the dawn of the twentieth century changed the history of the world for the time to come. The Socialist thought and the intellectual legacies of the Marxist theories shook the theoretical edifice of capitalism. However, the decline of Communist rule in former USSR and the disintegration of Eastern European block, yoked the rule of Communist regimes, and loosened the political force of Communism. The radical appeal of Communism in the third world has lost its charm for most of the radical elites and the workers alike.

The Communist rule in Afghanistan is one of the subjects that is likely to be settled among political analysts of conflicting ideologies, even longer after it is over. The event in the contemporary history will continue to fuel controversies among critics on the political efficacy of the rule.

Historically, Afghanistan played an important role as a buffer between British India and the Czarist Empire. Britain for long exercised influences over the external relations of Afghanistan with the objectives of preventing Kabul from developing any strategic linkage with the former Soviet Union. The departure of Britain from the region in 1947 and its decline as a global power altered the traditional geographical balance in the region. Kabul's dispute with Pakistan over the Durand line and Pushtunistan issues added to its urgency to look for political and material support from the Soviet Union.⁷ The United States, the post war super power, preferred a security alliance with Pakistan rather than Kabul for its containment strategy, yet it did not match the growing influences of Moscow in the important areas of training and supply of military equipment. These were vital instruments to the Soviet Union's penetration of the Afghan State. Since

⁷ Vartan Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics or Reforms and Modernization, 1880-1946*, California, Stanford University Press, 1969, pp.13-19

Afghanistan lacked the potential to modernize its armed forces, it had to depend solely on the Soviet Union. This provided an opportunity to the latter to increase its penetration and influence in Afghanistan's important areas of public policy and national security.

The Saur Revolution or coup of Communists was held with the help of young Afghan officers in April 1978. This introduced a new era of Marxist-oriented reforms in Afghanistan and led to disruptive changes in the social, economic and political structure of a predominantly feud tribal society.⁸ The reforms were meant to alter the oligarchical structure which had prevented progress, development and modernization of Afghanistan.

The story of Saur Revolution goes back to the times of Bolshevik Revolution when some Afghan leaders, headed by Muhammad Wali Badakhshi, had participated in October celebrations of 1919 at Moscow. They brought along with them the seeds of Socialism to Afghanistan. A young member of the delegation Abdul Rahman propagated progressive and radical ideas in the Afghan society which he had brought from Moscow.⁹ However, the leftist politics began to take roots in Afghanistan when the parliamentary elections of 1949 for the first time brought to parliament a large group of leftist well-educated members.¹⁰

After the end of Sardar Muhammad Daud Khan's (generally known as Sardar Daud) autocratic decade (1953-63) Afghan politics witnessed a new phase during which political activities were allowed. All powers were retained by the Afghan monarchy under the 1964 constitution, yet parliamentary elections were allowed. This provided an opportunity for free debate on national issues and political groups were free to publish their own newspapers and magazines in order to articulate their points of view.¹¹

General elections for the 216 members Wolesi Jirga (House of the People) and the 84 members Mashrano Jirga (House of Elders) were held on a non-party basis from 26th

⁸ Dr. Sher Zaman Taizi., "A Political Analysis of the Sour Revolution", Published Ph. D dissertation, University of Peshawar, First ed., (Peshawar: The Frontier Post Publications, 1991) pp.40-44

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Kamal Matinuddin, Power Struggle in the Hindu Kush, Lahore Services Book Club, 1991, pp.25-35

August to 28 September 1965. Three general groups emerged as a result of the elections, the monarchist, the democrats, and the leftists. It may be pointed out that during the period from 1963 to 1966 demands for the separation of the royal family from politics, increase in individual and political freedom, creation of a free press and the formation of political parties were made. The political parties which existed at that time were, Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), Khudam-ul-Furqan, Jamiat-ul-Ulema Muhammadi, Ikhwan ul Muslimeen and its militant wing Jawanan-e-Muslimeen (Muslim Youth).¹²

The PDPA was a leftist party while others were Islamic. The Islamic parties were formed to combat communism. The ideological orientations and national programs of these parties ranged from Islamism to Marxism–Leninism. Despite parliamentary elections, the traditional Afghan power structure remained undamaged as all the powers were retained by the monarchy. Out of the 216 elected members, 146 were tribal leaders. The Ulema constituted the largest professional group.¹³ The feudal, bureaucrats, religious and tribal elites supported the monarchy because it was symbol of Afghan unity and also served their interests.

The PDPA had organized itself on 1st January 1965 and elected Nur Muhammad Taraki, and Babrak Karmal as General Secretary and first Secretary of the party respectively. The PDPA had several socialist groups having different ideological leanings but had merged into one group just to unify the revolutionary movement. As happens in the third world politics, differences between the leaders arose soon after they began enunciating their ideas of how they intended to achieve the objectives previously agreed upon. The PDPA split into Khalq (people) and Parcham (flag) in 1967. The Khalq faction led by Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin was more radical than parchamies. Khalqies wanted to bring about political, economic and social changes by throwing the prevalent system. The Parchamies, headed by Babrak Karmal, wanted a more gradual change keeping constitutional monarchy intact and making allowances for Afghan traditions and

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid. p.29

the glory. Since Babrak Karmal wished to retain the system in vogue, his faction was sarcastically dubbed as the royal communist party.¹⁴ Majority of Khalqi were Pushtun while Parchamies had a fair number of non-Pushtuns amongst them. The Khalqies were mostly from the lower middle class and were less educated. The Parchamies, on the other hand, were from the upper strata of society and more urbane. Both had supporters in the armed forces with Khalqi officers in the military outnumbering the Parchamies by 5 to 1.¹⁵ The ethnic and leadership factors played decisive role in both the groups. The Soviets continued to support both the Khalq and Parcham elements of the PDPA thus keeping their options open.

The approach of both the groups towards politics was different. Khalqi leaders preferred a mass organization approach with specific emphasis on class time and working people. The Parchamies considered that approach unrealistic in view of the absence of a large industrial proletariat class with an illiterate and extremely conservative peasantry. Nur Muhammad Taraki advocated class struggle and rejected cooperation with others while Babrak Karmal favored a coalition approach. There were other small socialist groups namely Shula-e-Javed and Sittam-e-Milli but they could not gain any popularity in Afghan society. Both the Khalq and Parcham groups began to strengthen themselves by recruiting additional members. For example, both the factions tried to find and enroll new members from the universities, schools and business class.

The Khalqies enrolled Pushtuns, while the Parchamies recruited the Tajiks. So the split, which was initially personality-oriented and based on differences in factions, slowly took on an ethnic complexion. Nur Muhammad Taraki wanted to take independent decisions whereas Babrak Karmal was more amenable to advice from Moscow as the Parcham was more pro-Soviet in orientation.¹⁶ To quote one example, Nur Muhammad Taraki refused to obey the directives from Moscow to support Sardar Daud's coup against Muhammad Zahir Shah but Babrak Karmal did so and thus earned the confidence of Moscow. Kremlin was not happy with the growing rivalry between the two factions of PDPA and

¹⁴ A Hayman, *Afghanistan under Soviet Revolution 1904-1981*, London, Macmillan, 1982, pp.24-40

¹⁵ Ibid.p.30

¹⁶ Ibid. p.38

continued to advice and persuade them to reconcile their differences. As a result, both the groups united themselves in July 1977 with the assistance of Indian and Iraqi Communist parties.¹⁷

Although both the groups of PDPA united, their factions in army remained divided. Khalq and Parcham's revolutionary strategy was expedient and well in line with Leninist tradition in using army disaffection in their wresting of power.¹⁸ The closed pattern of Afghan society did not allow both the factions to broaden the appeal of their message. The Afghans, being a tribal society, did not have sufficient potential for an immediate revolutionary change. So both the Khalqies and Parchamies knew that it was a difficult task to mobilize the masses in support of their ideology. This was the reason that they opted for an expedient political course in which the forging of comradeship with the officer corps of the armed forces appeared an attractive and easy alternative that is why it was not Saur Revolution but Saur Coup.

Sardar Daud, during his first tenure as premier, had seen the rise of leftist elements in his country. He was, however, wary of too close a relationship with Moscow. He favored neither Nur Muhammad Taraki nor Babrak Karmal and is reported to have said, "*We have no connection with any group.*"¹⁹ Since he overthrew the monarchy in 1973 with the help of some Parchamies, he did include more members from this faction of the PDPA in his revolutionary council (RC) and the cabinet than the Khalqi faction. This was disliked by Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, who continued to have a grudge against Sardar Daud. The major point of worry for Sardar Daud was the systematic penetration of the armed forces by the Soviet Union through the PDPA.

Sardar Daud was of the view that with the passage of time, he would be able to get rid of the Parchamies. He hoped to muster enough political support among the members of the Afghan oligarchy and educated elite to subvert the power of leftist elements. He very soon realized that the leftists were gradually planning to oust him. The first incident was

¹⁷ Lous Dupree, Afghanistan, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1980, p.193

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ H.S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, Durhan, Duke University Press, 1985, p.57

the mysterious death of Muhammad Hashim Maiwandwal, who was considered by the leftists a formidable political rival. The second incident was the uncovering of a conspiracy allegedly hatched by the leftist army officers in September 1975 to overthrow Sardar Daud's government. About forty officers were arrested for plotting against the republic. Sardar Daud did not execute any of the officers and simply dismissed them. He wanted to use this event to purge the Parchami members in the armed forces. He also removed a large number of Parchamies from the civil administration. He cited corruption and inefficiency as reasons for their transfers and dismissals.²⁰

In order to gain support of the Islamic and other groups so as to tilt the balance in his favor, Sardar Daud tried to revive links with the moderate and Islamic groups but did not succeed. His autocratic policies had frustrated the majority of masses and his promised democracy was never introduced. The 1977 constitution had concentrated all powers in the hands of the President. He replaced the bicameral legislature with a unicameral. The constitution did not give any power to the Milli Jirga (National Council) and allowed only the official political party i.e. the Hizb-e-Inqilab-e-Milli to function. The president did not allow any check and balance on his powers. He was empowered to dissolve the parliament, call new elections, appoint judges, declare an emergency, suspend civil rights and act as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. It was a one-man show. Sardar Daud's regime was also threatened by the economic difficulties and from uncertain political conditions. The increasing belligerency of the conservative political groups and intrigues of the leftists began to undermine his regime.²¹ He adopted repressive measures and did not initiate any step to reconcile with the opposition political groups. Because of staunch opposition at home and Soviet suspicion of him, he reoriented Afghanistan's foreign policy by emphasizing 'true non-alignment', 'genuine independence' and rapprochement with the neighbors.²² He changed his foreign policy in order to get more aid from Saudi Arabia and Iran to save the rapidly deteriorating economic conditions. He also hoped that this tilt would enable him to get more funding for agricultural and industrial projects, which would generate employment and economic activity. This, he

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Kamal Matinuddin, *Power Struggle in the Hindu Kush*, Lahore Services Book Club, 1991, pp.40-44

²² Ibid.

thought, would earn him political support and cooperation of the general population. Shah of Iran was instrumental in bringing Sardar Daud closer to Islamic countries. In an attempt to decrease Afghanistan's economic and military dependence on the Soviet, Sardar Daud strengthened economic links with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait and Pakistan. He began to send his army men for training to Iran and Egypt and also increased the number of trainees being sent to the United States. The increasing Iranian influence in Afghanistan was not liked by the Soviets. During his visit to Moscow in 1977, Sardar Daud felt Soviet displeasure over his obvious tilt towards the Islamic states of the region.²³ Sardar Daud was a nationalist leader. In one meeting, Brezhnev voiced his concern over the deployment of foreigners. Sardar Daud replied to Brezhnev. "We will never allow you to dictate to us how to run our country and whom to employ in Afghanistan. How and where we employ the foreign experts will remain the exclusive prerogative of the Afghan state. Afghanistan should remain poor if necessary, but free in its acts and decisions".²⁴

The above mention policies of Sardar Daud, moved closer two factions of PDPA i.e. Khalq and Parcham. They feared that Sardar Daud, with the support of Iran and by turning to the oligarchical elite, would ultimately destroy the leftist elements. After the unification of the two factions, the PDPA reactivated the party among the armed forces and disaffected sections of the educated middle class. The party made all efforts to attract as many number of army men as it could. The Soviet Union was disturbed by the shift in Sardar Daud's foreign policy and increasing influence of the Iranian intelligence agencies in Afghanistan. Sardar Daud's criticism of Soviet allies Cuba and Ethiopia for deviating from true non-alignment was also a point of Soviet irritation. This was an indication to Moscow that Sardar Daud was becoming more independent and hardly caring for Soviet advice, which he regarded as interference in the internal affairs of his country.²⁵ The Soviets did not wish that Afghanistan should join anti-Soviet camp.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ www.AfghanistanHistory.Com

²⁵ Kamal Matinuddin, *Power Struggle in the Hindu Kush*, Lahore, Services Book Club, 1991, pp.40-44

1.2 Sour Revolution

The Saur revolution was guided and supervised by the civilian leaders of the PDPA after having developed complete links with the armed forces. It was a common desire of the civilian Marxists and their collaborators in the armed forces to overthrow an oppressive oligarchical power structure. The PDPA had already planned to replace Sardar Daud but they were looking for an opportune moment to strike. The murder of Mir Ali Akbar Khyber was the first incident, which was utilized by the PDPA to convert masses against Sardar Daud. Sardar Daud's government arrested several leftist leaders in order to bring the situation under control. The army officers belonging to Khalqi faction of the PDPA proved instrumental in delaying Hafizullah Amin's arrest. The PDPA continued staging of protests through demonstrations chanting anti Sardar Daud slogans and demanding the release of detained leaders. On 27 April 1978, the PDPA was able to bring an end to Sardar Daud's rule through a successful coup by young officers of PDPA in the army. Sardar Daud, along with his family members and close advisers were all shot dead during the takeover.²⁶

The PDPA formed the National Revolutionary Council (NRC), which consisted of members from both the factions i.e. Parcham and Khalq. Nur Muhammad Taraki was elected as the President of NRC. The first thing done by the NRC was purging of Sardar Daud's sympathizers and appointing PDPA's loyalists on key positions. The PDPA had no experienced and skilled personnel, which proved disastrous in the implementation of revolutionary reforms and policies. The NRC put strong emphasis on revolution, nationalism, progress, democracy and respect for Islam.²⁷ This was done in order to attract mass support for the regime. Soon the party changed its stance and began to propagate Marxism-Leninism and attacked Islam and Afghan traditions.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid. p.49

Pakistan did not want confrontation with the regime of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan after it seized power in a coup. No doubt it was disappointed because Sardar Daud realizing that the Soviet embrace had turned into a bear-hub, he had decided to improve relations with Pakistan and other Islamic countries. But Pakistan was itself in disarray. The country's economy was bled white by the prolonged agitation against Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto following the 1977 elections, and General Zia-ul-Haq's military government was unpopular for reneging on his promise to hold elections within 90 days after Bhutto was toppled. Making the best of a bad situation, Zia Ul Haq went Kabul to meet President Nur Muhammad Taraki in the hope of securing mutual accommodation.

Just after having captured the power, the rift between Khalq and Parcham began to surface. As already mentioned, both the factions had ethnic cleavages, which did not allow them to remain united for long. Hafizullah Amin and his loyalists in the armed forces resented the appointment of Babrak Karmal as Deputy Prime Minister. Both the groups were not happy over power sharing. The Khalqies began to prosecute the Parchamies on the grounds of their alleged involvement in a conspiracy to capture power as a result of which the PDPA coalition fell apart.²⁸ Hafizullah Amin became Secretary General of the party and emerged as the most powerful man in the new political setup. After having ousted the Parchamies, the Khalqies began to pursue its radical reforms more aggressively. The khalqi faced many difficulties in implementing the reforms. The party was not able to make a complete and accurate analysis of the Afghan society and culture before introducing land and other reforms. These reforms invited resentment and provided an opportunity to the opposition to exploit. Similarly, social and educational reforms pertaining to the status of women could not be imposed on an unwilling population. The purges had weakened the state machinery. Some of the reforms included: Redistribution of land holding, Elimination of usury, Discontinuation of the bride price, Removal of illiteracy, especially amongst women.

The Afghan masses that did not like these reforms and repression resisted and supported the opposition. Although the opposition was not strong enough as it was divided into

²⁸ Ibid. p.50

various factions yet it succeeded in exploiting contradictions between the ideology of PDPA regime and the popular Afghan cultural norms. The regime miserably failed to seek the support of the masses. The factional strife within Khalq, alienation of the Parcham workers, the murder of Nur Muhammad Taraki by the order of Hafizullah Amin and the brutalities of Hafizullah Amin, all presented difficulties both for the narrow-based PDPA and the Soviet leaders who had tended to believe that the task of defending and stabilizing the leftist regime would be easy.²⁹

By eliminating Nur Muhammad Taraki from the scene, Hafizullah Amin earned the ill will of his Soviet mentors who were trying to patch up differences between the two rivals. The Soviet did not approve other actions of Hafizullah Amin, which were alienating the Afghans from the pro-Marxist PDPA. After becoming President of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin wanted to act independently. He refused to accept an invitation to visit Moscow, which was not liked by the Soviets. It was not very prudent of Hafizullah Amin to take up cudgels against his patrons. He had serious opposition at home because of his policies and armed resistance was gaining momentum. He was totally dependent on the Soviets for political, economic and military support. Almost all the economic projects were financed and operated by the Russians who had about 5,000 advisers in Afghanistan at that time.³⁰ Hafizullah Amin did not succumb to the pressure of the Soviet and began his one-man rule. He took initiatives to revive friendly ties with Pakistan. The element of despotism in Hafizullah Amin and his repressive policies toward his political opponents offended the Soviet Union. Mounting resistance against the misconceived radicalism of Khalqi workers paralyzed the administration in the country. Repression unleashed by the Marxists forced thousands of Afghan nationals to flee their country and seek refuge in neighboring Iran and Pakistan. The friction had alienated the leftists who had worked together for Saur revolution. Nur Muhammad Taraki's supporters and the disillusioned workers of leftist factions all turned hostile to Hafizullah Amin for not pursuing a united-front strategy. The shrinking ranks

²⁹ Ibid. p.58

³⁰ Kamal Matiuddin, *Power Struggle in the Hindu Kush*, Lahore Services Book Club Lahore, 1991, p.56

of army severely limited the capacity of Hafizullah Amin regime to calm widespread turmoil.

1.3 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

Hafizullah Amin had become totally weak by October 1979 and the question was who would replace him, the Mujahideen or the Soviets. The Mujahideen lacked proper organization, unity and acceptable leadership and did not present a real alternative to the fast-deteriorating Hafizullah Amin government. This forced Soviets to intervene. When Hafizullah Amin knew of Soviet plans of intervention, he made attempts to seek help from Pakistan. He had been trying since long to revive contacts with Pakistan and eliminate misunderstandings. These efforts on the part of Hafizullah Amin were desperate calls for help in influencing situation inside Afghanistan. Pakistan did agree but it was too late. The Soviet Union had calculated that if they did not intervene, Mujahideen would take over the reign of power. The Soviets had poured in \$ 1.5 billion in economic aid between 1954 to 1977.³¹ They did not want to waste this investment. The Russians could not allow Afghanistan to slip out of their grip. A pro-Marxist regime in Afghanistan was loosing its hold. It had to be propped up and Hafizullah Amin was not the one who could be trusted to do it. The counter revolutionaries had to be crushed and the Soviet soldiers had once again to perform their international duty. The Soviet forces entered Kabul in the last week of December 1979, killed Hafizullah Amin and installed Babrak Karmal in his place. The super power violating all international norms had ultimately invaded a small country where it was going to face tough resistance culminating into the damage of its international image.

A USSR official newspaper wrote:

“The Afghan Government ...made an insistent request to the Soviet Union for the provision of immediate aid and support in the struggle against outside intervention. The Soviet Union decided to satisfy this request and to send to Afghanistan a limited Soviet military contingent which will be used exclusively to help repel armed interference from

³¹ Ibid. p.58

*outside. The Soviet contingent will be completely withdrawn from Afghanistan when the factors that made this action necessary are no longer present.”*³²

The role of Soviet troops was clearly set out by a high-powered Committee prominent among whom were: Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and party official Vadim Zagladin. The Committee defined their task as:

*“Defending the revolutionary regime in the DRA (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan), defending the country from external threats, including sealing of the borders of the country together with the Afghan forces, ensuring the safety of the major centers and communications, and also building up the combat readiness of the Afghan arms forces”*³³

³² Pravda dated. Dec. 31, 1979.

³³ The objectives were outlined in a report submitted to the Politburo- the Supreme decision making body in former Soviet Union, on April 07, 1980

HERBLOCK'S CARTOON

"WE HAD TO GO INTO AFGHANISTAN TO PROTECT
OUR SOUTHERN BORDER. NOW, TO PROTECT
AFGHANISTAN'S BORDERS—"



Herblock's view of the Soviet invasion. "We had to go into Afghanistan to protect our Southern border. Now to protect Afghanistan's borders."³⁴

³⁴ Thomas T. Hammond, *Red Flag over Afghanistan*, Boulder, Colorado, West view Press, 1984, p.136

The Soviet invasion of 27th December 1979 on a defenseless country was shocking for the international community. The Soviet intervention provoked a deep sense of alarm in Pakistan. Suddenly the buffer disappeared, and had the Soviet rulers consolidated their control in Afghanistan, they would have used it as springboard for a leap down the Bolan and Khyber passes to fulfill the historical Czarist ambition for access to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea. Pakistan could not afford to acquiesce in the Soviet intervention. But it could afford confrontation with a superpower even less. The horns of the dilemma on which Pakistan found itself was internal weakness and international isolation. Bhutto's execution in April 1979 had polarized opinion in Pakistan as never before. Zia Ul Haq's decision to ignore appeals for clemency by foreign leaders and media antagonized almost the whole world. Relations with the United States, already strained by discriminatory American sanctions imposed in 1979 to penalize Pakistan for defying American law against uranium enrichment, nose-dived in November when a mob of youths infuriated by a false report broadcast by an unidentified radio station alleging US occupation of Holy Kaaba, attacked and sacked the American embassy in Islamabad, leaving four staff members dead.³⁵

China, another neighbor perceived the invasion of Afghanistan towards its encirclement by a rival Communist power. Islamabad decided on a middle course, avoiding confrontation but raising a low-pitched voice of concern and protest. Its statement, issued two days later, Pakistan criticized the intervention but without mentioning the Soviet Union. "The statement regarded the induction of foreign troops as a serious violation of the norms of peaceful coexistence and the principles of the UN Charter". Rather defensively, the statement explained Pakistan's gravest concern in the context of her links of Islam, geography and nonaligned policy with Afghanistan. The United States, which had earlier treated Afghanistan with neglect and ignored the rise of PDPA to power, suddenly woke up to the dangers implicit in the advance of the Soviet power to within striking distance of the Indian Ocean and even the Persian Gulf an area of vital strategic

³⁵ Kamal Matiuddin, *Power Struggle in the Hindu Kush*, Lahore Services Book Club Lahore, 1991, pp.³³⁻⁴⁴

and economic significance to the survival of Western Europe, the Far East, and ultimately the United States.³⁶

The arrival of more than 80,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan had totally changed the power equation in the region and altered the geo-strategic environment in South and Central Asia. Why did the Soviets invade Afghanistan? Different theories have been propounded to explain the reasons for the Soviet military involvement in the Afghan conflict. When Hafizullah Amin failed to come up to the expectations of the Soviets, it was concluded by them that the only option left was to move in to save the tottering left wing regime and that risks of the conflict escalating would be nominal. The time chosen by the Soviets was appropriate, as the USA had not yet overcome the Vietnam syndrome. Secondly, it was preoccupied with the hostage issue in Iran. The Iranian revolution was still shaky and Soviet did not feel any threat from this side, Pakistan too was not in stable condition.

Main objectives of Soviet intrusion into Afghanistan were as follow:

1. To support the stability of the Marxist regime that was under attack from Muslim rebels;³⁷
2. To act as the final stop in establishing a long term Russian goal to reach the Indian Ocean and to free herself from the bonds of being a “superpower in a landlocked state”;³⁸
3. To secure Soviet southern flanks in the wake of US attempts to disrupt/weaken its southern Muslim Republics (presently Central Asian Republics, CARS);³⁹
4. To protect/secure/ensure their range of influence in the region and to elevate her Communist regime against the attack of Afghan Mujahedeens (Muslim rebels,

³⁶ Daily Dawn, Karachi (Pakistan) January 21, 1980.

³⁷ <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~srmcgann/pol5.html>

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

- literally meaning “Strugglers”) and Pakistani based Afghan Tanzeemats (militant groups);⁴⁰
5. The failure of communist regime in Kabul and the threat of coming to power of Islamic groups (Ikhwan Ul Muslemeen) and the possible spread of Islam in Central Asian States.⁴¹
 6. The pro Moscow government that was put in place after the April 1978 coup was not able to combat Muslim uprising that had previously swept through Iran and would come to spread to the millions of Muslims in the Soviet Union;
 7. Superpowers Doctrines of Hegemony.⁴²

After an examination of all the possible reasons for the Soviet invasion, it seems fair to assume that the Soviet objectives were limited. They had sent their troops to Afghanistan to support a pro-Marxist regime in Kabul in order to prevent its fall to conservative Islamic groups and to replace its chief executive by a more pliable and acceptable individual. The Islamic revolution in Iran and the introduction of Islamization process in Pakistan were worrying the Communists that if Afghanistan goes under the control of so-called Islamic fundamentalists, there could be reawakening of religious feelings. Possibility of unrest in the Muslim republics along the Soviet-Afghan border was also their concern. They had to prevent a spillover of Islamic revivalism across the Oxus and hence the need for maintaining a pro-Marxist government in Afghanistan was necessary. Marshal D. Schulman believed that the purpose of the Soviet attack was to avoid the creation of a crescent of militant anti-Soviet nations on its southern border and not to gain access to the Arabian Sea.⁴³ There is much truth in this assessment as Moscow, along with several other Western nations, was watching Islamic resurgence with concern. Kremlin was not so much in search of warm water port or control over the Iranian oil fields but was mainly motivated by its determination to prevent the overthrow of Kabul Communist regime by Islamic radicals on the Iranian model. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan resulted in a worldwide condemnation of Moscow. The United Nations, in

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² The Making of US Policy (1973-1990) Online, available, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/afessayx.htm>

⁴³ Christian Science Monitor, 12 Feb 1980.

its General Assembly Session, almost one week after the invasion, condemned the Soviet Union. A great number of countries issued individual statements denouncing the invasion. The reaction of the Muslim world and the Western countries was especially strong. On the arrival of foreign troops on Afghan soil, the immediate reaction of Pakistan came in the following manner:

*“Pakistan regards the recent induction of foreign troops into Afghanistan as a serious violation of the norms of peaceful co-existence and the sacrosanct principles of sovereignty of states and non interference in their internal affairs as enshrined in the charter of United Nations and hope that foreign troops would withdraw from Afghan soil forthwith”.*⁴⁴

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan signified, to some extent, the resurgence of a new cold war between the two global powers. The United States perceived the Soviet intervention as a challenge to its interests.⁴⁵ Jimmy Carter, the American President, saw it as a serious threat to *“the stable, strategic and peaceful balance of the entire world”*.⁴⁶ The general feelings in the United States also suggested that the American inaction on Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan could send a dangerous signal to Moscow, encouraging it to go for more ventures. Therefore, the United States was left with no choice but to take “several steps”⁴⁷ to redress the situation.

⁴⁴ Foreign Office statement released on 29 Dec. 1979.

⁴⁵ Nayer Chadda, Super Power Rivalry in South West Asia: The Afghan Crisis 1979, India Quarterly, Vol. xxxvii, No. 4, October – December 1981, p.50

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ a) The Carter Administration ordered suspension of grain shipments to the Soviet Union; b) It boycotted the Moscow’s Olympic games; c) It refused to sell high technology and other strategic material to the Soviet Union; d) It supported the strong condemnation resolution passed by the UN General Assembly; e) It spelled out what came to be known as “Carter Doctrine”: any attempt at gaining control of the Persian Gulf would be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by use of any means, including military force; f) it strengthened US Defense capabilities in Southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean. It sought new military bases in Kenya, Somalia and Egypt. More attention was paid to Diego Garcia, US naval base in Indian Ocean. Pentagon moved to build the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), which is presently known as the Central Command. Though the idea of RDF had gained institutional acceptance after the discovery of Soviet brigade in Cuba in 1979, it was not until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that a firm commitment was undertaken to make the United States the preponderant naval power in Indian Ocean and to accelerate plans for the RDF; g) Washington sought to muster an effective regional response to the Soviet invasion. This included efforts to strengthen Pakistan’s ability and will to defend its self. It also supported the efforts India was making to seek Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The United Nations General Assembly, in a special session held in January 1980, tabled a resolution supported by 104 states, with 48 negative and abstentions, that called for an immediate withdrawal of (unnamed) ‘foreign troops’ from Afghanistan.⁴⁸

1.4 .1 Genesis of the Resistance

There is a general impression that the Afghan resistance movement “Jihad”⁴⁹ originated as a result of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. This impression reflects a superficial understanding of the resistance. The fact of the matter is that the birth of the resistance had taken place before April 27, 1978 when People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came into power. Explaining the origin of the resistance, Engineer Ahmad Shah writes “armed struggle of our people against Communist Russia did not begin on December 27, 1978, in fact our armed struggle started soon after Sardar Daud’s takeover in 1973.”⁵⁰ According to him, the coup of July 17, 1973 was “plotted” by the Soviets. He says, “This coup was carried out through a faithful and known puppet of Russia, Sardar Daud, in collaboration with communist-minded officers of Afghan army.”⁵¹

Engineer Ahamd Shah’s last claim is open to question. Abdul Samad Ghaus, former deputy foreign minister of Afghanistan under Sardar Daud has denied Soviet involvement in the 1973 coup in these words, “I am, however, convinced after years of association with Sardar Daud and his colleagues, that the coup of July, 1973 was definitely not a Russian initiative. It was an Afghan venture in pursuit of purely Afghan aims.”⁵² Eng Ahmad Shah’s charge seems to stem from the fact that Sardar Daud was a secular-minded, modernist opposed to the obscurantism of the clergy.

⁴⁸ Angelo Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan, A modern History*, London, I.B. Tauris, London, 2003, p.91

⁴⁹ Jihad is the effort of participating in the defense of the Muslim community or in its expansion.

⁵⁰ Engineer Ahmad Shah, *The Background to the Problem of Afghanistan*, Central Asia, Peshawar, Summer, 1981, p.88

⁵¹ *Ibid.* p.84

⁵² Abdul Samad Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan, An Insider’s Account*, Washington, Pergamon-Brassey’s 1988, p.107

Although it is true that the Soviets did not instigate the 1973 coup, however, the pro-Moscow Parcham faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan played an important role in bringing about this coup. In fact, a Parchamite, Major Faiz Muhammad Faiz, who was later appointed the interior minister, spearheaded the coup.⁵³ Many other Parchamies were also given important positions in the government. Babrak Karmal, leader of the Parcham, was offered the post of deputy Prime Minister that he declined.⁵⁴

Since 1969 the Parchamies had been involved in clashes with Islamic fundamentalists, so they had many old scores to settle. In this regard, the members of the Jawanan-e-Musalman were most vulnerable. Then in late 1973, the fundamentalists made things difficult for themselves by trying to create unrest in Darwaz, a small town in the north of Badakhshan.⁵⁵ This attempt fizzled out but it provided the government of Sardar Daud with an opportunity to launch a crack down on fundamentalists. Over 200 fundamentalists were arrested in June 1974, after their regular meetings in Kabul had been penetrated by the secret police.⁵⁶

Before this wave of arrests, some fifty fundamentalists had fled to Peshawar. Burhanuddin Rabbani and Gulbudin Hikmatyar led these exiles. Bhutto's government welcomed the Afghan fundamentalists and offered them help including facilities for military training. Between 1973 and 1977, Pakistan surreptitiously trained a large group of Afghan opponents of Sardar Daud.⁵⁷ The largely ignored phase of the resistance started at the time. Naseerullah Baber also confirmed fleeings of some of main leaders of Jihad in his interviews with the author. Here the question arises, why was the Bhutto government doing this? The answer is twofold, first to neutralize any pro-Pashtonistan intentions of Sardar Daud government, second, to bring Sardar Daud to heel on the question of the disputed Durand Line.⁵⁸ Pashtonistan had always been the focal point of Sardar Daud's politics. Sardar Daud had an emotional attachment with the Pashtonistan

⁵³ Raja Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, London , Verso 1988, p.70

⁵⁴ Ibid. p.75

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Anthony Hyma, *Afghanistan under Soviet Domination 1964-81*, London, Macmillan, 1982, p. 67

⁵⁷ Lawrence Lifschultz, *The not-so-new rebellion*, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 30, 1981, p.32

⁵⁸ Ibid

issue. For this reason his coup was viewed with deep anxiety by Pakistani decision-makers. Anticipating of a revival of the Pashtonistan issue, Pakistan drew up a “forward policy”⁵⁹ on Afghanistan. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto greeted Sardar Daud’s Republican revolution by establishing an Afghanistan cell. He himself was its head. It included Agha Shahi, General Nasirullah Baber, and chiefs of military and civilian intelligence agencies. This was also confirmed by General Nasirullah Baber and Col Imam when the author met them; A few civilian experts on Afghanistan also attended the meetings from time to time.⁶⁰

In this situation the arrival of Afghan exiles proved something of a strategic asset for the Bhutto government. As stated earlier, military training was imparted to these exiles in order to use them for pressuring Sardar Daud on the question of Durand Line. If he would not recognize the line as an international border, then Pakistan was ready to give clandestine help to a full-scale insurrection against his government.⁶¹ The time for action came on July 21, 1975, when an insurgency erupted, particularly in Panjshair Valley.

The insurgency, however, proved to be a disaster. It was ill planned and badly coordinated. The insurgents had predicated their operation on the hope that they would enjoy the support of local people in and around government centers and installations under attack. They were up for a big shock. In those places where attacks actually occurred, the people cooperated with the police rather than the insurgents. According to Louis Dupree, the Panjshair incident “shook the complacency of many in the (Kabul) power elite... (However) a general uprising did not take place for the people refused to believe the announcement by the insurgents that ‘Godless, Communist-dominated regime’ rule in Kabul.”⁶² It may be recalled that Sardar Daud’s honeymoon with Babrak Karmal did not last beyond six months.⁶³ Anyhow, the Panjshair insurgency was quickly suppressed. Of those captured, ninety-three were brought to trial, three were executed and

⁵⁹ Tahir Amin, *Afghan Resistance: Past, Present, and Future*, Asian Survey, April 1984, p.378

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Lawrence Lifschultz, *The not-so-new rebellion*, Far Eastern Economic Review, January 30, 1981, pp.32-38

sixteen exonerated, while other received varying prison terms.⁶⁴ Those who were not arrested fled back to Pakistan.

It was during this insurrection that Ahmad Shah Masood made his debut as a guerrilla fighter. It seems worthwhile to mention that his guerrilla activities started on a sore note. His attack in Panjshair failed largely because of the opposition of the local population, which was unprepared for an attack and unwilling to support it. Gulbudin Hikmatyar was one of the architects of this plan, but he did not participate in it.⁶⁵ Ahmad Shah Masood recalls the 1975 fiasco with bitterness. He claims to have been let down by the Pushtun supporters of Gulbudin Hikmatyar, who did not rise in their respective areas to coincide with Panjshair uprising.⁶⁶ Since then both of them have not been on the best of terms with each other.

After the 1975 debacle, Pakistan did not wash its hands of Afghanistan. At one stage in 1976, Pakistan contemplated the option of helping Zahir Shah return to power. A delegation of Afghan exiles, which included Gulbudin Hikmatyar and Yunus Khalis, was secretly sent to Rome to persuade Zahir Shah to come to Pakistan. According to Nasirullah Babar, “Zahir Shah agreed to come to Peshawar after visiting Egypt and Iran. But in the meantime the military took control of power in Pakistan.”⁶⁷

The Saur Revolution resulted in the reactivation of Afghan exiles in Peshawar. The Pakistan government also did its best in helping them. The Press Information Department arranged press conferences for their leaders at which they would raise the slogan: “Islam is in danger”.⁶⁸ During one such news conference in March 1979, Gulbudin Hikmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani and Nabi Muhammadi said that the Afghan Ulema and Mashaikhs had unanimously given the Fatwa (religious decree) of Jihad against Nur Muhammad Taraki’s un-Islamic and undemocratic government. They claimed that

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Interview of General Naseerullah Baber, with the author in Peshawar, May 28, 2005

⁶⁸ Raja Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, London, Verso 1988, pp.70-77

Taraki's government was limited to a few cities and most of the cities were under the control of Mujahidin.⁶⁹

The right-wing press in Pakistan gave these leaders a helping hand by launching a full-scale propaganda campaign against the Afghan government. *Zindagi* (a weekly newspaper from Karachi) in its issue of January 4, 1979, published what it called an eyewitness account of the war in Nooristan. The report was headlined, "War of Liberation Intensifies in Afghanistan". In April 1979, *Afrasiab* published a cover story in *Jang Urdu* news paper, "Taraki Drinks Liquor on the pages of the Quran."

Pakistan's help for the resistance was not limited to propaganda. In February 1979, 'The Economist' reported the existence of a training camp near Peshawar where 270 Afghans were undergoing weapons drill and instruction in guerrilla techniques. This was also confirmed by Col. Imam in an interview with the scholar. This camp was run by the Hizb-e-Islami. They also disclosed that another 2000 Afghans were undergoing similar training at some undisclosed place in Pakistan.⁷⁰

The early resistance against Nur Muhammad Taraki government was sporadic and indigenous in nature. It was built on tribal lines in the shape of armed insurgencies. Two factors were responsible for the tribal uprisings. First, the reform package of Nur Muhammad Taraki's government that envisaged restructuring the centuries old landholding system, reform in matrimonial affairs, and introducing modern secular education system. Second, major factor for the tribal uprising was the unwise tackling of the law and order situation and use of brutal force by the government.

The reform program of the new government, which started by the middle of July 1978, played an important part in swelling the ranks of the resistance. In April 1979, the *Newsweek* wrote that three major factors in the government's program turned into the basis of resistance. One, alienation of the wealthy by terminating or reducing agricultural

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

mortgages, Second, abolishment of dowries, and third, institution of a sketchy brand of land reform which angered landowners, many of whom were Muslim Mullahs. The magazine further wrote, “Another essentially laudable campaign aimed at reducing the nation’s 80 percent illiteracy rate annoyed Muslims who did not want their wives and daughters dragged out of their homes and sent to new reading centers.”⁷¹

However, the first rebellion against the government of Nur Muhammad Taraki had nothing to do with reforms. It began in June 1978 less than three months after the Saur Revolution.⁷² Arising in the Pech Valley of Kunar province, it involved members of the Safi tribe (one of the tribe of Pushtuns) and neighboring Nooristanis. The outbreak of violence took place at a time when the policy direction of the new regime was unclear. Therefore, it cannot be contended that the uprising was motivated by the anti-Marxist/Pro-Islamic sentiment.

In the case of Pech Valley, the reasons for the uprising concerned local problems and personalities rather than national ones. According to Pech residents, the uprising was caused by the repression of one area official. A man who was appointed Wuleswal (local administrator) got involved in an argument with distant relatives. Taking advantage of his authority, the Wuleswal (head of district) arrested his rivals and tried to transport them to the government center at Chaghasarai (center of Kunar province). The jeep convoy in which the prisoners were traveling was attacked and an officer and soldier accompanying the prisoners were killed. In retaliation, the official expressed his intention to bring in troops to Raza Ninglam, the village from which the attack was launched. It led the residents to flee towards the more secure mountains of Nooristan.⁷³ Four months after the Pech incident, the government centers at Kamdesh and Bargematal in the Bashgal Valley of Nooristan were attacked and seized. Throughout the following winter, the unrest

⁷¹ Loren Jenkins, ‘Afghan Uprisings’, Newsweek, April 16, 1979, p.18

⁷² David Busby Edwards, “Origins of the Anti-Soviet Jihad”, in Grant M. Farr and John. G. Merriam, (eds), *Afghan Resistance, the Politics of Survival*, Lahore: Vanguard, 1988, p.32

⁷³ Ibid.

spread, and by the spring of 1979, most of the Nooristan and Pech Valleys were without any governmental presence.⁷⁴

Insurrections broke out sporadically in other areas of Afghanistan between the autumn of 1978 and the spring of 1979. The most serious of these was the Herat uprising of March 1979. On March 19, thirty Soviet advisers and their families were hacked to pieces and taken round the city impaled on pikes. The entire city exploded into rebellion. The literacy campaign provided the spark. The Afghan soldiers refused to fight and for four days the city remained under the sway of rebels. The Soviets brought their own men to restore the government control. Almost 10,000 people were killed or wounded in the operation.⁷⁵

When in the summer of 1979, insurrection broke out among the Zadran tribe, the reason once again was local. The first uprising in Paktia occurred because of the behavior of a government official named Roshan, who had been appointed Saranwal (prosecution attorney) in Khost. He reportedly put an old family rival in jail and forced other family members of the jailed person to flee their houses.⁷⁶ However, serious resistance in Paktia began only after the promulgation of female literacy program. Almost every provision of the decree, along with the other decrees provoked a universal hostility from the people of Paktia.⁷⁷

The government officials placed restriction on the amount of 'bride-price' and announced that on weddings food should be prepared only for about thirty people, whereas it was common for several hundred guests to attend a wedding. Individuals (male and female) were allowed to choose their spouses, and women were granted the right to divorce. These measures instantly incurred the wrath of hitherto inactive tribes. What the government actually planned to do mattered less than what it was perceived as doing. Propaganda rapidly spread that the government was about to abolish polygamy and to

⁷⁴ Ibid. p.33

⁷⁵ Raja Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, London , Verso 1988, pp.34-49

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid

make all old men who were wedded to younger women divorce their wives and give them to younger unmarried men. Propaganda also had it that Khalqies were going door to door forcing women and girls to come to classes where they sat unveiled and were taught by young Khalqi teachers. It is clear that uprising in Afghanistan was before Soviet invasion and the people did not welcome the Communist regime as they were against it.

1.4.2 Ideology of the Resistance Group

The term “Ideology” has many meanings and definitions. A French philosopher Destutt De Tracy coined it in 1796. He used it to denote a “*science of ideas*” that was to be based, not on the discredited principles of faith and authority linked to the church and the monarchical state, but on knowledge gained from the human senses. The science of ideas was a science with a mission; it aimed at serving men, even saving them, by ridding their minds of prejudice and preparing them for the sovereignty of reasons.⁷⁸

Since then the meaning of this term has undergone considerable changes. And in this process it has also acquired certain pejorative connotations. In contemporary political discourse, ideology is frequently contrasted unfavorably with pragmatism. Arthur Schlesinger has gone to the extent of saying, “*Ideology is the curse of public affairs because it converts politics into a branch of theology and sacrifices human beings on the altar of dogma*”.⁷⁹

Despite such criticisms, the term remains indispensable for any political discourse. It has also retained some positive shades of meaning. Here it has been used to mean a “*set of ideas, prejudices, beliefs, and doctrines of an individual, group, class, or movement*” This is how The New Bantam English Dictionary has defined the term.

Every guerilla war movement has an ideological foundation besides certain social bases. The ideology of a guerilla movement provides spiritual guidance to its members and it

⁷⁸ “Ideology”, The New Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol-20, 1986, p.828

⁷⁹ George F. Kennan, In the American Mirror, The New York Review of Books, November 6, 1986, p.3

psychologically keeps intact the integrity of the movement, while the social understructure provide physical substance to a movement and define the level of attachment of the guerrillas to their homeland for which they fight and sacrifice themselves. In the course of action, ideology explains the goals and objectives, while the social setting defines the tools with the help of which a guerrilla movement operates and achieves its ends. In the case of Afghan resistance, the ideology of the movement was invariably the factor of religion. While the social base or the networks of this movement rested mainly on three components i.e. Tribal, Sufi and Mullah.

Now, we come to the question, what was the ideology of the Afghan resistance group? The simple and ready answer is, “Islam”. This is what almost all the resistance leaders claimed. Their proclaimed objective was the establishment of an Islamic order in Afghanistan. However, there were some people who took these declarations with a pinch of salt. Robert Reck, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, is one of them. On January 14, 1986 he was asked what would happen if the Afghans tried to create an Islamic state, similar to Iran, after the Soviets have withdrawn. “*Afghans have traditionally been moderate in terms of their religious beliefs*”, Peck said. He noted that the Afghan resistance groups have tended to use Islam “*as a rallying cry*” to unify themselves against the Soviets. “Once the Soviets leave Afghanistan, our expectation is that Afghans will sort out their political future and the traditional moderation of Afghans, where religion is concerned, is likely to reassert itself. The Economist quoted Peck. Saying: “*Islam provides a rallying cry against the intruders, but the real issue was local autonomy*”.⁸⁰

Despite this skepticism, it is indeed striking that nearly all the resistance parties and groups have been using religious symbols in their names and rhetoric. In fact, the resistance leaders portrayed the conflict in Afghanistan as a “*war between Kufr and Islam*”.⁸¹ This portrayal was not much different even before the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. In June 1979, Asia Week reported the circulation of pamphlets along

⁸⁰ The Economist (London), October 1, 1988, p.31

⁸¹ Sibghatullah Mujaddadis, interview, published in the daily Nawa-i-Waqat (Rawalpindi), May 25, 1984.

the frontier regions of Afghanistan, with Mullahs names attached, proclaiming the killing of one Khalqi equal to offering 80,000 prayers.⁸² This is how political battles are fought in many third world countries.

It is also to be borne in mind that no religion can remain free from local influences. The accretions Islam has acquired in Afghanistan are quite heavy. According to Louis Dupree, "The Islam practiced in Afghan villages, nomad camps, and most urban areas would be almost unrecognizable to a sophisticated Muslim scholar".⁸³ Olivier Roy's observation is not much different. He says that in Afghanistan customs and superstitions, often of pre-Islamic origin, exist everywhere.⁸⁴ It is no wonder that in his 1973 treatise, Prof. Qamaruddin Khan described Afghanistan as one of the last vestiges of medievalism.⁸⁵

These observations reveal how the Afghan attitude towards life is more tribal than Islamic. About Pushtunwali⁸⁶ (the tribal code), an Afghan says: "It is stronger force in our lives than the Quran". The tribal code commends badal (vengeance), but the Sharia attempts to limit it. So strong are cultural influences that even a man like Gulbudin Hikmatyar has been unable to get rid of them. In 1979, before the Soviet intervention, he displayed his attachment to badal in the following words, "we have had so many killed that if we kill one for one, as we intend to do, we will run out of Russians and Khalqies before the debt is repaid".⁸⁷

As a result of tribal influences, Afghans retain many primitive attitudes, but still these attitudes were portrayed as Islamic. Saif-ud-Din Nusratyar⁸⁸ was right when he said that

⁸² Anthony Hyman, *Afghanistan under Soviet Domination, 1964-81*, London, Macmillan, 1982, pp.124-44

⁸³ Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980, p.104

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Qamaruddin Khan, *Political Concepts in the Quran*, Karachi, Institute of Islamic Studies, 1973, p.60

⁸⁶ The Pushtunwali embodies the ideal Pushtun behavior. It is a body of common law, which has evolved its own sanctions and institutions. On the level of law, the Pushtunwali and the Sharia are often in opposition. For example, the Sharia stipulates four witnesses to prove the charge of adultery. But for the Pashtunwali, paghoar (hearsay) is sufficient

⁸⁷ Quoted in *Newsweek*, June 11, 1979, p.10

⁸⁸ Nusratyar represented the Jawanan-i-Musalman in the students council of the Kabul University.

the “present (Afghan) culture has no links to the true Islamic culture”.⁸⁹ But many people continue to regard Afghan culture as Islamic. However, there is no denying the fact that the Afghan Mullahs are more conservative than their counterparts in other countries. And Afghan history bears testimony to this. The Mullahs played an important role in overthrowing the government of a reform-minded Afghan ruler Amanullah in 1929. In the wake of Amanullah’s ousting, the Mullahs emerged with greater self-confidence than ever. As a result of their pressure, education of girls was abandoned and modern education was severely curtailed.⁹⁰ In 1959 when the anti-government riots broke out in the Kandahar region, the girl’s school along with government offices and the local cinema became targets of attack.⁹¹ In 1970, the Afghan government encouraged the Mullahs to protest against the publication of a poem praising Lenin in the left-wing magazine Parcham. The protesters not only demanded action against the above-mentioned journal but also the abolition of education for women.⁹² In 1979, many schools were destroyed in Panjshair on the plea that they were the tools of atheistic propaganda.⁹³ According to an educated Afghan, the Mullah opposes modern education because he thinks it leads the man astray.⁹⁴ It is no coincidence that most of the Mujahidin are uneducated, and one resistance leader accepts the fact that educated people have not shown much enthusiasm for Jihad. In his words, “our Jihad had proved that educated people are not useful for Jihad”.⁹⁵

The resistance groups were generally, divided into two categories “fundamentalists” and “moderates”. Fundamentalists formed the backbone of the resistance. They called themselves Islamic revolutionaries. Fundamentalism has become an important term in contemporary political discourse. The roots of fundamentalism are found in the American history but now the term has come to be identified with Islam, rather than Christianity.

⁸⁹ Ashraf Ghani., *Afghanistan: Islam and Counterrevolutionary Movements*, in John L. Esposito, (Ed), *Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics and Society*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp.⁹⁰⁻⁹¹.

⁹⁰ William Maley, [ed], *Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban*, Lahore, Vanguard, 1998, p.126.

⁹¹ Ibid, p.128

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Rahimullah Yusufzai, *Resistance in Afghanistan: The Panjshair Model*, Regional Studies (Islamabad), Summer 1985, p.98

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai, interview, published in weekly Nidaa (Lahore), May 31, 1988, p.29

According to Radek Sikorski, fundamentalism is “the desire to return to the pure faith of early Islam, to get back to the scriptures and brush aside the obscurities and accretions of tradition”.⁹⁶ The US ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley, while expressing his views on fundamentalism said: It is used for anything which is disliked. In the case of Mujahidin there is no such thing”.⁹⁷ He further said, “Actually there is no such thing as fundamentalism in Islam, nor the type of dogma as understood by the West. Islam is an evolutionary process, dynamic and creative, and such expression as fundamentalism are coined only to create aversion to the valiant freedom fighters in Afghanistan”.⁹⁸ In sharp contrast to Oakley, Syed Ahmad Gilani says, “The term fundamentalist is not a proper one, because every Muslim is a fundamentalist”.⁹⁹ He feels that “extremist” is the appropriate term in this context. Anyhow, there are four main fundamentalist parties, Hizb-e-Islami (Hikmatyar),¹⁰⁰ Hizb-e-Islami (Khalis),¹⁰¹ Jamiat-e-Islami (Rabbani),¹⁰² and Ittehad-e-Islami.¹⁰³

These parties claim descent from the fundamentalist (or Islamic) movement, which was launched in the late 1950s by the Quranic scholars of Kabul.¹⁰⁴ These scholars had received their education within the official system and not in private Madrassas and they completed their studies at Al-Azhar University in Egypt. They were deeply influenced by the Egyptian Brotherhood. The most notable of them was Dr. Ghulam Muhammad Niazi,

⁹⁶ Radek Sikorski, *Moscow's Afghan War*, London, Alliance Publishers, 1987, p.32

⁹⁷ *The Pakistan Times*, Islamabad, September 1, 1988.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ *The Muslim*, July 1, 1988.

¹⁰⁰ Headed by Engineer Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, it received support from the Ghilzai and smaller Pushtun tribes. Hezb Islami was the most severe opponent of Rabbani Government; Hezb Islami was driven out from the battle field by the Taliban in 1996.

¹⁰¹ Headed by Moulavi Yunis Khalis, it was smaller, more localized and more moderate than Gulbudin Hekmatyar faction. Its support came primarily from the Eastern Afghanistan.

¹⁰² Headed by Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani. Unlike other resistance parties, jamiat was composed of northern minorities and had the most famous commanders, Ahmad Shah Masood of Panjshir valley and Ismail Khan of Herat. Rabbani became acting president of Afghanistan in the summer of 1992 following the fall of Najibullah and the short stint in office of Sibghatullah Mojaddidi, and thereafter, he refused to give up the position. Jamiat fought against the mujahideen groups over the control of Kabul from 1992 to 1995, and being driven into the northeastern Afghanistan in 1996, it had fought under various captions labels (such as Northern Alliance, United Front) against the Taliban.

¹⁰³ Headed by Abdur Rasool Sayyaf and relied heavily on Saudi sources of funding. After the fall of Najibullah government, Ittehad fought against the Shia Hezb-i-Wahdat but joined the Northern Alliance against the Taliban following their take over of Kabul in 1996.

¹⁰⁴ Radek Sikorski, *Moscow's Afghan War*, London, Alliance Publishers, 1987, pp.32-44

who, later on, became Dean of the Faculty of Shariat at Kabul University. The group that these scholars formed had a limited influence as its activities were largely confined to intellectual discourses. The group was called Jamiat-e-Islami, but it was also known as Tahrik-e-Islami. The group introduced translations of the works of foreign fundamentalists, such as Syed Qutb and Abul Ala Maududi.¹⁰⁵

The group, however, did succeed in influencing a good number of students and in 1965, fundamentalist students were able to demonstrate openly and distribute a leaflet “Shabnama-e-Jihad” (The night-letter of Jihad).¹⁰⁶ In 1968, Minhajud-in Gahiz, an intellectual supporter of the movement founded a weekly magazine ‘Gahiz’ and the same year a student Abdur Rahim Niazi established Jawanan-i-Musalman.¹⁰⁷ Other important members of the Jawanan were Engineer Habib-ur-Rahman, Dr. Muhammad Umar, Ghulam Rabbani Atesh, and Gulbudin Hikmatyar. The members of this organization had a militant approach. They were known to throw acid at unveiled women.¹⁰⁸ They were also involved in violent fights with leftist students in the Kabul University. In 1970 the Jawanan claimed responsibility for the murder of a leftist student leader, Saidal Sukhandan that landed Gulbudin Hikmatyar in jail.¹⁰⁹ In 1972, the organization was renamed Jamiat-e-Islami and the formation of a shura was announced. The shura consisted of the president (Burhanuddin Rabbani), vice president (Abdul Rasul Sayyaf), secretary general (Engineer Habib-ur-Rahman), and a few others.¹¹⁰

Although the Afghan fundamentalist drew their inspiration from the Egyptian Brotherhood, efforts were made by Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami to establish organizational links with them. In 1966, Maulana Maududi assigned this task to Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the third Amir of the jamaat-e-Islami. Between 1970 and 1974, he visited Afghanistan

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. p.70

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. p.71

¹⁰⁷ Niazi who belonged to Maimna (Faryab province), died of blood cancer during the summer of 1970 in Delhi. Muhammad Zaman Muzammil in his book, Reasons of Russian Occupation a Dimensions of Resistance in Afghanistan, Peshawar, Hizb-i-Islami, 1981, has described him as the founder of Hizb-e-Islami. The book shows him wearing a suit and necktie.

¹⁰⁸ Vladimir Efros, Afghanistan: US Terrorism in Action, Moscow, Novosti, 1984, p.67

¹⁰⁹ Sheen Ze (pseudo), “Political Drive by Afghanis-III” The Frontier Post, November 26, 1988

¹¹⁰ Roy, Op.Cit, p.73

many times and met the fundamentalist leaders such as Engineer Habib-ur-Rahman, Abdur Rahim Niazi and Gulbudin Hikmatyar. During one of his visits, a secret meeting took place in Paghman province in the house of Ghulam Rabbani. The present leaders of Jamiat-e-Islami, Ittehad-e-Islami and Hizb-e-Islami attended this meeting, among others. In the course of this meeting it was decided that Afghanistan's Islamic movement would be organized on the pattern of Jamaat-e-Islami. The charter of the movement was to be drawn along the lines of Jamaat's manifesto. The Jamaat even claims that the credit of firing the first bullet in the Afghan Jihad goes to Qazi Hussain Ahmad.¹¹¹

The other category of resistance parties embraces mahazi-Milli-e-Islami,¹¹² Jabha-i-Nijati-Milli,¹¹³ and Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami.¹¹⁴ These parties are classified as 'moderate'. They represent the old elite. Syed Ahmad Gilani, leader of Mahaz-i-Milli-i-Islami, for example, was a friend and adviser of Zahir Shah. Nabi Muhammadi, who leads the Harkat, was a member of the parliament from 1969 to 1973. These parties also declare that they want Islamic order in Afghanistan but their approach is not radical or rigid. One scholar has even opined, "They would be satisfied if pre-1978 Afghan political institutions are restored".¹¹⁵ He further said, "they desire a role for the former King (who was in Italy) and probably would be satisfied with a government headed by him".¹¹⁶ They, like the fundamentalists, are in favor of a multi-party system but oppose the idea of permitting the leftists to form a legal party.

By way of conclusion, it can be said that beyond the slogan of Islam, the resistance groups do not possess much in terms of a coherent political ideology. Indeed, most of the resistance parties claim that they have adopted Islam as a political ideology. Here the

¹¹¹ Interview with Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Aamir Jamaat Islami Pakistan, Nowshera, July 28, 2005.

¹¹² Headed by Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani. He drew on his traditional family and Qadiriyya Sufi linkages to create this rather small party. It played no combat role in Afghanistan.

¹¹³ One of the seven major mujahideen parties based in Peshawar during the 1980s, also one of the three "moderate" parties, was headed by Professor Sibghatullah Mojaddidi. He drew on his traditional family and Naqshbandiyya Sufi linkages to create this rather small party. It plays no combat role in Afghanistan today.

¹¹⁴ A Pushtun dominated party founded by Muhammadi Nabi Muhammadi in 1978. It also included a sizeable number of Uzbeks. It advocated free elections, agricultural reforms and a policy of non-alignment.

¹¹⁵ Zalmay Khalilzad, *Moscow's Afghan War, Problems of Communism*, January-February 1986, p.11

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

question arises, if these parties have the same ideology why do they maintain their separate identities? It is clear that Islam means different things to different people. And indeed there is no agreement among Muslim scholars about the details of the Islamic political system. There is hardly any issue on which conflicting opinions do not exist. In the case of Afghanistan, this problem is further compounded by the fact that it has a substantial Shiaa minority, which follows the Jafri Fiqh. The seven-party alliance wanted to enforce the Hanafi Fiqh, which is substantially different from the Jafri Fiqh.

1.4.3 Unity and Disunity of the Resistance

The Afghan resistance was not a unified movement. The plethora of resistance parties and groups, in fact, a microcosm of Afghan society, which consisted of twenty-two ethnic entities speaking more than thirty different languages.¹¹⁷ At one time, the resistance was divided into more than a hundred parties and groups.¹¹⁸ Then their number was considerably reduced. Still there were about two dozen resistance parties and groups in existence. Foreign pressure and inducement played an important role in bringing about this reduction. In the words of Olivier Roy: “On the diplomatic level, an Arafat was needed, or at least a PLO. The Western powers, therefore, sought to impose an alliance even though an artificial one, using a recurring blackmail. If you want to receive aid, you must unite first”.¹¹⁹

There was also internal pressure for unity. In 1980, a Jirga of Afghan Ulema threatened the resistance leaders, “if you do not unite, we will declare Jihad against you”.¹²⁰ The same year Pakistan announced that it recognized only six groups and the rest of them were asked to stop their activities by September 15.¹²¹ Despite internal and external pressures the resistance had failed to forge real unity in its ranks. The resistance parties remained deeply divided along ethnic, sectarian, ideological and personal lines.

¹¹⁷ Fredrik Barth, ‘Cultural Wellsprings of Resistance in Afghanistan, in Rosanne Klass (Ed), Afghanistan, The Great Game Revisited, New York, Freedom House, 1987, p.189

¹¹⁸ Waris Mir, ‘Mujahidin ka Haftgana Ittehad, Naw-i-Waqt (Lahore), July 28, 1984.

¹¹⁹ Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, p.122

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

Furthermore, the resistance had been suffering from factionalism. Except for Jamiat-e-Islami (Professor Rabbani), every (major) party had a breakaway faction.¹²²

The fact of the matter is that disunity had been the biggest problem plaguing the Afghan resistance. This problem was not limited to squabbling among Peshawar-based leaders. It extended to fronts inside Afghanistan where thousands of partisans had lost their lives in internecine fighting. The first major internecine clash occurred in December 1978, a year before Soviet intervention. In this clash Hikmatyar's men killed ten members of Jamiat-e-Islami in Parachinar.¹²³ In August 1979, the Afghan army garrison at Asmar in the Kunar Valley under Col. Abdur Rauf defected to the resistance. Hizb-e-Islami representatives immediately demanded that Rauf join their organization and fight under their banner. Rauf refused saying that he was not yet prepared to join a specific political organization before acquainting himself with all groups. Rauf and his men suddenly found themselves under attack from armed Hizb units.

In July 1981, a Dutch journalist visiting resistance forces in the Kabul region reported that the Afghans were engaged in two civil wars simultaneously: one against the Soviets and the DRA, and the other among themselves.¹²⁴ The resistance party most often cited as the initiator of these clashes was Gulbudin Hikmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami. In November 1983, Olivier Roy after visiting Afghanistan wrote, "About half the Hizb-e-Islami (Hikmatyar) commanders were responsible for 90 percent of the clashes within the resistance."¹²⁵ Roy, Apart from one Afghan involved in cross-border relief work is quoted to have said: "In almost every case, internal conflicts started with Hizb."¹²⁶

The charges against Gulbudin Hikmatyar received a new boost in 1982. In September of that year a written order of Gulbudin Hikmatyar got into the hands of his rivals. The "order" instructed his commanders to harass rival groups, to take their weapons and

¹²² A.R. Siddiqi, 'Afghan resistance reviewed', Dawn (Karachi), January 7, 1985.

¹²³ Lawrence Lifschutz, 'External resistance, internal conflicts', Far Eastern Economic Review, January 23, 1981, p.25

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ J. Bruch Amstutz, Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation, Washington, National Defense University Press, 1986, p.121

¹²⁶ Ibid. p.122

stocks of food wherever possible, to drive them from key areas and to encourage other guerrilla units to take first place in the firing line to keep Hizb losses to a minimum.¹²⁷ Gulbudin Hikmatyar said it was a fake and just part of propaganda war that “western imperialism” had been waging against him because of his Islamic zeal.¹²⁸ However, other resistance leaders took this explanation with a pinch of salt. Even three leaders who were participating in the then five-party alliance along with Gulbudin Hikmatyar did not hesitate to display copies of the “order” to Western reporters.¹²⁹

Jere Van Dyk who had heard a great deal about internecine fighting asked Gulbudin Hikmatyar: “Are you fighting a war on two fronts: one against the invader from the North and one against those who do not want a pure Islamic state in Afghanistan?” “Yes”, replied Hikmatyar. “We are fighting the Communists and we fight all vestiges of colonialism in our country. We will stop only when a pure Islamic state is established”. Dyk then asked: “Wouldn’t it be better to put differences aside for the moment, like Mao and Chiang Kai-shek, who got united to fight the Japanese, unite to drive out the Communists, then settle your own battles for the sake of Afghanistan”. “Mao was weak”, said Hikmatyar, “and Chiang Kai-shek was corrupt”. Neither man had God. We shall win because we do”.¹³⁰

Eduard Lagourgue, a French aid worker who, in early 1988 undertook a six-week trip to the Bamiyan district in Central Afghanistan, reported that he passed through forty-five checkpoints manned by the guerrillas of fifteen different groups. His escorts, who were attached to an ammunition supply train of the Jamiat, had to pay a total of million Afghanis (\$65,000) in tolls. Along the way, he saw fierce fighting between Jamiat-e-Islami and Hizb-e-Islami, but no fighting against the Soviets. “The only party fighting the

¹²⁷ George Arney, ‘The heroes with tarnished haloes’, *The Guardian Weekly* January 17, 1988, p.10

¹²⁸ John Fullerton, *The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan*, Hong Kong, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 1983, p.71

¹²⁹ ‘Russia in Afghanistan’, *The Economist*, January 9, 1983, p.43

¹³⁰ John Fullerton, *op.cit*

Soviets was the Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami”, he said. “The others were all fighting each other”.¹³¹

Commander Ahmad Shah Masood in one of his interviews about cease fire with Russian troops in early 80’s said that “*Hizb-e-Islami men are like cancer that is why one has to treat the cancer first*”, that is why after cease fire with Russians he fought with Hizb-e-Islami and disarmed Gulbudin Hekmatyar men in Panjshair Valley, and broadened his offensive against Hizb-e-Islami in other parts of Afghanistan. One of the main aims of forming Shora-e-Nizar was to unite military commanders in the field and fight against Russians as well against his opponents. Through Shora-e-Nizar, Ahmad Shah Masood tried to pressurize Burhanuddin Rabbani, the head of Jamiate-e-Islami.

The issue of Muhammad Zahir Shah (and of Loya Jirga) had also been a source of disunity for the resistance. Zahir Shah who ruled Afghanistan from 1933 to 1973, enjoyed considerable popularity among the Afghan refugees. A survey conducted by the Afghan Information Center in 1987 revealed that seventy-two percent of Afghan refugees questioned in their camps said they favored Zahir Shah as the national leader. The alliance leaders collectively received a favorable rating of only two percent.¹³² In November 1988, refugees near Quetta refused to listen to Gulbudin Hikmatyar when he started criticizing Zahir Shah. Gulbudin Hikmatyar told a journalist in 1987 that not even a single Afghan is with Zahir Shah. The idea of bringing him back is the conspiracy of big powers and we will foil it. He declared, if “Zahir Shah comes to Kabul, we shall fight him the way we have been fighting Sardar Daud, Nur Muhammad Taraki, Hafizullah Amin, Babrak Karmal and Najibullah. For us there is no difference between Najibullah and Zahir Shah”.¹³³

In January 1988, Maulavi Yunus Khalis said that the “stunt” of Zahir Shah was raised by the enemies of Islam to weaken the resistance against the Communists in Afghanistan. He

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Lawrence Lifschultz, ‘More discord than accord’, Far Eastern Economic Review, November 19, 1987, p.45

claimed that the ex-king was unacceptable to the Muslims as it would be a betrayal of the fifteen-lakh martyrs who have sacrificed their lives to establish an Islamic society rather than return to the old system.¹³⁴ Maulavi Sarfaraz Ahmad, deputy supreme commander of the Hizb said that Zahir Shah would be tried in an Islamic revolutionary court for having committed treason against Islam and the country. He further said that Zahir Shah promoted Russian influence in Afghanistan and that the punishment for this crime is death.¹³⁵ Such tough pronouncements could not eliminate pro-Zahir Shah sentiments among the Afghan refugees. On the contrary, it had been on the rise, largely because of bickering among Peshawar-based leaders. Even in the seven-party alliance, Zahir Shah had many supporters. In July 1987, two leaders of the alliance Mujaddadi and Nabi Muhammadi said the best course would be the establishment of an interim coalition government under Zahir Shah. Syed Ahmad Gilani supported them in their declaration.¹³⁶ Although some resistance leaders were demanding the head of Zahir Shah, the Imam of Kaaba, Abdullah Bin Subayyal is known to have visited Peshawar in an effort to obtain the support of fundamentalists for Zahir Shah.¹³⁷ Of those fundamentalist leaders like Prof Burhanuddin Rabbani, Professor Sayyaf, head of Ittehad Islami at time of resistance were against Zahir Shah's role in Afghanistan but they changed their mind later on.

It is for these infightings and differences that the idea of real unity had eluded the Afghan resistance. Afghanistan witnessed the making and breaking of many alliances. Coalitions were formed to collapse and re-emerge in slightly different shapes. The reason was that all groups paid lip service to the concept of unity, but few were willing to sacrifice their independence or aspirations to overall supremacy. The first alliance was established in early June 1978 by Burhanuddin Rabbani. It was called the National Rescue Front and it claimed to represent eight right-wing groups and to have the support of 100 of the 374 members of Sardar Daud's last parliament. However, the alliance proved extraordinarily short-lived. It collapsed within six weeks.¹³⁸

¹³⁴ The daily, Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore, December 27, 1987.

¹³⁵ The Muslim, Islamabad, January 10, 1988.

¹³⁶ Jang, Lahore, November 24, 1987.

¹³⁷ Lifschultz, Op.cit, p.44

¹³⁸ Mushahid Hussain, 'The refugee factor', The Muslim, December 4, 1984.

Soon after the demise of the National Rescue Front, the Peshawar-based leaders were pressurized to make another effort at unification. Prominent Afghans in exile, along with foreign groups and governments prepared to support the resistance, all urged unification. So a second merger attempt was made in September 1978. Hikmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami and Rabbani's Jamiat-e-Islami formed a united front, which was named as Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami. Initially Maulavi Sakhi Dad Faiz of Jamiat-e-Islami headed the front. Gulbudin Hikmatyar was not satisfied with Sakhi Dad's ascendancy and insisted that a third man should lead the alliance. So Nabi Muhammadi replaced Maulavi Sakhi Dad on September 27, 1978.¹³⁹ The catalyst was a reported Arab offer of \$2 million in aid.¹⁴⁰ The second alliance proved more durable than the first; it lasted three months.¹⁴¹ Intense rivalry among the leaders and the expectation that foreign largesse (money or gift given generously) would continue without unification led to its dissipation. But Muhammadi, who did not have a party of his own, turned Harkat into his party.

The third effort at unification was made in January 1980. The offer of millions of dollars brought by Dr. Abdullah Salim Azzam served as the stimulus for this unity. Abdullah Azzam was successful in making the six parties agree in principle to establish a coalition. However, after only two sessions Gulbudin Hikmatyar's Hizb, claimed that since his party had the largest following among Afghans, its primacy should be recognized. He also found fault with the membership of two moderate groups, led respectively by Pir Saeed Ahmad Gilani and Sibghatullah Mujaddadi, when his demands were refused, he backed out.¹⁴² The remaining five agreed on January 27, 1980 to form a loose coalition called Ittehad-e-Islami. It was done to qualify for the offer of Islamic aid, and to win international support from the upcoming Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference held in May 1980. The alliance hoped to receive Conference support as the Afghan government-in-exile. But the alliance was only partially successful. Before the conference, Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf, the alliance spokesman, was permitted to make a statement before the political committee of the Conference. But this honor was also bestowed on Gulbudin

¹³⁹ J. Bruch Amstutz, *Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation*, Washington, National Defense University Press, 1986, p.92

¹⁴⁰ Sheen ze (pseud), 'Political Drive by Afghans-VI', *The Frontier Post*, November 29, 1988.

¹⁴¹ Amstutz. Op. cit, p.94

¹⁴² Sheen ze (pseud), Op.cit.

Hikmatyar. However, the Conference did not urge diplomatic recognition of the alliance as the Afghan government-in-exile. This was hardly surprising, given the fragile nature of the coalition and the absence of Gulbudin Hikmatyar's party.¹⁴³ After the Conference, ideological and personal differences between the moderates and the fundamentalists came to the fore once again. Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf constantly upbraided the moderates. They in turn, accused him of embezzling alliance funds. By December 1980, the alliance had collapsed. It was formally dissolved in April 1981. Sayyaf followed the example of Naib Muhammadi and turned "Ittehad-e-Islami" into his own party.¹⁴⁴

Imperatives for unification, however, remained. In June 1981, the moderate parties of Gilani, Muhammadi, and Mujaddadi established a coalition called Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahidin. Two months after the moderates formed their coalition, the fundamentalists organized (August 1981) their alliance with the same name. This time, Gulbudin Hikmatyar also became part of the alliance because his refusal to join the earlier alliance had been widely criticized by the Afghans. Another factor was that Gulbudin Hikmatyar could no longer sustain his claim that his party had the largest following inside Afghanistan.

The fundamentalist coalition was expanded from six to seven members. The seven member parties were as follows, Jamiat-e-Islami (Professor Rabbani), Hizb-e-Islami (Hikmatyar), Hizb-e-Islami (Khalis), Ittehad-e-Islami (Sayyaf), Harakat-e-Islami (Maulavi Muhammadi), Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami (Mansur), Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami (Moezzin), Jabh-a-Nijat-e-Milli (Mir).

Maulavi Muhammad Mir had broken with the original Jabha-e-Milli of Sibghatullah Mujaddadi. Like Mansur and Moezzin, Mir had few followers and no prominent affiliated guerrilla bands. Under the terms of the original merger agreement of August 1981, leadership of the alliance was to rotate monthly; each was to have equal representation in the executive council. Most important, each party was to close its office

¹⁴³J. Bruch Amstutz, *Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation*, Washington, National Defense University Press, 1986, pp.94-95

¹⁴⁴ Ibid

in Peshawar and hand over its assets to the unified body.¹⁴⁵ This latter step, however, was never taken. In May 1983, a delegation from Saudi Arabia, along with the head of Jamaat-e-Islami Mian Tufail Muhammad visited Peshawar to force greater unity in the ranks of the resistance. The resistance leaders were bluntly told “no unity, no money”. As a result, the seven-party alliance attempted a closer merger. These parties re-affirmed their intentions to dissolve their separate entities and to transfer their resources to the unified body. Instead of a rotating president, one person, Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf, was chosen president for two years. Sayyaf told journalists that the parties in the alliance would now fight under one command, fighting would be intensified, and combat strategy would be changed. But practically nothing changed.

Most of the problems stemmed from ongoing tension among the main leaders. Khalis and Burhanuddin Rabbani were often at odds with Sayyaf and Gulbudin Hikmatyar and the latter two did not get along well with each other. In November 1983, Khalis almost deserted the coalition and the coalition members had to make a public appeal to him not to do so. In 1984 Sayyaf was being condemned as a “crook”. The relations between the two alliances were also tense. Hikmatyar would refer to Gilani, Mujaddadi and Nabi Muhammadi as “American Pirs”. Earlier Hikmatyar had told an interviewer “two alliances do not exist. We know of only one alliance, ours. Those who are outside it will either perish or be compelled to join it”.¹⁴⁶

The existence of two alliances in Peshawar made a mockery of the resistance unity. The resistance leaders were under constant pressure from foreign powers to improve this state of affairs. In November 1984, the Saudis threatened the resistance leaders that if they did not sink their differences, their aid would be stopped. They were also warned against mentioning their differences in public.¹⁴⁷ These exhortations of unity fructified in May 1985, when the coalition, also called the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahidin (IUAM), came into being. It embraced four fundamentalist and three moderate parties. This alliance had proved surprisingly durable. It is not to suggest that it had succeeded in

¹⁴⁵ Amstutz, Op. cit, p.101

¹⁴⁶ Amstutz, Op Cit, p.97

¹⁴⁷ Daily, Jang, Lahore, November 26, 1984.

creating real unity among the resistance parties. The principal weakness of the resistance continued to be internecine strife, which existed at all levels. According to E.A.S. Bokhari. “The individualism of the resistance groups which almost bordered on hatred of any central control and their strong sense of group loyalties had resulted in extreme fragmentation of the armed resistance tactically”.¹⁴⁸ Hamid Karzai, the press officer of Sibghatullah Mujaddadi, had candidly commented on this situation. He says *“I see no grounds for the alliance continuing now the only force keeping us together is the reluctance to give a moral boost to the People’s Democratic Party in Kabul.”*¹⁴⁹

Yunus Khalis was chosen as the first spokesman of the IUAM. In October 1985, agreement was announced that the post of spokesman would rotate among the seven parties, each incumbent serving for three months. In mid-1986, it was announced that the alliance would conduct elections both inside Afghanistan and among the refugees.¹⁵⁰ In June 1986, the new spokesman, Burhanuddin Rabbani, visited USA, Saudi Arabia and France where he met with President Reagan, King Fahd and Prime Minister Chirac. This visit (accompanied by Gilani, Mujaddadi and Nabi Muhammadi). (particularly to the US) prompted Hikmatyar and Sayyaf to say that they had opposed the visit to Washington and that Rabbani therefore had no mandate to undertake it. Gulbudin Hikmatyar said that the American involvement in the Afghan Jihad would deprive it of its Islamic character. He pointed out that the Prophet of Islam had never sought assistance from infidels in his Jihads.¹⁵¹

During 1988, the unity of the resistance was subjected to tremendous pressures. In February, Dr. Bahauddin Majrooh, the Director of Afghan Information Center, was assassinated. His killing created great strains for the already tenuous unity of the resistance.¹⁵² This event coupled with other factors made Mujaddadi so frustrated that he

¹⁴⁸ E.A.S. Bokhari, ‘The Afghan Resistance: An Analysis’, The Nation , Lahore, February 4, 1987.

¹⁴⁹ The Independent, London, August 30, 1988, p.8

¹⁵⁰ Charles Dunbar, ‘Afghanistan in 1986, The Balance Endures’, Asian Survey, February 1987, pp.137-38.

¹⁵¹ The Muslim August 6, 1986.

¹⁵² According to reports, Mujaddadi accused Hikmatyar of having ordered the killing of Majrooh. On this Hikmatyar whipped out a pistol as did Mujaddadi. Others intervened before either man squeezed off a shot (Newsweek, April 18, 1988, P.¹⁴.) Mujaddadi is reported to have told Hikmatyar: “I consider you a cup of poison, but for the sake of Afghanistan I sit with you, (International Herald Tribune, March 22, 1988, p.6)

resigned from Supreme Council of the alliance and from the leadership of his own party. He told the BBC that Pakistan's policy of favoring the fundamentalists over the moderates had made his position untenable.¹⁵³ On March 8, he told The Times that chaos prevails in the meetings of the IUAM and every topic put forth for discussion is opposed one way or the other. He added that he does not see any difference between the government advocated by the extremists and the present Soviet-backed regime in Afghanistan.

In October 1987 after weeks of wrangling, Maulavi Khalis was appointed permanent chairman of the IUAM but within five months he had to resign.¹⁵⁴ It was announced that he was quitting because of "deteriorating health". The actual reason was that he (along with Sayyaf) was strongly opposed to sending a Mujahidin team to Geneva as suggested by Pakistan. When he failed to persuade his colleagues, he opted to step down saying that it was impossible for him to head an alliance, which makes decisions without his consent.¹⁵⁵ Maulavi Khalis resigned but no team was sent to Geneva. The Geneva agreement again exposed the fragility of resistance unity. The fundamentalists condemned the agreement in the strongest possible terms. They described it as an "*International Conspiracy*". A few days before the signing of the agreement, Gulbudin Hikmatyar had warned that by signing the agreement Pakistan "will lose the respect and credibility which it had enjoyed by supporting the Afghan Jihad".¹⁵⁶ He had also said that if the Government of Pakistan accepted the Geneva accord, the Mujahidin would make Iran the base of their armed struggle.¹⁵⁷ It was indeed an intriguing statement because Hikmatyar had closed his office in Iran in 1985 protesting against the Iranian attitude. In contrast to this, Zabiullah Mujaddadi had said, "*A couple of days ago the BBC reported that the alliance had rejected the Geneva accord, I am not aware that the Afghan National Liberation Front and even some other parties have done that.*"¹⁵⁸ His party, he

¹⁵³ The Muslim, March 8, 1988.

¹⁵⁴ The Pakistan Times, Islamabad, March 13, 1988.

¹⁵⁵ Dawn, Karachi, March 14, 1988

¹⁵⁶ The Nation, Lahore, April 9, 1988.

¹⁵⁷ Dawn, Karachi, February 25, 1988.

¹⁵⁸ The Muslim, June 3, 1988.

said, did not reject the entire Geneva package and would “welcome the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan”.

The formation of the interim government in February 1988 also failed to promote unity. In May the IUAM asked the US and other Western countries to recognize the interim government.

In September, Engineer Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai wrote to the UN Secretary General requesting him to grant official recognition to his interim government. But IUAM immediately issued a press statement claiming that Ahmad Shah’s interim government “does not have a mandate from the alliance to function and work on its behalf, on behalf of the Afghan Mujahidin, the refugees or the Afghan nation.”¹⁵⁹

The Taif talks between Yuli Vorontsov and Burhanuddin Rabbani also proved to be a harbinger of crisis for the resistance. Yunus Khalis and Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf were opposed to these talks. In the wake of the Taif talks, all kinds of accusations were leveled against Burhanuddin Rabbani. When Maulvi Khalis, addressing a meeting of refugees at Kacha Garhi refugee camp, started criticizing the Taif talks, his audience strongly reacted against that. They raised slogans against him and other leaders who, they said, were enjoying life in comfortable houses while the poor refugees were exposed to the biting winter. Sayyaf, who was also present on the occasion, did not speak in view of the mood of the refugees.¹⁶⁰

1.4.4 Strength and weakness of Resistance

The Afghan Mujahedeen were rightfully proud of having achieved the miracle of the century. The courage, determination and the independent spirit of the Afghan played a major role in the withdrawal of Russians from Afghanistan. Bravery in a battle, a commitment to avenge blood, fatalistic attitude of life which gave them the courage to

¹⁵⁹ Dawn, September 26, 1988.

¹⁶⁰ The Frontier Post, December 10, 1988.

face the enemy with impunity, a deep faith of Islam, all helped in keeping up their determination to fight on in spite of the very heavy odds against them.

Unfortunately, the resistance groups had not been able to forge complete unity because of their tribal rivalries and internal conflicts. Internal rivalry not only among those who were based in Peshawar and Tehran but also amongst the field commanders was the major weakness in the Afghan resistance movement. Secondly, there was a lack of leadership, the command and control structure was substantially missing. This resulted in no clear cut policies, no clear cut orders to the field commanders and even if orders were given they were not obeyed. Thirdly, the Mujahedeen lacked sufficient training in the use of sophisticated weapons. Not all the groups were able to get weapons in the same quality and quantity and no defense against high level bombing was available to the Mujahedeen.

- The Mujahedeen lacked a clear political strategy, which could make them united to fight the common enemy;
- They were not fighting a proper guerrilla war, i.e. tactics of hit and run, it was rather a localized tribal warfare, every tribe, and sub-tribe fighting in its own local area;
- Foreign suppliers and donors did not have enough knowledge of the Afghan society and social structure;
- There was a lack of sincerity among the supporters. Many backers of the Afghan Mujahedeen had their own axe to grind and were not true to the Afghan cause;
- There was ethnic tension among the resistance. Inter factional clashes among the resistance, and the clashes between Pushtuns and non-Pushtuns weakened the Afghan cause tremendously;
- Penetration of Wahabism, a totally new philosophy among the Afghans, created a lot of fractions which led to sectarian clashes;
- Pushtuns inherit egoism and lust for power. With the exception of one, all the resistance leaders were Pushtuns. In the struggle, every Afghan had played a role, and had given equal sacrifices, but one ethnic group considering itself to be

superior to others, was bound to lead to clashes. The Takhar clash¹⁶¹ was more a Pushtun and non-Pushtun clash, than a factional clash;

- There was a wastage of money inside Pakistan on unnecessary things, e.g. maintaining a huge staff, renting big bungalows, driving around in luxurious cars, etc;
- There were reports about misappropriation, on a high scale, of un-accountable arms supplies;
- Destruction of the Afghan social structure had taken place, the Mullah playing the role of a Malik or a General;
- Afghan factions involved, more in Pakistani politics than in their own problems;
- The Afghan refugees were too much involved in the economic activity of Pakistan e.g. the trucking business had been dominated by Afghans.
- Over-optimistic propaganda by the Western and Afghan media had produced adverse results. The Western press had all along been writing very optimistic, and one-sided reports. They never gave the actual facts which, in the long run harmed the Afghan cause more than it benefited it. Reasons for that could have been that the journalists wanted to portray their image much more than the Afghan cause;
- The system of education among the refugees was not uniform; each party had its own schools, giving education more on their party line, which led to conflicting ideas among the younger generation. Too much party indoctrination had made them more loyal to their parties than to the nation and this was the reason why so many factional clashes had been taking place, Takhar and Herat incidents between Hizb-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Islami present good examples;
- The donors of Jihad tried to support parties, not unified front because they wanted fragmented resistance to fulfill their agenda.

¹⁶¹ July 1991, at the Farkhar Pass, a local Hezb-e-Islamic commander, Syed Jamal had slaughtered thirty of Ahmad Shah Masood commanders. The killing led to an open war between the two parties especially in the North. The alleged killer Syed Jamal along with his five colleagues was arrested by Ahmad Shah Masood troops. they were later on executed with the orders of Ahmad Shah Masood. The Farkhar pass, episode sowed the seeds of permanent hostilities between Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah Masood, which damaged Mujahideen cause and standing.

Differences and disunity were the chief characteristics of the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union. Contrary to popular belief, the resistance leadership had very nominal or almost negligible religious differences. The Afghans are religious people but they are religiously tolerant as well. Their attachment to the religion during resistance against Soviet Union was fully reflective in the names of the resistance parties and groups either affixed or suffixed by the word 'Islam'. It means they had very rare ideological nature of differences, as the ideology of Afghan resistance was invariably Islam. The differences between various resistance groups and parties were primarily concerned with their sociological and ethnic origins rather than ideology. The Afghan resistance was cut along tribal, ethnic and sociological lines since its spontaneous build up during Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin periods. The resistance moved ahead with these inbuilt deficiencies until it fell apart in 1992 with the fall of Dr. Nagibullah regime in Kabul.

1.5 The Geneva Accords and Soviet withdrawals

The Geneva peace process started because of the efforts of the UN Secretary General and his representative Diego Cordovez. It was only after shuttling from capital to capital for several months that Cordovez succeeded in bringing the representatives of Kabul and Islamabad to Geneva in June 1982. After this, there were many rounds of talks for peaceful settlement of the Afghan issue. Three documents on mutual guarantees of non interference and non intervention of refugees from Pakistan were virtually complete by 1986 while some knotty issues remained to be resolved. On April 17th 1988, the Geneva Accord was signed which consisted of the following four instruments:

1. Instrument 1 was signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan and pertained to the principles of mutual relations in particular to non interference and non intervention in each other's internal affairs;
2. Instrument 2 was signed between the USSR and the United States of America which concerned giving of guarantees by both the super powers that there would be no intervention or interference in the internal affairs of the high contracting parties;

3. Instrument 3 was signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the voluntary return of refugees which was vitally important for Pakistan.
4. Instrument 4 was signed between the USSR and Afghanistan specifying the time frame for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The de-induction was to commence from the 15th May 1988. The Soviets military contingent was to be totally pulled out from Afghanistan by 15th August 1988.

It may be pointed out here that the real party i.e. Mujahedeen were not involved in the Accord which indicated that a peaceful settlement of Afghanistan issue was uncertain. The end of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan could not diminish the severity of internal conflict. The Geneva Accord had only facilitated the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and vital issues of conflict remained unresolved. The instruments of the Accord failed to address the question of self determination which, in fact, was fundamental to any effort of restoring peace in the region. The Soviets also did not lose their interest in the stability and continuity of the Communist regime in Kabul. Moscow left a large arsenal in Afghanistan and continued to supply more weapons, enabling Kabul to use indiscriminate force against its opponents. There were purely pragmatic reasons for Moscow to stabilize the regime headed by Dr. Najibullah. The political and security situation of the region around Afghanistan did not improve qualitatively with the signing of Geneva Accord. Moscow made sure that Kabul forces were equipped with the necessary military equipments for defending.

The Soviet withdrawal had effects in political and psychological terms on the efforts of the Kabul regime to gain domestic acceptance and some international respect. Firstly, the stigma of Soviet involvement was removed; Secondly, one of the fundamental causes of the national uprising that motivated the Afghan Jihad disappeared with the Soviet troops pull out. Finally, Dr. Najibullah's initiatives to promote national reconciliation began to earn credibility as he demonstrated flexibility and struck local deals with some tribal chiefs and certain internal commanders. He also showed some inclination to change the basic character of the regime and his party. This strategy was adopted by Kabul regime to isolate the Mujahedeen resistance by fostering war weariness among the population, on

the one hand and entering into deals with local influential which offered autonomy in exchange for cease fire. On other hand the regime was not internally strong enough to resist any challenge. Encouraged by Shah Nawaz Tanai the defense minister of the regime, some of the resist groups and internal commanders gave serious thought to striking an alliance with some elements of the armed forces to topple Najibullah regime. With the change in international scenario, Pakistan shifted its policy more to the promotion of political settlement. Islamabad also opened up diplomatic channels with Moscow in order to bridge the differences on the formation of a broad based transitional government in Afghanistan. The relations between Tehran and Moscow began to improve. Iran had welcomed the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and called for cooperation with Moscow against the West. These changes had a tremendous effect on the political alignment with Afghanistan, resulting in the collapse of Dr. Najibullah regime in April 1992.

In short, Geneva Accord was the seed of all confrontation that Afghanistan had in coming years. The Geneva Accord was a honeymoon of the super powers; one super power gave the way to another to escape from Afghanistan. While leaving the state in a civil war situation, the future of Afghanistan and Afghan people was not decided, and the problems were not tackled properly. US positive and negative symmetry was the sign of continuing civil war in Afghanistan. The problem of refugees was not resolved, the Mujahedeen were not taken into confidence about the future because they were the main opponents of Soviet and Afghan communist governments. Iran, an important neighbor of Afghanistan, was not satisfied with the Accord.

To sum up, Afghan people though won the war in the battlefield, had to suffer enormously in the coming years due to the major powers conspiracy, rivalry among regional powers and the incompetence of Afghan leaders.



(Source: www.Afghanistan.com)

Soviet forces leaving Afghanistan in 1989 after the signing of Geneva Accord in 1988



General Boris Gromov

The last commander of the 40th army in Afghanistan

(Source: Personal collection)

CHAPTER 2

THE FALL OF Dr. NAJEEBULLAH AND ESTABLISHMENT OF BURHANUDDIN RABBANI GOVERNMENT

After signing of Geneva Accords, Soviets were soon to begin their withdrawal from Afghanistan but continued to support Dr.Najeebullah for whom they left behind huge quantities of weapons and ammunition for fight against the Mujahideen. In this period there were frequent Afghan Scud missile attacks on the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. The seven Peshawar-based Mujahideen parties, who had resisted the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, formed an anti-Najeebullah interim government in exile with Pakistan's backing and encouragement. The most powerful person in this set-up was Engineer Gulbudin Hikmatyar. It was Islamabad's hope that the leaders of the Mujahideen parties would sit together and work out the modalities for establishing a post-Dr.Najeebullah government in accordance with the wishes of the Afghan people.

Pakistan, which was under the military rule of General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq during the decade-long Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, was staunchly supported by the US-led alliance and became the third largest recipient of American economic and military assistance after Israel and Egypt.¹⁶² The conclusive defeat of Communism was considered far more important than pious concerns about non-proliferation and democracy. With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the expectation was that the Dr.Najeebullah government would collapse and, to hasten this, the Mujahideen intensified their attacks against the regime. Their first target was Jalalabad, the capital of the eastern province of Nangarhar. It was expected that the city, which is near the Pakistan border, would be captured with ease. Some seventy soldiers of the regime defected to the Mujahideen who, instead of receiving them with open arms, slaughtered them and mutilated their bodies, which they sent back to Jalalabad in sacks. This barbarity act was done by the orders of those Arab Mujahideen who were affiliated with

¹⁶² Riaz M. Khan, *Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal*, (Lahore: Progressive Publisher, 1993), pp.25-27

different Mujahideen groups. The barbarity convinced the city's defenders that they would meet the same fate and strengthened their resolve to fight. The Mujahideen laid siege to the city, which continued for three months and ended in their defeat. This boosted the morale of the regime, which launched counter-offensives in which the Mujahideen suffered further setbacks.¹⁶³

The fortunes of the Dr. Najeebullah regime continued to rise until, an abortive coup attempt in March 1990 by General Tannai, the Khalqi defense minister. Thus the old rivalry between the Khalqies and the Parchamies surfaced again. Several Khalqi officers subsequently fled Kabul and many of them sought and were given asylum in Pakistan. There were two immediate consequences of the abortive coup. Dr.Najeebullah could no longer trust the Khalqies regardless of whether they had been associated in the coup attempt or not. They were accordingly purged from the army. This created confusion in the defense forces and destabilized the regime even further. The second consequence was that it prompted the Babrak Karmal loyalists who were furious at his ignominious ouster to resume their intrigues against the regime.

In Afghanistan, Dr. Najeebullah's position became progressively weaker. His principal supporter, the Soviet Union, was on a steep nosedive to elimination and so Dr.Najeebullah could no longer count on Moscow's military and economic assistance. The powerful ethnic Uzbek warlord Rashid Dostum, who had hitherto extended support for purely selfish reasons, also abandoned him. Whereas previously Dr. Najeebullah had been willing to take non-communists into the government, he was now ready to step down and transfer power to the Mujahideen. Accordingly in April 1992, he informed the UN of his intentions and the latter devised a mechanism for the transition. It envisaged an interim dispensation consisting of a fifty-member committee of non-controversial Afghans living in the US, Europe, the Middle East, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The committee, in turn, was to transfer power to the Mujahideen within six months. In mid-April 1992, the UN asked the committee members to assemble in Pakistan from where

¹⁶³ The Frontier Post (Daily), Peshawar, 25 April 1992

they were supposed to move into Afghanistan.¹⁶⁴ Most of the committee members thus gathered in Islamabad and were about to proceed to Kabul when on 18 April a coup, backed by Ahmed Shah Masood and Abdul Rashid Dostum, was staged by Babrak Karmal loyalists. A number of Dr. Najeebullah's supporters, including the minister of national security, were killed. Dr. Najeebullah, however, managed to escape and took asylum at the UN office in Kabul. The organizers of the coup, all Persian-speaking Parchamies, requested Ahmad Shah Masood, who was at the time in Charikar sixty-five kilometres to the north of Kabul, to take over. Ahmad Shah Masood instead asked the seven leaders of the Mujahedeen factions, who were in Peshawar to form a government in Kabul. The leaders, however, could not agree on its composition or even what the next step should be.¹⁶⁵

2.1 The Peshawar Accord

April 1992 saw some momentous developments in the Afghanistan crisis. Internally, the Mujahedeen guerillas had made notable advances and were in possession of most of the countryside outside Kabul. In the face of Mujahedeen advance, armed tribesmen, who had stuck it out for fourteen years in difficult war conditions, along with disaffected government troops, switched allegiance to the victors. Close allies of the besieged President Dr. Najeebullah who had changed loyalties included the Uzbek General, Abdul Rashid Dostum, who controlled the important stronghold of Mazar-i-Sharif, which came into the hands of the Mujahedeen. On April 16, 1992 following an aborted attempt to flee the country, President Dr. Najeebullah resigned “more suddenly and less bloodily than most people had foreseen.”¹⁶⁶

Ironically enough, with victory within their grasp, the Mujahedeen groups found themselves totally unprepared to take over the leadership of the country. They had no interim plan ready with which to step in and take over the task of governance and what

¹⁶⁴ Riaz M. Khan, *Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal*, (Lahore: Progressive Publisher, 1993), pp.28-33

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ The Economist, London, 25 April 1992, The Afghans nervous end game, p.21

was more important, to ensure that civil strife did not take place. The substance of an economic reconstruction program of their war-ravaged country totally eluded them, as well as any stopgap arrangement to meet the immediate needs of the populace in the face of a ruined infrastructure. The result was that for an entire week following Dr. Najibullah's resignation, the country was without a government, while hectic activities were underway amongst the Mujahedeen groups in exile, notably the Peshawar-based ones, to thrash out the shape of an interim administration.

On April 24, 1992, the Peshawar Accord was signed among nine Pakistan based Mujahedeen groups, preceded by much bargaining over power sharing. Suddenly, from their refugee status, these groups acquired a representative authority for the Afghan nation and that too while they were still physically based abroad. Two Mujahedeen guerilla groups, who had partly forced the situation to take this turn through their military pressure on the besieged Dr. Najibullah regime, were facing each other in, and around Kabul more in confrontation than with any idea of cooperation. These were the forces of Ahmed Shah Masood, the famous Tajik hero of the fourteen-year war against a superpower and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Pushtun heading a Hezb-e-Islami faction under his name, of the two, Ahmad Shah Masood had stuck to his mountain fastness, traveling just once abroad, and that too for a day's in Pakistan in early 1992 to meet with the Mujahedeen leaders and Pakistani officials. He presented the image of a warrior who also possessed great administrative ability, amply reflected in the way he had managed the survival not only of his forces but also the population of the areas under his control. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar had the clout of an organization behind him, which had carried out a successful propaganda on behalf of the Afghan cause abroad and was considered to be a hardliner in contrast to the more moderate Ahmad Shah Masood. Despite their armed strength, neither Ahmad Shah Masood nor Gulbuddin Hekmatyar tried to grab any stopgap role during this crucial one week when either could have usurped power.¹⁶⁷ For any person or a group wanting to take over power, the ground reality of Afghanistan had changed both in its internal and external environment. Within the country, an entire array of new factors had reared up above the debris of a fourteen-year war, all demanding

¹⁶⁷ The Economist, London, 25 April 1992, Awkward Afghans, pp.13-14

immediate resolution: the fate of former President Dr. Najeebullah and his associates in the government and armed forces; the composition of an interim administration and its tasks of governance; the long-standing rivalry amongst the Mujahedeen groups whose origins pre-dated the 1979 Soviet invasion; the war-ravaged economy unable to provide the wherewithal for the many immediate needs of the people and requiring a massive economic reconstruction program just to put the administration on the rails; the conflicting interpretations of 'Islamic values', of the definition of an 'Islamic state' and the role of an 'Islamic government'; the repatriation program of refugees from Pakistan, Iran and other countries; the ten million land mines the Soviets left embedded, mostly in what were once agriculturally productive areas; the assertion of all ethnic identities for participation in decision-making in any future government; and so on. Disparate as these factors appeared, all were inextricably interlinked, and all had assumed a critical importance.¹⁶⁸

2.1.1 External Factors

The external situation was equally complex. Afghanistan found itself like the burdened heart of a troubled region, embroiled in its own numerous crises. At the time of the 1979 Soviet invasion, Afghanistan had bordered only four states, Iran, Pakistan, USSR and China. Following the Soviet Union's collapse, it acquired three more immediate neighbors, namely, the republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, in place of the USSR. Two new factors had emerged which the rest of the world would have to come to terms with. The landlocked status of Afghanistan had acquired a new dimension, since along with the six Central Asian Republics it accounted for a block of seven landlocked states, sharing many mutual concerns and close cultural, religious, historical and ethnic affinities. Their natural routes to the outside world lay across Afghanistan and through the neighboring Muslim countries of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.

The second element was that in this contiguity of new and old states, all were Muslim majority countries of which Kazakhstan possessed a vast nuclear arsenal and two others; Iran and Pakistan were credited with nuclear capabilities. Two other determinants were

¹⁶⁸ Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddedi interview to BBC, press release of Afghan National Liberation Front, Dated April 14, 1993.

present on the Afghan scene. As the repository of the sovereignty of the nations of the world, the United Nations has over the years acquired a certain fundamental legitimizing status, ensuring that its future role in Afghanistan would remain. With the various Afghan Mujahedeen organizations it had enjoyed a measure of acceptability as a relatively neutral body. On many occasions, if a development so warranted, Mujahedeen groups would uphold some UN measure as being in their interest. But on other occasions they would denounce those measures they did not agree with, holding them to be against Afghan interests.

The second factor was the nature of the internal conflicts, fused along Shia-Sunni, linguistic, Pushtun versus non Pushtun and ethnic lines, with historical affiliations in the adjoining regional countries. These historical links were revived with actual contacts once the refugee exodus took place and acquired a more live symbolism. However, these links would be put into effect in the Afghan context and not outside it. Pakistan, as a neighbor, presents the same religious mix and would also in some measure reflect its own public responses to what happens in its neighborhood. It is to be borne in mind that at one level of the Afghan conflict throughout 1992 the Pushtun-versus-Persian- speaking controversy had always been in evidence. The political tussle for power underway did not seemed to be a matter of a few months. It was not likely that one dominant group would be allowed to figure to the exclusion of others. The environment was more suitable for a dominant alliance and that is the power configuration that was being sought. The problems were not only multi-dimensional but of massive proportions ensuring that the period of instability would be that much longer. Afghan developments would therefore compelled world attention, if only because of the concern of the world governments to remain sufficiently abreast of these developments so as to be in a position to do timely management.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁹ Dr. Andreas Rieck, German Orient Institute, Humburg presented a research paper, "Russian Policy towards Afghansitan since 1992", in a two day international seminar on "Confidence Building Measures between Paksitan, Russsia and Central Asia. The seminar was held at Area Study Centre for Russia, China and Central Asia, Peshawar University on November 8-9, 2000.

2.1.2 Concerns of the Western Countries

A western media comment, significant for the fact that it was made shortly before the signing of the Peshawar Accord, highlighted the areas of concern. Raising the pertinent question of why outsiders should have an interest in Afghanistan, The Economist of London postulated three reasons. One was based ‘*partly on basic humanity*’ without which no new world order could claim respect, namely, to help mitigate the miseries arising out of the ware homelessness, unemployment, economic collapse and land mines. The outside powers, notably America, Russia, Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, according to this comment, could not escape the blame for the damage, nor the moral obligation to help repair it, having ‘*nourished*’ the war with arms and money. The second reason was self-interest. If the ‘*patchwork*’ of Afghanistan’s different ethnic groups, languages and religious practices were to come apart, the disintegration could spread beyond Afghanistan. The Pushtun and Baluchi tribes would look to their kinsmen in Pakistan; the Hazara tribes to Iran; the Turkmen, Tajiks and Uzbeks to the new Muslim states of the former Soviet Union. Follow a path of ethnic strife and ultimately the integrity of Pakistan, Iran and even India might be threatened.¹⁷⁰ The third reason was the dismal prospect that Afghanistan’s next regime might impose a harshly fundamentalist form of Islam: “*imagine a fundamentalist Afghanistan next door to a fundamentalist Iran and then imagine the fears of the Russians and other non-Muslim minorities in Central Asia.*”¹⁷¹

“The British Weekly further warned against any direct intervention to make or keep an Afghan peace, other than an intervention with the weapons of diplomacy and economic pressure.”

To what end it did not state, nor did it give any example in our times where diplomacy or economic pressure had induced lasting stability. Internationally too, the response to the developments within Afghanistan had been vaguely defined, since the specter of an Islamic fundamentalism, which while clear perceived to be a factor, had also defied any

¹⁷⁰ The Economist, London, 25 April 1992, Awkward Afghans, pp.¹³⁻¹⁴

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

attempt to be explained in any specific terms. The irony was that until the collapse of the Soviet Union, fundamentalist Islam in Afghanistan did not seem such a worrisome factor as to cause stoppage of aid from the outside world.

2.1.3 Accord Talks Begin

Talks began in April 1992 in Peshawar between the Pakistan government and the Mujahedeen Resistance leaders against this background. The Afghan side included the following leaders: NIFA chief, Pir Sayed Ahmad Gilani; Jamiat-e-Islami chief, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani; Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's deputy, Engineer Qutabuddin Hilal, represented the Hezb-e-Islami faction; son of Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, Dr. Najeebullah; deputy leader of Ittehad-e-Islami, Commander Musa; Qazi Mohammad Amin Waqad; Shura-e-Etala'f chief, Ayatollah Mohsini and Hezb-e-Wahdat spokesman, Javed. Four leaders were absent, being represented only by their spokesmen. Prof Mujaddedi, Prof Sayyaf, Maulavi Mohammadi and Maulavi Younas Khalis, in spite of their presence in and around Peshawar, did not attend the meeting. This was a significant signal of their independence of action. Though media opinion saw some measure of conflict between Ahmad Shah Masood's Islamic Jihad Council announced two days previously from Kabul and the proposed Afghan Mujahedeen Council, what they missed was that the Afghans were now dealing with their differences quite independently of any external counsel. The immediate interest of Pakistan and Iran lay in being properly aligned with the developments taking shape, without being embroiled in the conflict. At this stage, Pakistan announced that it would cooperate with the UN in trying for a safe passage for Dr. Najeebullah out of Afghanistan.¹⁷²

On April 20, it was reported that the Pakistani official efforts at achieving an accord had come to naught. The cynics saw this as a defeat for Pakistan's 14-year long 'interventionist' role to control the Afghan jihad. The other side of the picture was that the Afghan power tussle having already begun, Pakistan officially withdrew from any position which would jeopardize its shift to a neutral stance. This was a sensible thing to

¹⁷² William Maley, *The Afghanistan wars*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp.199-233

do. What was significant was the consensus achieved between the incumbent governments of Pakistan with the Mujahedeen Resistance leaders on certain basic principles. Neither side wanted any prolongation of factional conflicts within Afghanistan. Both wanted to fully preserve the unity and territorial integrity of Afghanistan. The Afghan side stated that an interim Afghan Mujahedeen Council would be established to ensure transfer of power in Kabul. The Pakistan officials withdrew, having done the necessary mediation. The intra-Afghan dialogue resumed to thrash out among themselves the provisions of an Agreement, which emerged as the Peshawar Accord on 24 April 1992. It also ushered in the phase of struggle, totally Afghan in character, marked by violent clashes, shifting alliances and incomprehensible contradictions. All these factors mark significant developments underway in Afghanistan, laying the basis for a future, which might turn out to be far different from what was being adjudged from the ongoing conflicts.

The Peshawar Accord was signed, as its name suggests, in Peshawar, on 22 Shawal of the Muslim calendar, which corresponded to April 24. It immediately led to speculations that Pakistan had stage-managed the whole show and compelled the Afghans, whom the whole world found intractable, into some sort of a consensus.¹⁷³

A look at the provisions of the Accord was sufficient to show that it was entirely an Afghan exercise. There were twelve clauses altogether dealing with the structure and process for a provisional period to last for only six months, following with a 'Transitional Government' would be installed for a period of two years. Afghanistan was specifically described as an "Islamic State". The first provision established a 51 person body which would "establish power in Kabul". It would be headed by Sibghatullah Mujaddedi who would also be President for the first two months, or up to the end of June 1992: "After this period this body will remain as Interim Islamic Council along with the Transitional State and its chairmanship will be held by Mujaddedi". "The period of this Council would be four months", or up to the end of October 1992.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

When the initial two months of the period of establishing power had elapsed, a “Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan” would come into effect with Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani as its President, as well as the head of Leadership Council that would also come into being. It was felt necessary to specify that Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani’s tenure would commence when the two months of the transfer of power had elapsed or from end of June 1992 to end-October 1992. The third provision was a significant sentence standing all by itself: “The above mentioned period will not be extended even by a day.” It was indication enough of the intense power struggle that had gone into ensuring that these two apparently important positions, for which there were obviously other contenders, did not remain too long within the same hands to become an exclusive preserve. Clause 4 provided for a second level of administration, a “Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet to be constituted from the “second grade members of the Tanzeemaat” (or the Mujahedeen organizations, emphasis added), by the discretion of their respective heads. Clauses 5 to 10 mentioned the important portfolios and assigned them to some of the Mujahedeen groups. The Prime Minister ship was given to the Hezb-e-Islami, Afghanistan. There were three deputy Prime Minister Ships with concurrent portfolios, namely: the Ministry of Interior to Ittehad-e-Islami; the Ministry of Education to the Hezb-e-Islami of Maulavi Khalis; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the National Islamic Front. The Ministry of Defense was assigned to the Jamiat-e-Islami, Afghanistan, and the Supreme Court to the Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami. These were to be the executive and judicial arms of the Leadership Council, whose task included “making a division of appointments in the ministries; as well as to determine Ministries for Hezb-e-Wahdat, the Shura-e-Etalaf (or the Council of Coalition) and Maulavi Mansoor”. The specific mention of these persons and groups again testified to the fact that intense bargaining was conducted over the sharing of power. Clause 12 specified a time-frame for this entire process, six months or up to the end of October 1992, by which time a ‘Transitional Government’ was expected to had been installed for a period of two years, or up to the end of October 1994. The significant part of this clause was that it would be by a “unanimous decision” of the Islamic Council. In other words, no unanimity, no transitional government. In the light of this qualification of unanimity, the insertion of

clause 3 assumed significance, and its inclusion at the position where it is, seems to have been an afterthought to check growing ambitions. Thus an extreme contradiction was woven in, best understood by framing the question: if at the end of six months, not to be extended by a single day, there was no unanimous decision, what then?

The Accord was equally significant for the details and aspects it ignored to mention, even if they might have been discussed at the negotiations. There was no mention in the Accord of who would make up the 51-member body, and what its specific steps would be to “establish power”. No mention was made of Ahmad Shah Masood or Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who had been described as possible claimants to power by the world media. No economic priorities were mentioned, given the scale of the devastation and the likely immediate needs of the people. No mention was made of any program whatsoever for the repatriation of refugees to their respective areas. Moreover, following the signing of the Accord, it was not until four days later that the caravan of the new Government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan started its journey to the capital. What had happened in the meantime was the outbreak of civil war in the city between the forces of Ahmed Shah Masood and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.¹⁷⁵

2.1.4 The Peshawar Accord and Related Developments

The tough resistance against Mujahideen onslaughts put up by the Dr. Najeebullah regime, and his survivability against coups, made Dr. Najeebullah himself a factor to consider in the events shaping up. 1991 was marked by intensified efforts on the part of the United Nations with special envoys to the Secretary General shuttling between New York and Teheran, Islamabad, Peshawar and Kabul to bring about an agreement to end the internecine war in Afghanistan and to install an acceptable representative government.

¹⁷⁵ Jalalzai Musa Khan, *The Foreign Policy of Afghansitan*, Lahore, Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2003, pp.55-99

a) The Benon Sevan Plan

In March 1992, special envoy Benon Sevan presented his formula, which reportedly had the broad support of all major elements directly concerned namely, the Dr. Najeebullah regime, the Peshawar-based Alliance, the Teheran-based Alliance, and the Pakistani and Iranian governments. The Benon Sevan formula envisaged the assembling in Vienna of 150 Afghan leaders representing all political and religious viewpoints, all ethnic groups, all tribal divisions, and former King Zahir Shah. These 150 notables would choose 35 representatives who would summon a Loya Jirga to decide on the shape and composition of a transitional government, which would conduct elections by early summer. The group was expected to convene by mid-April 1992 and elections to be held by the end of June 1992 under UN auspices. This formula was endorsed by Pakistan, Iran, the Kabul regime, USA and Russia. Several rebel groups also expressed interest in participating but others denounced it as an attempt to thwart the establishment of an Islamic state in Afghanistan. The Benon Sevan formula, for the certainty it offered of prospects of peace almost within grasp, brought about a virtual avalanche of radical shifts in alignments, claims to representation and mini rebellions. It will require the perspective of time to see the interlink ages where they existed. A month away from the expected target date of the Vienna assembly, accusations and counter-accusations saw the emergence of yet newer alliances.¹⁷⁶

The focus shifted onto Dr. Najeebullah. The man, who had survived as the head of the Kabul government for six years, became central to political talks for determining the future course of events. Mujahedeen Resistance leaders spent valuable time stressing their unwillingness to include Dr. Najeebullah or any member of his government or former associates of the non-Islamic, communist parties. There was a shift in Pakistan's own policy, indicated by its willingness to talk to Najeebullah government. Commanders of the resistance groups based in the north and belonging to several ethnic groups, with 40,000 well-equipped, battle hardened troops under their command, formed their own alliance to claim representation in any future government set-up. The ethnic generals

¹⁷⁶ Press Conference of UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy on Afghanistan, Benan Sevan, in Islamabad, dated April 23, 1992, The Frontier Post, Peshawar, dated April 24, 1992.

named in this connection were General Dostum, an Uzbek (based in northern Jauzjan province), General Momin (based in Hairatan, the gateway to Central Asia) and Syed Mansoor (leader of the Ismaili Militia in the north). A report stated: “The ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, Ismailis and Hazaras and other minorities accuse Dr. Najeebullah and his entire Pushtun allies in the Kabul government of trying to establish Pushtun dominance in Afghanistan prior to the peace talks”. There were reports that Dr. Najeebullah had opened private talks with Gulbudin Hekmatyar, also a Pushtun, about a possible alliance against the minorities. Dr. Najeebullah and his allies denied these charges, and called it a sabotage of UN talks by fanning ethnic fears. More specifically, Dr. Najeebullah accused senior party members of the Watan Party, belonging to ethnic minorities, of stirring up troubles. Others blamed Dr. Najeebullah for doing the same to hold on to power, even though in an interview he stated he would abide by the will of the majority of the Afghans.¹⁷⁷

The fact remained that the Watan Party (the renamed PDPA) headed by Dr. Najeebullah had itself split into three factions. The hardliners wanted a tough line against both the rebel groups and their own party factions. One section stood for working out an alliance with the Mujahedeen groups and their own rebels. The liberals supported the Benon Sevan formula and wanted a moderate, democratic state to come into being, even if it meant the end of the Watan Party and Dr. Najeebullah’s exile.

At the same time inter-factional warfare erupted within and outside Kabul. Anyone with a gun it seemed fought anyone else with a gun. New alliances sprang up, confounding confusion. The UN-sponsored peace plan came under severe criticism. Fatwas were issued by its opponents and against all those who favored the Benon Sevan peace plan. Maulavi Khalis totally rejected the peace plan and accused Benon Sevan of wanting to undo the Islamic struggle of the resistance and to hand over power to “anti-Mujahedeen and pro-Western Afghans at the behest of USA and other enemy forces”. It was announced that Professor Sayyaf’s Ittehad-e-Islami and Maulavi Khalis’s faction of the

¹⁷⁷ The News, Islamabad (Daily), March 17, 1992, “Fear of Ethnic War in Afghanistan.”

Hezb-e-Islami would adopt a single, unified political and military policy “to fight against regional and international plots.”¹⁷⁸

Gulbudin Hekmatyar demanded that Dr. Najeebullah voluntarily hand over power to the Mujahedeen, and that the Afghan people be allowed to decide their own future “rather than authorizing the UN and aliens to choose their government”. He opposed any role whatsoever for Zahir Shah in any transitional government.¹⁷⁹ Hekmatyar declared that his party would never agree to those who had either backed Dr. Najeebullah’s regime or were ever known to be supporters of former monarch Zahir Shah.¹⁸⁰

b) Power Vacuum after Dr. Najeebullah

The next jolt came when Dr. Najeebullah suddenly resigned on 16 April 1992, seemingly in response to the Mujahedeen Resistance’s demand that he should surrender the power. His resignation tendered to the UN was in exchange for safe passage abroad. As he tried to leave the country, he was not allowed to do so by his own armed groups who had turned against him. He then sought refuge in the premises of the UN building. Dr. Najeeb’s decision took everyone by surprise. His resignation found the Mujahedeen groups, who had been clamoring for his ouster, totally unprepared to take over power.

Following Dr. Najeebullah’s resignation, military control of Kabul by the Mujahideen forces became the first imperative. Administratively, there was a total vacuum as thirty senior officers of the government and the military also resigned with Dr. Najeebullah. A military council comprising four generals assumed power as the Revolutionary Council, assuring allegiance to any configuration that took over power according to the will of the Afghan people. Before his sudden resignation, Dr. Najeebullah had agreed to hand over power to UN-sponsored 15-member ‘Neutral Council’ for this pre-transitional phase; to be nominated by the Peshawar based Mujahedeen groups. However, differences among the latter delayed the setting up of this Council. Before his failed bid to flee the country,

¹⁷⁸ The Muslim (Daily), Islamabad, March 25, 1992.

¹⁷⁹ The Muslim (Daily), Islamabad, April 8, 1992

¹⁸⁰ The Muslim (Daily), Islamabad, April 8, 1992

Dr. Najeebullah reportedly pleaded with the Pakistan government to expedite the process so as to avoid a chaotic power struggle in Kabul, and said that he himself could not hold on under the circumstances. Most of the generals on the Revolutionary Council were those who had either refused to obey Dr. Najeebullah or had arrived at some sort of an understanding with the Mujahedeen regional area commanders. New alignments led to strategically important areas and locations going out of the direct control of Kabul and into the control of the militia and armed units present within them, such as Mazar i-Sharif, the Bagram Airbase and Ghazni. Deals had been struck between units of such militias, Mujahedeen and commanders of regional garrisons, quite independently of their respective central commands. The Revolutionary Council pledged to continue support to the UN peace plan and to defend national integrity.

This alliance forming was a factor of importance. In the unpredictable situation all over the country, quicksilver changes were underway. In the northern areas of Afghanistan and Kabul itself, a strategic arrangement was arrived at between the commanders of Jamiat-e-Islami and the Persian-speaking rebel military and militia units with anti-Najeebullah sections of the ruling Watan Party as well as with some of the more moderate Mujahedeen groups. The Council controlling Kabul would naturally look to this new consensus as the one coalition to talk to, especially since it was present within Afghanistan and was thus within reach.

c) Masood-Hekmatyar Rivalry

Another factor of importance had also become operational. Jamiat e-Islami forces under Ahmed Shah Masood and Gulbudin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami forces, bitter rivals since long, were then engaged in obstructing each other's efforts to reach Kabul first, neither leader was at this stage inside Kabul. Ahmad Shah Masood was towards the north of Kabul, and Gulbudin Hekmatyar sat astride the Kabul-Jalalabad highway.

It was this intra-group rivalry and the absence of any wider consensus, which set the scenario for a power vacuum to be filled. Noting that peace prospects seemed foredoomed, observers of these developments stated that peace in Afghanistan could only

be predicated on a grand consensus among the most divergent and mutually exclusive sections of society, including all parties without exception, otherwise Afghanistan would divide along ethno-sectarian lines under numerous warlords.¹⁸¹

The only ray of hope according to other opinions, was the UN peace plan, otherwise a civil war would threaten national integrity. It may be recalled that Iran and Pakistan had fully backed the UN peace plan. Fears were also expressed that a sudden collapse of the Kabul administration and the disintegration of its army, in view of the Mujahedeen groups' unwillingness to deal with what they considered were remnants of the Soviet invasion, would create a counter-productive political vacuum. Pakistan too was addressed for ensuring that Afghanistan's fragmentation did not take place, even if it meant calling an emergency session of the Security Council and asking for the stationing of a UN peace-keeping force.

Pakistani observers of the Afghan scene held the Afghan Mujahedeen groups responsible for the ferocious divisions among them, and criticized the hardliners for thwarting the UN peace efforts. They warned against elements on both sides of the border, the self-styled standard-bearers of Islam bent on misguiding the Afghan people. They also warned the Pakistan government to steer clear of the "pious" of those very groups which it had previously pampered and which were no longer in a mood to cooperate. It was advised to deal strongly with the more recalcitrant of the dissidents, and warned against potential dangers because "far too much of arms and ammunitions were in irresponsible hands."

Also of concern was the fate of the associates of the former regime and the role the United Nations could and ought to play in the prevailing confusion. Noting that the genuine good of Afghanistan would lie best in the hands of moderates, an editorial opinion observed that these moderate elements had themselves become targets of the hardliners, both the remnants of Dr. Najeebullah and the cohorts of the mullahs. Neither mean well for the people, being insatiably hungry for power. There were proposals that an effective general amnesty would ensure speedy repatriation of refugees, which was an

¹⁸¹ The Nation (Daily), Lahore, April 18, 1992, Editorial, Najeeb's exit and after.

essential precondition for the election of a genuinely representative government.¹⁸² Gulbudin Hekmatyar was on record as saying that in so far as amnesty for Dr. Najeebullah was concerned, “It is not our job to put conditions for the inclusion or exclusion of a certain party from the electoral process. It is up to the people to accept or reject a party.”¹⁸³

On 18 April 1992, a Foreign Office spokesman confirmed newspaper reports that Dr. Najeebullah had sought refuge and was lodged in the premises of the United Nations building, and that Kabul was under the control of the former Afghan Chief of the Army Staff, General Nabi Azimi. The Pakistani official position was that bloodshed must be avoided in Afghanistan. It fully supported its territorial integrity and stood for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power to a council enjoying the support of Afghan Mujahideen. The Pakistan government was also engaged in conducting negotiations with the Peshawar-based Mujahideen organizations to bring about conditions conducive to a speedy consensus over some sort of a body to take over the Kabul administration. The point that needs to be stressed was that Pakistan was not doing this in isolation, but in coordination with Benon Sevan and the Iranian government, as well as the Saudi government. Special Iranian emissary, Ambassador Mir Mehmud Mousavi, was present in Islamabad for negotiations during this critical juncture.

d) Hekmatyar’s U-Turn

The notable development of this period was the visible U-turn Gulbudin Hekmatyar seemed to take. He not only adopted a milder stance on the issue of a general amnesty, but also appeared to be more amenable to the proposed peace plans-even though every time he made a concession; it was generally with attached conditions. Though he enjoyed the full support of the Pakistani Jamaat Islami party headed by Qazi Hussain Ahmad, representing the hardline approach in Pakistan, it had become clear that this approach

¹⁸² The Muslim (Daily), Islamabad, April 18, 1992, Editorial, Pragmatism paves the way.

¹⁸³ The Muslim (Daily), Islamabad, April 19, 1992, Pakistan stresses territorial integrity of Afghanistan.

itself had no takers left, especially since the Mujahideen groups had begun a power struggle amongst themselves, thus irreparably diffusing the focus of unity. There was a shift in Islamabad's earlier Afghan policies. It gave full backing to the UN peace formula. The Pakistani press had earlier reported that certain officials had carried out operations independently, contrary to the official policy of restraint. The shift in Pakistan's posture in turn necessitated a review by the Mujahideen groups of their own strategies, in view of international pressure and widespread support for a political settlement in the light of UN peace efforts. Even the Saudis counseled peace moves. The Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Turki al-Faisal visited Peshawar on 9th April 1992 and met with the Mujahideen leaders. The Mujahideen leaders knew that whenever the next phase of settling down began, they would require some level of Saudi financial assistance. No less in importance was the factor of refugees, particularly those who had lived for fourteen years in refugee camps and who were articulate in demanding a broad-based government able to look after their interests as well.

Another factor shaping up was the Masood-Hekmatyar confrontation. Shortly before the signing of the Peshawar Accord, it was reported that Gulbudin Hekmatyar had told the Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami chief (unilaterally conducting his own mediation efforts) that he would not allow Ahmed Shah Masood's forces to pass through Hezb-controlled areas. Reportedly, Commander Ahmad Shah Masood sought Qazi Husain's intervention and the Jamaat chief was reported to have made efforts to help remove the differences. This confrontation seemed to have grown initially around the issue of which group be entrusted with the security of Kabul.¹⁸⁴

It eventually enlarged into which group would control Kabul. Gulbudin Hekmatyar once again donned his hard-line armor. Events in Kabul, according to him, were a conspiracy to sabotage Hezb-e-Islami plans. He criticized Generals Nabi Azimi and Asif Dilawar of the Army Council in control of the Kabul administration for showing partisanship by allowing the airlifting of troops of 'a particular Mujahedeen group, from the north' to

¹⁸⁴ The Muslim (Daily), Islamabad, April 4, 1992, Change in Kabul a plot, Hekmatyar's informal chat with newsmen took place at his Shamshatu refugee camp base in Pakistan.

prevent the fall of Kabul city to the Mujahedeen of his party. He charged that the same Generals had also held negotiations with the delegation of “a neighborly country”, meaning Pakistan.¹⁸⁵

A general consideration was that it was Commander Ahmad Shah Masood who held the key to Kabul’s fate. The Army Council in control was willing to negotiate with him in preference to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Throughout the jihad, Ahmad Shah Masood had displayed no vengeful streaks or actions. His role, other than ensuring law and order, did not suggest any power ambitions on his part. He had even sent a wireless message to Peshawar to urge the Mujahedeen leaders to reach an agreement soon.¹⁸⁶

In April 1992 the news came of an Islamic Jihad coalition having been formed in Kabul, headed by Ahmed Shah Masood who had reached the outskirts of Kabul. Important negotiations were underway simultaneously in many areas but world attention was caught by those taking place in Peshawar amongst the Mujahedeen leaders, and between Ahmad Shah Masood and foreign minister Abdul Wakil on the outskirts of Kabul. Observers saw no linkage between the two, but they did wonder at Ahmad Shah Masood’s seemingly independent initiatives. Abdul Wakil told foreign journalists that they would not enter the city until a Mujahedeen government was in control there. The world media was quick to note that in this changing pattern of power a majority of the northern forces deployed outside Kabul were not from the dominant Pushtun ethnic community. So a Pushtun ‘counter reaction’ was expected. Reports of ‘minor skirmishes’ were normally between the non-Pushtun Jamiat to which Ahmad Shah Masood belonged and the Hezb-led groups which were predominantly Pushtun. Gulbaddin Hekmatyar had reportedly made an unscheduled dash to Afghanistan on April 18, 1992, leaving the crucial peace talks underway in Peshawar, in a bid to stake his claims and establish areas under his control in the fast developing situation in Kabul. At the same time the Hezb-e-Islami had also begun accusing Ahmad Shah Masood’s men of joining hands with the Kabul administration so as to undermine the Mujahedeen struggle. Ahmad Shah Masood’s

¹⁸⁵ The News (Daily), Islamabad, April 19, 1992.

¹⁸⁶ The Nation (Daily), Lahore, April 20, 1992, Peshawar meeting fails to achieve consensus

forces were also joined by defecting militia commanders, Abdul Rashid Dostum, Sayyed Jaffer Naderi and General Abdul Momin, forming a powerful military nucleus. It was the same group that had earlier, in January 1992, mutinied against Dr. Najeebullah; Thus Ahmad Shah Masood became the “nerve centre” of the power struggle.

Meanwhile, the Army Council in Kabul freed a number of prisoners, including political detainees, such as the leading party and military leaders who had staged an unsuccessful coup against Dr. Najeebullah in March 1990, led by the former Defense Minister Shah Nawaz Tania.¹⁸⁷

Gulbudin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami had also managed to free some of its imprisoned activists from a jail where some leading figures had been imprisoned for years. Kabul-based diplomats feared that these developments, all-hinting at greater confrontation, had rendered the UN formula irrelevant.

Independent analysts pointed to the sea changes that had occurred within a week and stated that Afghanistan had entered an unpredictable phase. There appeared to be only two options, direct negotiations based on flexible compromises or a prolonged factional war, of which the latter seemed more certain. At this stage of unfolding events, Kabul was divided into four parts, each under the control of a different ethnic military command. As one observer noted, “this state of affairs had been reached because of the lack of direct communication among the parties involved in the Afghanistan issue, including the governments of Pakistan and Iran, with the rulers of Kabul.”¹⁸⁸

The Western media also pointed to another factor, the emergence of the newly independent Central Asian states, who had also built up contacts with rebels especially in northern Afghanistan. And the problem was further complicated by the fact that “thanks

¹⁸⁷ Dawn (Daily), Karachi, April 20, 1992

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

to the superpowers, which learned nothing and achieved nothing, the country was armed as never before.¹⁸⁹

e) The Post-Accord Developments

In an ironic setting, the factional power struggle at the negotiating table in Peshawar was also fought out in direct-armed clashes in the outskirts of Kabul. The forces of Ahmed Shah Masood and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar were at each other's throat, even as their party leaders were engaged in direct talks to thrash out the details of power sharing. From April 24-30, in their violent crossfire, hundreds of Kabul residents died victims of the uncompromising power struggle. It was totally Afghan in character. Violent outbreaks, this time involving nothing less than missiles, tanks and aerial attacks, accompanied the ongoing negotiations to stress those points on ground which were not being successfully made at the negotiating table. Amidst accusations and counter-accusations, demands and counter-demands, there were swift changes in alliances. Enemies of today became the allies of the next day, to become antagonists again shortly thereafter. The episodic details filled the international media, but the mercurially swift changes did not allow sufficient time for the protagonists, as well as the observers, to pause and ponder where the events had brought the situation on the ground.

f) Non-Pushtuns in Charge of Kabul

The Peshawar Accord, even as it emerged as a consensus agreement out of a tough contention for power, led to instant surfacing of further differences. On an immediate basis, the major development that it ushered in was a transitional arrangement to take over power in Kabul, emerging as a coalition and not dominated by any party. The top positions in this interim arrangement were in the hands of non-Pushtuns. Dr. Najeebulla's resignation and his subsequent refuge in the UN premises were accompanied by the killings of some of his prominent associates. It was specifically noted by the news reporters that the killings of these Pushtuns had been at the hands of the non-Pushtun

¹⁸⁹ The Nation (Daily), Lahore, April 20, 1992

officers of the erstwhile Watan Party. Even in the Revolutionary Council, which overthrew Dr. Najeebullah, and was in control of Kabul, awaiting the outcome of the talks in Peshawar, the top positions were in the hands of the Persian-speaking non-Pushtuns. This was a novel factor in the light of the recent history of Afghanistan in which for the preceding two and a half centuries, power-holding authorities in Kabul and the provinces had been variations of Pushtun configurations.

Afghan sources based in Peshawar speculated that it was Babrak Karmal, a non-Pushtun, who was behind all these events leading to the ouster of Dr. Najeebullah and the subsequent onslaught against the Pushtun officers of the Afghan army. They accused him of trying to divide the country along ethnic-linguistic lines and thus to take revenge from the Pushtun-dominated Khalq, which had earlier been behind his own downfall.

In the three days before the signing of the Peshawar Accord, it was reported that Pushtun governors of the former regime, in some Pushtun-dominated areas, had sided with the Pushtun Mujahedeen belonging to the Gulbudin Hekmatyar and Younis Khalis factions of the Hezb, against their former associates in Kabul whose ethnic alliances were with the Tajik, Ahmad Shah Masood. In Peshawar, the Afghan Mujahedeen sources alleged that the USA and other Western countries were conspiring to bring Ahmad Shah Masood into power through the backdoor. Their new world order, they said, espoused the disintegration of Afghanistan to save the newly established Central Asian states from what they perceived to be the increasing wave of an Afghan-style Islamic fundamentalism.

Pakistan's neighbor status, as well as its fourteen year sanctuary role, itself stood threatened by this evolving scenario, since there was an entire history of a Pushtunistan issue in its relations with Afghanistan. Moreover, any further violence on the "Pushtun/non-Pushtun lines were likely to arouse Pushtun sentiments in its provinces of Baluchistan and the NWFP, quite independent of the earlier echoes of this issue within its internal politics. The media cautioned that "Islamabad must at all costs retain its neutral position between the infighting Mujahedeen that it had sheltered in Pakistan for so long".

Since Afghanistan had a seat in the General Assembly and the next agreed government has to occupy it, the United Nations was the best intermediary for the formulation of the government in accordance with the wishes of the Afghan nation.”¹⁹⁰ Observers of the Afghan scene warned against the consequences of allowing yet more circulation of arms, drugs and refugees. Media critics blamed the government for delay in ensuring the full implementation of the Benon Sevan formula and for ignoring signals sent by Dr. Najeebullah shortly before his resignation for a quick agreement over some sort of a transitional body to take over the Kabul administration. The Pakistani media, by and large, warned its government against getting involved in the rowing sectarianism. For Pakistan’s own integrity it was important to ensure the survival of Afghanistan as a multi-national state by not deviating from the UN formula.

On 27 April 1992, a statement issued by a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman reported that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had successfully mediated a ceasefire agreement between Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah Masood, via telephonic persuasions, and urged upon the Mujahedeen parties to promote their peace talks through timely actions. All Mujahedeen parties had reportedly agreed to bring hostilities to an immediate end. The Foreign Office spokesman also stated that the Peshawar Accord had received further backing from Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb, as well as from the Iran-based seven-party alliance, the Hezb-e-Wahdat. Meanwhile, in Peshawar, the Interim Council which had been established under the provisions of the Peshawar Accord decided to send a five-member delegation headed by interim President, Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, to take over power in Kabul.¹⁹¹ By the end of April 1992, they were still not in Kabul, because Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, from his stronghold outside the city, had threatened to shoot down any aircraft landing at Kabul airport (which was in the control of Masood’s forces), thus reiterating his earlier condemnation of the Interim Council as “an exercise in futility”. The situation was tense enough for the Pakistan government to put its own air force on alert. Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddedi’s entourage had to go by road, reaching Kabul on 27 April 1992.

¹⁹⁰ Frontier Post (Daily), Lahore, April 21, 1992

¹⁹¹ Foreign Office statement released on 27 April 1992.

Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddedi's first announcements included his government's offer of general amnesty for all troops and other personnel of the former regime. This ostensibly covered the controversial figure of Dr. Najeebullah himself, and thus turned into a highly contentious issue, even though Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddedi's pronouncement had not mentioned Najeeb's name specifically. It was immediately exploited as an issue by all those who stood in opposition to the Interim Council, largely because they had been left out of it. Dr. Najeebullah's fate thus got tied up with this politics of confrontation. While announcing his cabinet, Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddedi named Ahmed Shah Masood as the Defense Minister, a development that did not go down well with Gulbudin Hekmatyar.

Meanwhile, Gulbudin Hekmatyar had forwarded three conditions for honoring the ceasefire agreement he had temporarily agreed to. He demanded that all militia units be expelled from Kabul. This, in effect, meant the non-Pushtun units, particularly the Uzbek militia under General Rashid Dostum's command. He urged that all Afghan forces be screened and placed under the direct control of the Mujahedeen government, and that the entire responsibility of protection and security of Kabul city be handed over to the joint command of the Mujahedeen. All these conditions amounted to a reduction of Ahmad Shah Masood's influence.

Representatives of the important Mujahedeen groups appeared on Pakistan Television to announce their support to the Accord and the ceasefire agreement. Representatives of the Iran-based groups also appeared on TV and endorsed the agreement. Later, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani was to appear on the screen to state that the ceasefire agreement had been reached unconditionally.¹⁹²

When Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddedi reached Kabul on 1 May 1992, the ground realities already stood exposed, which would dominate his own two-month tenure, and well beyond the six-month period envisaged under the Peshawar Accord. Different armed

¹⁹² The Muslim (Daily), Islamabad, April 22, 1992

and militia groups controlled different parts of the city, independent of the larger Masood-Hekmatyar confrontation, with the former forces of Dr. Najeebullah fighting on both sides. Direct clashes followed by ceasefires, incurring heavy human casualties, became a regular pattern between the known and unknown armed contenders. The role of the United Nations became a controversial issue among the Afghan groups, while it received full backing from the governments of Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Benon Sevan continued his lonely shuffles from trouble spot to trouble spot, meeting all personalities who mattered, including General Rashid Dostum in his Mazar-i-Sharif headquarters.¹⁹³

UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali himself arrived in Teheran and later flew to Islamabad in an effort to prevent the situation from worsening. External factors of immediate importance to Afghanistan were Pakistan, Iran and Central Asian states, particularly in the light of its own growing Pushtun speaking versus Persian speaking confrontation, leading to speculation that linguistic and ethnic considerations were affecting the foreign policy moves of these neighboring countries. For instance, one of the leaders of the Iran based Hizb-e-Wahdat, Abdul Haq Shafaq, met the UN Secretary General in Teheran and insisted that his organization be given a role on the basis of population and influence.¹⁹⁴

Gubudin Hikmatyar's Hezb, on the other hand, rejected the Council's authority because "small parties were given big ministries". Gulbudin Hekmatyar and his various spokesmen were persistent in their criticism of an international conspiracy against the establishment of an Islamic government. They maintained that along with some neighbors, Western countries had encouraged Ahmad Shah Masood to go into coalition with remnants of the Dr. Najeebullah regime. They consistently rejected the composition of the Interim Councils as "put together in a hurry by foreign intelligence services in order to sabotage the peaceful transfer of power". Calling the alliance in Kabul a "Communist coalition", Hezb Islami spokesmen Qareeb Ur Rahman Saeed asserted that

¹⁹³ The Frontier Post (Daily), Lahore, April 22, 1992

¹⁹⁴ The Nation (Daily), Lahore, April 21, 1992

their party was bound to fight against communism, and punish person like General Rashid Dostum and Dr. Najeebullah who had massacred hundreds of people.

Sibghatullah Mujaddedi's arrival in Kabul and his installation in the presidential palace for two months saw the deepening of hostilities. Law and order in Kabul was not existed. There was no administration. Yet Kabul Radio reported that delegations from various parts of the county visited Kabul and met Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Pir Said Ahmad Gailani and Ahmad Shah Masood. Invariably, the delegations composition was described as consisting of "commanders, Ulemas, and elders" of that area. Their choice of which leaders to call upon strongly suggested their own leanings. What seemed to the outside world to be rather a fluid state of affairs, from the Afghan point of view, a period when Afghan leaders assessed their own range of influence and formed realignments and strategies for the days ahead. Sibghatullah Mujaddadi's tenure ended on schedule and towards the end of June 1992, Burhanuddin Rabbani took over his four month tenure as the head of leadership Council and the Transitional Government, with the limited objective of holding elections and transferring power to the next 'transitional' phase. The Leadership Council was in effect the continuation of representation accorded to various Mujahedeen groups, as per the Peshawar Accord's provisions.

Sibghatullah Mujaddedi's brief tenure saw his administration battling with a worsening law and order situation. There was utter confusion as to which armed militant group came under which command. A Defense Ministry broadcast ordered troops who had earlier been the regular units to join Mujahedeen groups and report on duty by May 16, 1992. All those who failed to comply would be dealt with under 'Islamic Shariah law'. Around the same time the role of General Rashid Dostum's Uzbek militia became a factor of importance. In April, they had reportedly been involved in widespread looting and Kabul residents were said to be apprehensive, with posts being manned by youthful Mujahedeen.

Hezb-e-Wahdat which was in control of important sections of Kabul city and much of the central provinces of Afghanistan, continued to pressurize the new administration to give a fair share of power to ethnic minority groups. Since no reliable census had been undertaken in Afghanistan for many years, the figures of the ethnic make-up varied according to different groups. Hezb-e-Wahdat's claim was that the Shias constituted 25 percent of the total population, mostly the Hazaras of the Hazarajat areas. The Hezb-e-Wahdat demanded a federal system of government, which could give formal recognition to the growing ethnic consciousness of minority groups, who had contributed significantly to the success of the jihad. Radio Kabul announced that under the leadership of the Islamic government of Afghanistan, "all Afghans, the Pushtuns, the Tajiks, the Hazaras, the Uzbeks or the Pashais would live like brothers in a pride manner. They will solve their problems through intra Afghan dialogue and understanding, keeping in view the national interests of their country".

Sibghatullah Mujaddedi chaired a Jihad Council meeting in which it was decided that a high command of police and other internal security units be re-activated, new identity cards issued and prior approval of the Jihad Council sought for all issues of national importance. Significant was the expectation that all members were to attend all meetings of the Jihad Council, "or decisions would be taken without them and would be final." Radio Kabul's major theme was the national and international significance of the Islamic government taking over from the "Soviet-installed Communist regime" which had caused "irreparable losses to the social and economic structure of Islamic Afghanistan". The infidel regime put everything of the country at the disposal of the Soviets. The puppet regime was conspiring to transform the Afghan society into a communist society. The Afghan Muslims unprecedented sacrifices to make the holy war against the communist infidels was a great success. The communist black era had come to an end.¹⁹⁵

The delegations of foreign missions that called on Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddedi were mostly those from Islamic countries offering solidarity and assistance. Of

¹⁹⁵ Zim Karlenest, "An entrim report on the situation of Afghanistan", in Aussen politik, German Foreign Affairs Revivew; Vol 40.No. 1; pp.⁴¹⁻⁵⁰

significance, for a future role to be played by them, were the immediate reactions of India and Russia. On 15 May 1992, an Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman had announced that India would supply foodstuffs to Kabul by asking Kazakhstan, to re-route the food supplies, and India and Kabul government will pay for them. India's good relations would continue as well as economic aid. All-India Radio also reported social developments within Kabul reflecting its concern.

Jamiat-e-Islami spokesman, Dr. Najeebullah Lafrai, confirmed as much in a press conference that he held in Peshawar during a visit. He recounted the "Islamic steps" taken up to that point of time, which included a decree for observing Islamic 'Hijab', ban on liquor, ban on the Watan Party, and removal of anti-Islamic books from libraries. It was also decided that all members of the ruling Leadership Council would address Juma congregations at Haji-Fatah Mosque in Kabul. A commission was established to formulate the framework of the interim government. Educational institutions were re-opened. General Rashid Dostam militia forces were merged into the 51st Division of the Afghan armed forces.

Maulavi Younas Khalis, addressing a huge gathering of Afghans, reiterated support to the Islamic government, and described the conflicts which had erupted in the Mujahedeen groups as a conspiracy hatched by the enemies of Islam. He accused Iran of interfering in the "religious affairs" of the Afghans through its support to Shiaa Mujahedeen groups.

The Russian Foreign Minister visited Kabul amidst this official propaganda against Soviet infidels. The importance of this visit was reported by the international media. The assessments were that the Russians wanted to continue friendly relations with any new government in Kabul, as Afghanistan continued to be of importance to Moscow, where the policy of expansionism no longer existed. As the legal successor to the former Soviet Union, Russia felt morally and legally bound to help in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and pay "war reparations". These were also the major issues of the return of Russian Prisoners of wars (POWs) kept in various Afghan camps.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

Dr. Najeebullah's fate had also become a major divisive issue. In an interview given to an Indian television program, Prof. Sibghatullah Mujaddedi said that Dr. Najeebullah should be included in the general amnesty. Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, on the other hand, felt he should be tried as a traitor. The fact remained that Dr. Najeebullah too had suffered shattering personal losses, with more than a hundred members of his clan having killed during the jihad. Sibghatullah Mujaddedi's stress was that since Dr. Najeebullah, too, had forgiven all those responsible for these killings, the general amnesty should be extended to him also. Burhanuddin Rabbani, on the other hand insisted that some limited number be brought to trial, including Dr. Najeebullah, and also demanded that the UN should not interfere in the matter.

Maulavi Khalis was adamant in his opposition to any form of Russian assistance, and demanded that Prof. Sibghatullah Mujaddedi send back the assistance that the Russian Foreign Minister had brought with him. Referring to the war crimes perpetrated on the Afghan nation, he asked how Moscow could be considered a friend.

On assumption of power, President Burhanuddin Rabbani's immediate actions included the setting up of a commission for holding elections, by convening the widest possible representation of Afghan commanders, Ulema, intellectuals, elders and anyone else who held a representative status. He appointed Syed Noorullah Emad, of his own Jamiat-e-Islami, as its chairman. His job consisted in sending out delegations, each headed by a judge, to the nooks and corners of the country to meet notables and bring back a list of delegates for the proposed grand gathering to be eventually held in Kabul for selecting representatives who would then hold free and fair elections.¹⁹⁷

This process came up against immediate problems. With millions of refugees yet to be repatriated, it posed the problem of how the delegates were to be chosen and on what population basis. The latest census in this connection was the one held by the UN in 1987. This was proposed as the basis but failed to muster unanimous support. The

¹⁹⁷ Interview of former DG, ISI, Lt. General (retired) Hameed Gul with the author.

convening of the grand gathering invited further controversy over its terminology. The proposed “Shura-e-Ahle-Hal-o-Aqd”, Or the council of wise men, was denounced as a non-Afghan improvisation. There were demands for convening the more traditional Afghan Loya Jirga. This Shura versus jirga issue deepened as Burhanuddin Rabbani’s four-month tenure drew to a close towards the end of October 1992. It must be said to his credit that he ensured that the commission’s delegations did go out in various directions. However, genuine difficulties hindered their progress, including difficulties of communications. The result was that as Rabbani’s tenure came to its end on 28 October 1992, the grand gathering had not been convened and elections of delegates for the next phase remained as distant as before. The infighting had continued. Realignments had taken place. Gulbudin Hekmatyar’s opposition to Ahmad Shah Masood extended to rivalry with Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani as well; whose authority and actions he had refused to accept all along.¹⁹⁸

Burhanuddin Rabbani, however, had managed to build up sufficient credibility, so that when his four-month tenure ended, the Leadership Council held an extraordinary meeting in Kabul on 31 October 1992, and approved an extension of 45 days in his tenure. Rabbani’s mandate was to convene the proposed gathering by 15 December 1992, failing which, power would be transferred to the Leadership Council to elect a new President. The meeting was attended by Pir Sayed Ahmed Gilani (National Islamic Front), Professor Abdur Rab Rasool Sayyaf (Ittehad-e-Islami), Ayatullah Fazil (representative of Hezb-e-Wahdat), Prof. Sibghatullah Mujaddedi (National Salvation Front), and Maulavi Mohammed Nabi Mohammadi (Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami). Gulbudin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami also had a representative. (Hekmatyar had indicated his willingness to attend only if the meeting was held outside Kabul.) Moulavi Khalis’s Hezb did not participate because according to him the Leadership Council did not follow its own principles. He also regretted that the Council had recently granted membership to two members of the Harkat-e-Islami and the Hezb-e-Wahdat without taking other members into confidence. (Both were Shiaa organizations.) There was no dearth of criticism against Burhanuddin

¹⁹⁸ Interview of Mohammad Sediq Cahakary, Minister of information and Technology of Rabbani Cabinet, with the author.

Rabbani's failure to carry out his task. The Hezb-e-Islami criticized him through a spokesman for having spent 'four months in vain and completely failed in all his programmes'. Moreover, he did not honor his commitments to the Leadership Council with regard to the pullout of the militia and removal of communists, formation of the Ahle-Hal-o-Aqd Shura, setting up of a commission for the formation of an Islamic army and holding of meetings of the Leadership Council: "Unfortunately, he did not succeed in accomplishing his task during four months. (Rabbani) should have convened the meeting of the Leadership Council, but unfortunately he did not do so because either Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani was not interested in it or he wanted to extend his rule in one way or the other."¹⁹⁹

The more substantive criticism was on the question of statistics. Repatriation had not been done in many areas. Even the accuracy of the UN census report was questioned; it too was conducted during wartime and therefore could not possibly be comprehensive. Burhanuddin Rabbani's critics, with some justification, questioned the utility of delegations going out to conduct their surveys in 'woleswalis' (Districts) when in some areas people had not been given identity cards, and in other areas they had as many as four each. Burhanuddin Rabbani's proposals, given out on 26 October 1992, were that a district of 30,000 people would be eligible to have two delegates, with a provision for one more delegate if there was a minimum extra population of 18,000. A sub-district of 15,000 would be eligible for one delegate. He proposed that the 1978 UN census be used as the basis of population figures, and the UN monitor the elections of the members to the Shura. He recommended that the new President be allowed to select five percent of the delegates and the Leadership Council fifteen percent. This came in for strong condemnation by the Gulbudin Hikmatyar as another way of extending his tenure.²⁰⁰ There was continued criticism of the suggested Ahle-Hal-o-Aqd Shura. Most people, it was argued, were not even familiar with this name. The Loya Jirga, as an Afghan institution and traditions, was preferable because the majority of the Afghans demanded it.

¹⁹⁹ The Muslim (Daily), Islamabad, October 27, 1992

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

UNHCR sources, meanwhile, reported that about 1.3 million refugees had returned to the Khost, Nangarhar and Kunar areas. First a few family members returned, reconstructed the damaged homes and then brought the rest of their families, with UN providing cash and food stuff. UN teams were busy in mine clearing, having completed it in Kunar province. The UN teams were also assisting in the restoration of the agricultural system and construction of roads around the Nangharhar areas. There were problems; for instance, in the absence of the refugees, lands in some areas had been sold off. There were also flickering rays of hope. In Jalalabad, life was fast normalizing under Governor Haji Abdul Qadeer Khan, heading a functioning multi-party Shura, with Hezb-e-Islami (Khalis) comprising 25 per cent of the Assembly, the Hezb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar) 19 per cent, Sayyaf's Ittehad-e-Islami 19 per cent, and the remainder from smaller groups.

Burhanuddin Rabbani began his extended tenure amid grave apprehensions whether the Shura would in fact be convened and mounting criticism over his suggestions. The new factor was that the northern areas demanded more representation. By October 30, a fresh exchange of fire broke out between the Ahmad Shah Masood and Gulbudin Hekmatyar forces. As one observer lamented, the two had both a great constructive and destructive potential. A greater understanding between the two could have brought the Tajiks and Pushtuns together, something that Afghanistan desperately needed. The fiery Tajiks and Uzbeks had a well-organized military force estimated at 70,000. Around this time there were reports of General Rashid Dostum's unofficial visit to Pakistan and then onwards to Saudi Arabia.²⁰¹ Throughout these developments, Pakistan was in the forefront of media attention for its speculated, actual, potential or planned role. Some of it arose out of the comings and goings of various Mujahedeen leaders either to Peshawar and Islamabad or via Islamabad to other countries. On October 30, clashes broke out between the supporters of Gulbudin Hekmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani, leaving 2300 dead in a single offensive, described as the highest single casualty toll during the entire jihad. It was reported that Maulavi Nabi Mohammadi, Professor Sayyaf and Maulavi Khalis had joined hands with Gulbudin Hekmatyar. Moulavi Khalis had at one stage criticized both

²⁰¹ The Muslim (Daily), Islamabad, October 27, 1992

Hekmatyar and Rabbani for pursuing policies contrary to Afghan traditions and interests, and found himself in alliance with one against the other.²⁰²

Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani's extended tenure of 45 days remained precarious and was marked by growing differences over the shape of Hal-o-Aqd Shura. Afghans interviewed by the media expressed skepticism over the possibility of any Shura or Jirga being convened, given the ongoing conflicts between Ahmad Shah Masood and Gulbudin Hekmatyar, and the fact of approaching winter, which would make communications difficult. Nor was there any apparent consensus over a presidential candidate unanimously selected, or possible candidates to contest elections. At Leadership Council meetings, some important leaders were generally absent. Gulbudin Hekmatyar remained absent consistently, though some representative of his was always present to register the Hezb's dissident position over some point or the other. At the military level, the Hezb objectives were to capture key routes so as to be in a position to control food and fuel supplies. This led to intermittent conflicts, followed by ceasefires. Gulbudin Hekmatyar's opposition had extended to include General Rashid Dostum as well. General Rashid Dostum had meanwhile established his own party the Jumbish-e-Milli-Islami Afghanistan, a broad-based movement consisting of political and military representatives entirely of the northern areas. General Rashid Dostum demanded a seat for himself on the Leadership Council and adequate representation in the Jihad Council. Sibghatullah Mujaddedi was one of his supporters on this particular point. Towards the end of November 1992, Rabbani announced his candidature for the Afghan presidency.²⁰³

December 1992 was significant as it marked the formal end of the Peshawar Accord, ushering in portentous developments. The events seem to follow some distinct patterns. A fortnight before the end of Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani's extended tenure, the forces of Gulbudin Hekmatyar, General Rashid Dostum and other militias entrenched in different parts of Kabul city, were all involved in separate battles against the Defense

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Interview of Dr Bashar, An expert on Afghan affairs living in US, with the author.

Ministry forces under Ahmad Shah Masood. Their efforts were to achieve as many of their objectives through a show of force as was possible, so as to be in a better bargaining position. The efforts of the Burhanuddin Rabbani administration were to ensure that the Shura be held at any cost. In view of winter conditions, the Defense Ministry had announced that it would airlift the Shura delegates from different parts of the country. The Leadership Council remained at loggerheads and utterly divided over the selection of candidates, even as almost everybody criticized Burhanuddin Rabbani's announcement of himself as candidate on rounds that he had set the stage to ensure his continuation in power. Further complications were added to the already complex situation. A close aide of Gulbudin Hekmatyar threatened that his group would execute prisoners of war from the former Soviet Union if Moscow did not stop printing money for the Afghan government. The Hezb-e-Islami contended that without a gold reserve to back up the currency, this too, was a conspiracy to destabilize Afghanistan's already shattered economy. He also accused the interim government of using the money for military purposes and political payments, buying loyalties of commanders for the forthcoming council elections. The majority of the Russian POWs were said to be in Hezb-e-Islami's hands. The Russian Embassy in Islamabad issued an immediate statement appealing to the UNO and other states to help guarantee the safety of their POWs.²⁰⁴

General Rashid Dostum's bid for power was the next major factor of tension. He airlifted fresh militia units from his well-organized base at Mazar-i-Sharif who occupied strategic points around the capital. His increasing role as power broker had become evident at all crucial stages, the ousting of Dr. Najeebullah, and the mobilization of his forces in Kabul at the fag end of Sibghatullah Mujaddedi's two-month tenure, signaling that he had to go. A week before the end of Burhanuddin Rabbani's extended tenure he took measures to reinforce his position and place his demands. It was not clear who supported Burhanuddin Rabbani at this stage and who did not. There were speculations that Pir Sayed Ahmed Gilani had joined forces with General Rashid Dostum and the Hezb-e-Wahdat against Burhanuddin Rabbani. Rashid Dostum's fresh maneuvers led three

²⁰⁴ The Russian Embassy in Kabul, which also represented the interests of the CIS (Central Asian States), had evacuated its personnel after the Hezb's August offensive, which had resulted in heavy casualties.

parties to issue a joint communiqué in Burhanuddin Rabbani's support. These were Professor Sayyaf's Ittehad-e-Islami, Maulavi Khalis's Hezb, and Maulavi Mohammadi's Harkat i-Inqilab-e-Islami, with their common opposition to any undue Shiaa influence in future Afghan government.²⁰⁵

Burhanuddin Rabbani also announced that he would relinquish power only if the Leadership Council agreed to a successor. He also insisted that his government would hold the Shura as promised to elect his successor. Observers forecast that most Mujahideen parties and the bulk of the Afghan population were unlikely to accept the verdict of the Shura, even as it was being convened. A day after his tenure ended, President Burhanuddin Rabbani, still in power, issued a statement that he would transfer power only to a council of elected national representatives. He refused to answer questions as to why he was not handing power back to the Leadership Council. The fractious leaders of the Leadership Council, while supporting the Shura in principle, alleged that Burhanuddin Rabbani had bribed delegates. Burhanuddin Rabbani announced that Shura members from Kandahar, Badghis, Ghor, Farah, Paktia, Paktika, Logar, Kunduz, Takhar, Parwan, Kerpisa, Urozgan, Zabul, Herat, Helmand and Nimroz provinces had already been flown in, and some more from other areas would follow.²⁰⁶

Burhanuddin Rabbani's opponents demanded that he steps down immediately and hand over power to Vice President Maulavi Nabi Mohammadi to avoid a showdown and a political vacuum. They further suggested that Maulavi Mohammadi should convene the Shura within a month and elect the new President. Meanwhile seven Jihadi groups issued a joint statement asking the Leadership Council to delay the Shura session. These were: Hezb-e-Wahdat, Harkat-e-Islami, Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami, Hezb-e-Islami (Khalis), National Salvation Front, and Hezb-e-Mahaz-e-Milli.²⁰⁷

The United Nations special representative, Mr. Sotiros Mousouris, having taken over from Benon Sevan, issued a statement which said that the Interim Afghan government

²⁰⁵ The news (Daily), Islamabad, December 12, 1992

²⁰⁶ Rahimulla Yusufzai's reports in The New's, Islamabad, December 12, 1992

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

had invited the UN as observer to the Shura proceedings, as well as for financial assistance. Donor countries, according to this statement, were willing to help out with funds provided the Shura was representative in character. The UN was anxious to avoid getting involved in further controversy, in view of the earlier debacle when its peace plan was sabotaged. The UN cautious statement stressed that the Shura must have the support of the entire Afghan people, representing all segments regardless of religion, gender, ethnicity or Language.

On 19 December 1992, Radio Kabul announced that 1000 Shura members met and began their deliberations in Kabul amidst tight security measures. Shura members interviewed by the BBC seemed hopeful of fruitful results. President Burhanuddin Rabbani appealed to the opposition to help make the Shura a success by honoring their earlier promises. The participants of the Shura, it was announced, would have the power to legalize political decisions taken by the country's big institutions as per Afghan traditions and in accordance with the collective religious and tribal interests of the masses.

The Afghan society in Kabul was completely divided over the Shura. Gulbudin Hekmatyar maintained that it had no legality, and that it amounted to a declaration of war against other organizations. The khateeb²⁰⁸ and imams of Kabul city reportedly urged upon their congregations the importance of the Shura-e-Ahle Hal-o-Aqd. Leaders like Dostum indicated their readiness to accept the Shura's representative status provided it recognized and gave representation to the northern movement; meanwhile their forces would remain on the alert.

President Burhanuddin Rabbani was re-elected as a President of the transitional government for a period of two years. With the convening of the Shura, it could be said that the Peshawar Accord came to the logical end of its limited course, as it had begun, inconclusively. The uncertain responses at the time of its signing had crystallized into

²⁰⁸ Khatib or khateeb is an Arabic term used to describe a person who delivers the sermon, during the Friday prayer or Eid prayers. The khatib also leads the prayers on Friday and during the Eid prayer. The khatib is usually the Imam (prayer leader), but sometimes the two roles can be played by different people. There are no requirements of eligibility to become a khatib, although the person must be a male who has attained the age of puberty. It is also required that the khatib be in a state of physical purity.

factors whose interplay will mould the Afghan scenario in the period that lies ahead. The curtain had come down on as presumed one phase of intense fratricidal conflicts.

Flag of Afghanistan under Burhanuddin Rabbani (1992-96)



2.2 The Islamabad Accord

As the fighting continued in Afghanistan between different groups, Pakistan intervened again, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif invited Gulbudin Hikmatyyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani and other leaders to Islamabad and the talks resulted in a power sharing agreement on 7 March 1993 under which Burhanuddin Rabbani continued as president and Gulbudin Hikmatyar was appointed prime minister. The new arrangement was to last until July 1994 and in this period the regime was to draft a constitution, hold parliamentary and presidential elections and create a national army and police force. The leaders went to Makkah, the holy city of Saudi Arabia and, in front of Islam's holiest shrine, the Kaaba, they pledged to honor the agreement. However, shortly afterwards; differences broke out between Gulbudin Hikmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani on the formation of the cabinet and the distribution of ministries. During this period, Pakistan, which had been preaching the need for political stability to the Afghans, was itself in chaos. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolved the national and provincial assemblies of Pakistan on 18 April 1993, but the decision was overturned by the Supreme Court and Nawaz Sharif was reinstated on 26 May, only the initial dismissal was based on corruption charges, the 18 July action

was simultaneous resignation of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Moin Quershi, a former World Bank employee, headed the interim government until Benazir returned to power for her second term on 19 October 1993. Her government was, in turn, dismissed by President Farouq Laghari three years later and Nawaz Sharif became prime minister again, with a huge parliamentary majority in February 1997.²⁰⁹

Unfortunately, the Islamabad accord was not implemented. The Cabinet to be formed by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar was not agreed upon. He felt too insecure to enter Kabul. He announced the removal of the Defence Minister, Ahmad Shah Masood, while Burhanuddin Rabbani announced that he was retaining him. The accord soon broke down when Gulbuddin Hikmatyar attacked Kabul. Though he was repulsed, the country was pushed into another phase of war and destruction. These efforts indicate that Pakistan was fully committed to restoring peace in Afghanistan but constant in-fighting among the Afghan leadership, the increasingly hostile, non-co-operative attitude of the warring groups; the emergence of ethnic divisions in Afghan society prevented the accord from implementing.



(Source: www.RAWA.org)

March 7, 1993: A scene of the signing ceremony of "Islamabad Accord" among the "Afghan leaders". Sitting left to right: Ahmed Shah Ahmadzai (Ittehad-e-Islami), Sheikh Asif Mohseni (Harkat-e-Islamic), Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (Hizb-e-Islami), Burhanuddin Rabbani (Jamiat-e-Islami), Sibghatullah Mujjadidi (Jabha-e-Nijat-e-Milli), Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi (Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami), Syed Ahmad Gaillani (Mahaz-e-Milli), Ayatollah Fazil (Hizb-e-Wahdat-e-Islami), Pakistani Prime minister Nawaz Sharif is standing on the back side of Rabbani.

²⁰⁹ Iftikhar Murshed, *Afghanistan: The Taliban Years*, London, Newton Printing, 2006, pp.38-44

2.3 The Jalalabad Accord

The inability to form a government under the Islamabad understanding led to a resumption of fierce fighting in the weeks leading up to 29 April 1993, when the leadership of nine Mujahedeen groups, including Burhanuddin Rabbani and Gulbudin Hikmatyar, met in Jalalabad at the initiative of the Nangharhar Shura (council) led by Governor Haji Abdul Qadeer. After protracted negotiations and under pressure to the Nangharhar Shura an accord was signed on 20th May, 1992, which involved some modifications to the Islamabad understanding. The government thus formed included each of the seven Peshawar-based Sunni parties and the Shiaa groups. However, despite being the new prime minister, Gulbudin Hikmatyyar did not dare enter Kabul as he feared that he would be killed by his arch enemy, Ahmed Shah Masood, who had become defense minister. He therefore established himself in Charasiab and ministers were thus obliged to shuttle between the two cities. Cabinet decisions were never implemented. Gulbudin Hikmatyar soon realized that he was prime minister only in name and that actual power lay with Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masood. He initially remained silent but when Burhanuddin Rahbani refused to endorse a cabinet recommendation that an agreement with Russia under which the latter printed the national currency, to abrogate. Gulbudin Hekmatyar reacted sharply and the ill-disguised tensions within the government came into the open.

At this point Gulbudin Hikmatyar, who had eighteen months earlier rocketed Kabul on the presumption that General Rashid Dostum was in the city, reconciled his differences with the latter. The two seemingly implacable ideological enemies thus became allies and forged an anti-government alliance, which also included the Shiaa Wahdat party of Ali Mazari and the Islamic National Liberation Front of Sibghatullah Mujaddadi. The new alliance, which was called the Shura Hamahangi (the Supreme Coordination Council of the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan), thus started a war against the Burhanuddin Rabbani regime on the first day of 1994, which continued sporadically until February 1995, when the Taliban overran Hikmatyyar's headquarters at Charaasiab. Rabbani was to hold office until July 1994. However, he secured a decision from the Afghan Supreme

Court, while the chief justice was out of the country, extending his term to December 1994. Even this decision was not respected, the president and the premier continued in office until the Taliban²¹⁰ takeover of Kabul in September 1996.

The Taliban movement was a reaction to the prevailing anarchy after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the subsequent misrule of the Burhanuddin Rabbani regime. The Taliban were the product of the Madrassas or seminaries that have existed in Afghanistan since the coming of Islam into that country. In Afghan history, students from these seminaries have always risen at the time of national crises either to fight invaders or to oppose unpopular regimes within the country. The core of the resistance to the British during the Afghan wars of the nineteenth century was from the Taliban of the time. Similarly, the struggle to rid the country of Soviet occupation through the 1980s was spearheaded by the Taliban, and, in the second half of 1994, it was again the students from the Madrassas who set forth to restore order in the country. In previous times, Taliban had always returned to their seminaries after achieving their objectives. This was not to be so after 1994 because, on defeating the local warlords, they decided to form a government themselves. In the last week of August 1994, Mullah Omar Akhund set out with forty-five followers from a Madrassa in Maiwand [Kandahar] to punish a commander who had molested a local family. It was neither ideology nor religious fervor that accounted for their subsequent success. It was the war weariness of the populace that made them welcome any force, which could deliver them from the hands of brigands. They hungered for the restoration of peace and the semblance of an honest administration, no matter how harsh its system of justice. Local warlords had created fiefdoms owing nominal loyalty to one political leader or the other, but imposing in fact their own arbitrary fiat in the areas that they controlled. In Kandahar, the main road to Herat on the one hand, and to Chamman in Pakistan on the other, had toll posts and barriers at virtually every kilometer, where local commanders exacted "fees" and whatever other extortions they decided upon on any passing traffic. The lives and honor of ordinary citizens were at their mercy. Initially even Burhanuddin Rabbani sought to


²¹⁰ Taliban is the plural of the word Talib which means "student".

use the Taliban to eliminate his opponents and to quell the unrest that had been generated by his failure to abide by the Islamabad Accord. He offered them assistance and there is sufficient evidence to show that his emissaries frequently contacted Taliban to offer financial and other support. Burhanuddin Rabbani is on record as saying: "The Taliban and some Mujahedeen from Kandahar asked us to help them to open roads and improve law and order in their province. We supported them."²¹¹

The Taliban, however, did not need such assistance. The local commanders who surrendered brought with them substantial quantities of weapons and ammunition. With each success the ranks of the Taliban swelled with veterans who had fought against the Soviets. However, it was not through force of arms but the persuasiveness of their message that the Taliban were able to triumphantly sweep first the eastern and then the western part of Afghanistan. By late October 1994, the Taliban movement gained victories one after another in their war against the Mujahedeen and, within a short time, captured the whole province of Kandahar, from where they spread their influence to other parts of the country.

²¹¹ Iftikhar Murshed, *Afghanistan: The Taliban Years*, London, Newton Printing, 2006, pp.38-44

Ethnolinguistic Groups in Afghanistan



502551 175004341 6-97

212

2.4 UN failed role

Benan Sevan, Diego Cordovez successor as special representative of the UN Secretary General, attempted to apply a political formula that had been announced by UN Secretary General Javier Perez De Cuellar on May 21, 1991. Referred to as a five-point plan, it included, recognition of Afghanistan's sovereign status as a politically non-aligned

²¹² www.fas.org/irp/world/afghan/afgan_ethno.gif

Islamic state, acceptance of the right of Afghans to self-determination in choosing their form of government and social and economic systems, need for a transitional period permitting a dialogue between Afghans leading to establishment of a government with widely based support, the termination of all foreign arms deliveries into Afghanistan, funding from the international community adequate to support the return of Afghanistan's refugees and its reconstruction from the devastation of war.

These principles were endorsed by the Soviet Union and the United States and Afghanistan's neighboring governments, but there was no military means of enforcing it. The three moderate Peshawar parties accepted it, but it was opposed by Gulbudin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Sayyaf and Moulavi Khalis who held out for a total victory over the Kabul government. Nevertheless, these four "fundamentalists" found it politic to participate in the effort to implement the UN initiative. Pressure from their foreign supporters and the opportunities that participation offered to modify or obstruct the plan encouraged them to be reluctant players. Pakistan and Iran worked jointly to win Mujahidin acceptance at a conference in July 1991. Indicating its formal acceptance of the plan, Pakistan officially announced the termination of its own military assistance to the resistance in late January 1992. Dr. Najeebullah also declared his acceptance, but until March 18, 1992, he hedged the question of whether or when he would resign in the course of negotiations. Benan Sevan made a strenuous effort to create the mechanism for the dialogue that would lead to installation of the transitional process envisaged in point three of the plan. The contemplated arrangement was a refinement and a simplification of earlier plans, which had been built around the possible participation of Zahir Shah and the convoking of a meeting in the Loya Jirgah tradition. By March 1992, the plan had evolved to the holding of a meeting in Europe of some 150 respected Afghans representing all communities in the late spring. Most of Benan Sevan's effort was directed at winning the cooperation of all the Afghan protagonists, including the Shiaa parties in control of the Hazarajat. In early February, he appeared to have won the active support of commanders among the Pushtuns in eastern Afghanistan and acquiescence from Burhanuddin Rabbani and Gulbudin Hekmatyar to the extent of submitting lists of participants acceptable to them in the proposed meeting. Simultaneously, Benan Sevan

labored to persuade Dr. Najeebullah to step down on the presumption that his removal would bring about full Mujahedeen participation. Instead, Dr. Najeebullah's March 18, 1992 announcement accelerated the collapse of his government. This collapse in turn triggered events that moved faster than Benan Sevan's plan could be put into effect. In the midst of hectic maneuvering to put the European meeting together, Benan Sevan declared on April 4 that most of the parties (including Hekmatyar's) and the Kabul government had agreed to transfer power to a proposed transitional authority. He also announced the creation of a "pre-transition council" to take control of government "perhaps within the next two weeks." He was struggling to keep up with events, which threatened to dissolve the government before he had a replacement for it. In the end, some of the Shiaa parties and the Islamists in Peshawar blocked his scheme.²¹³ They withheld their choices or submitted candidates for the European meeting whom they knew would be unacceptable to others. The hope for a neutral, comprehensive approach to a political settlement among Afghans was dashed. Benan Sevan then worked to ensure a peaceful turnover of power from the interim Kabul government that replaced Dr. Najeebullah on April 18 to the forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud and General Rashid Dostum. In effect, the turnover was peaceful, but without an overall political settlement in place.

In June 1992, Benon Sevan had relinquished his position and moved on to other duties in the UN system. A gap then followed in UN political activity in Afghanistan, However on 14 February 1994, Secretary General Boutros Ghali appointed the former Foreign minister of Tunisia Mahmoud Mestri to Head the UN Special Mission for Afghanistan. In a report of July 1994, the mission made a number of important points that the people widely identified themselves, first and foremost, as Afghan and Muslims, that they wanted to ensure the territorial sovereignty of Afghanistan, that most of the country (at least two thirds) was at peace and that the mission was repeatedly told that the majority of those fighting were doing so for money since this was the only way to earn a living, especially in Kabul. If this had led to a program of pressure on those states fuelling the conflicts to desist, the mission might have played a very useful role. Instead it became

²¹³ Roy Oliver, *Afghanistan: From Holly War to Civil War*, Princeton University Press, 1995, pp.45-67

entangled in the morass of Afghan internal politics, recommending in paragraph 40(c) that the UN ‘begin serious and in-depth consultations with the various Afghan leaders on the establishment of a viable transitional authority and a complete and total cease fire’.

Unfortunately, Mestiri proceeded in a manner that was utterly detached from the ground realities in Afghanistan. When the members of the Shura-i-Hamahangi moved with the massive forces against Burhanuddin Rabbani in January 1994, one of the things, which they did in the process was tear up the Peshawar and Islamabad Accords. They did so, but having failed in their efforts to oust Burhanuddin Rabbani by military means, they were hardly in a position to resurrect the two accords and demand that Burhanuddin Rabbani stand down in mid 1994 in accordance with their provisions. Yet this essentially was the position that Mestiri was to adopt. Indeed, he went so far as to express to journalists the view that he confronted a very difficult task to wrest power from Burhanuddin Rabbani.

There was no prospect whatever that this would happen. Mestiri had no capacity himself to wrest power from anyone and because he had failed up to that point to secure any commitment from the Taliban to accept the UN’s plans, Burhanuddin Rabbani would have been made to accede to his demands. Mestiri lost all credibility and his mission effectively came to an end, although he continued to talk to the various parties and retained his position until May 1996. His mediation miscarried because he failed properly to grasp three essential features of the situation.

First, Burhanuddin Rabbani Government was confronted not by normal politicians but by a total spoiler Gulbudin Hikmatyar and with an unpredictable movement of Taliban. In such circumstances, it was not sufficient for the UN simply to be moral guarantor of a transition mechanism; security guarantees are required from a neutral security force. Mestiri never offered this and as far as a ‘national security force’ was concerned, the Security General stated that the most Afghan parties can expect was the establishment of

a voluntary trust fund for which I would solicit contributions from member States interested in supporting the peace process in Afghanistan.²¹⁴

Second, Mestiri took inadequate account of the role played by neighboring States in prolonging Afghan conflict, without some understandings to insulate Afghan politics from wider regional rivalries, his plans had little hope of succeeding.

Third, he offered no solution to the problem of State collapse.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

CHAPTER 3

DIFFICULTIES FACED BY RABBANI AS PRESIDENT

Burhanuddin Rabbani without creation of power vacuum got the seat of power from Sibghatullah Mujaddidi on 28 June 1992; people around him had closely encircled him. The people and supporter around Burhanuddin Rabbani were not extraordinary people. Anyhow, Burhanuddin Rabbani and his people were expected to improve the situation. Optimism dominated pessimism. Some centers of the power came into being. Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan, the ruling party was abuzz with fictional politics. There were people in the Jamiat-e-Islami who wanted share in the government for organisations of the Jamiat in Peshawar. The government posts should be allocated, as far as possible, on that bases and the shura of the Jamiat-e-Islami should hold the authority. Ahmad Shah Masood, commander of the Jamiat-e-Islami did not like this attitude. He did not consider the shura of the Jamiat-e-Islami of any value and considered most of them as idle and worthless. On the other hand, he claimed to have helped Jamiat-e-Islami to attain the power, and held control over the forces around Kabul. He did not give any importance to the opinion of the other side and unofficially inducted the second-row people of the Jamiat-e-Islami. With the passage of time, most of them wanted to be treated as the first-row people of the Jamiat-e-Islami. They obeyed his orders. In fact, Ahmad Shah Masood had grabbed this competence, that is, whenever Burhanuddin Rabbani wanted to take any action in state affairs, he would first seek consent of Ahmad Shah Masood before making any announcement.²¹⁵ However, when Ahmad Shah Masood wanted to take any action, he would first take action and then inform Burhanuddin Rabbani that such and such action, which was deemed necessary, was taken. Although the power was attained with the help of Ahmad Shah Masood, members of the shura of the Jamiat-e-Islami were inducted on high posts of the government but they could not have the desired powers. With the increasing pressure from Gulbudin Hikmatyar from Chaar Asiab, the power and

²¹⁵ Interview of Col Sultan Imam, Ex ISI Col, with the author.

importance of Ahmad Shah Masood also increased and gave him opportunity to take action independently. Ahmad Shah Masood accommodated his own people in important ministries, such as ministries of foreign affairs, internal affairs, security, defense, banks and municipalities and received updated information about those ministries and departments. Even when he left the defense ministry, there happened no change in the affairs.²¹⁶

The Kabul city moaned under the government of Mujahideen for seven months. One month lapsed over the term of the presidency of Burhanuddin Rabbani fixed in the Peshawar Accord. Opponents and supporters of the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani knew that the Peshawar Accord was not honored. Rabbani should have relinquished the power one month earlier according to that Accord. Instead, he resorted to stabilize the bases of his power on one excuse or the other. Burhanuddin Rabbani said that his existence in power was necessary to ensure existence of the Jihadi government. His remaining in power in that critical phase might streamline the affairs of the state, particularly the government of Mujahideen. With formation of the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, pressure and threats from Gulbudin Hikmatyar increased. The people expected a large-scale killing and destruction. The people in the government, particularly in charge of defense ministry, guessed that they were able to resist the pressure and defend the areas of Kabul under their control.²¹⁷

3.1 Burhanuddin Rabbani Government's Relations with Jumbish-e-Mili and the situation of Mazar Sharif

It was said about Babrak Karmal and other highly placed people and militants of Parcham that they were based in the area of Hairatan, in the north of Samangan, on the bank of river Oxus and provided guidance to the Jumbish-e-Mili party. The Jumbish-e-Mili was obliged to the generosity of Ahmad Shah Masood for its political stability and military strength. He might have been constrained, or could not understand that in future the

²¹⁶ Interview with Muhammad Sediq Chakary, Minister of Information and Technology of Rabbani Cabinet, with the author.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

Jumbish-e-Mili would prove more harmful to him than Gulbudin Hikmatyar. The defeat of Hizb-e-Islami in Kabul strengthened the positions of militia forces. The Jumbish-e-Mili maintained close relations with Hizb-e-Wahdat. Most of the people of Hizb-e-Wahdat were Shiaa from Hazara community. During the course of revolution, they received sufficient arms and deployed in the western and south-western parts of Kabul. This party had strong bases in Deh Mazang, Karta-e-Chahar, Kota-e-Sangi, Mehtab Qala and Dar-ul-Aman areas of Kabul city. Cordial relations of General Rashid Dostum with this group enhanced the confidence of Burhanuddin Rabbani in him. With increasing confidence of Burhanuddin Rabbani in General Rashid Dostum, moved the latter close to Ahmad Shah Masood. Abdul Rashid Dostum who had not lost his importance, but had rather gained more importance than the Mujahideen, did not find Ahmad Shah Masood up to his taste. He thought of making friends among his Mujahideen and commanders in the north and persuading them to join his circle. Wide range publicity in favor of General Rashid Dostum, who was called Dostum Pacha (King Dostum) in areas under his control, was carried out. The commanders, who had seen General Rashid Dostum in line of supporters of the government, made it a good excuse to derive benefit from him. Existence of the fronts of Hizb-e-Islami under the command of Mohammad Naseem Mehdi near the Jumbish-e-Milid made a way for the opportunists and made it clear to them that joining General Rashid Dostum and work under his command did jeopardize their status of jihadi. Defection of Uzbek commanders from Kunduz and Takhar and even the Persian commanders from Badakhshan and Takhar rang the bell of danger in the ears of Ahmad Shah Masood. He was compelled to threaten them and taunt them how could they dare obey the militia with such a long past of the jihad. These words reached General Rashid Dostum and he was told that Ahmad Shah Masood was thinking of his isolation. The situation taught General Rashid Dostum that Mujahideen would never understand him independently. He turned to attract and win people from the organizations and bolstered his foreign relations. During his visits abroad, he explained his position to receive financial and armed assistances. The Islamic government considered that the internal situation and de facto control of General Rashid Dostum over the northern provinces of the country hindered watching his activities. General Rashid Dostum received assistance from Uzbekistan, Turkey, Iran, and even Russia. General

Rashid Dostum was thinking to introduce his Jumbish-e-Mili as an Islamic organization to Jihadi parties. The Jumbish-e-Mili, which had strong-armed leadership, was deprived of academic and administrative leadership. General Rashid Dostum did not accept his administrative weakness. In a meeting with a government representative when he had ruptured his link with the government and was involved in hostilities and wanted more share in structure and establishment of the government, he said;

“You think that I don’t have personnel competence and a program, and a Pehlawan, uneducated and imprudent etc. Let us bind ourselves to fair distribution of power by any standard that you accept and doing that. If the standard is military strength, come on, consider the number of arms, armed persons, armed units, organization and training and share the power proportionately. If you don’t accept this standard, the power should be shared on the basis of public service, development in the area and technical hands. We may consider the issue on the other side, I know that you have a job in Kabul, there is a war, if you cannot work in Kabul, your excuse may urge to show what work have you done in Badakhshan, Takhar and Kunduz, which are quite peaceful and hundred percent loyal to you? What Burhanuddin Rabbani had done in his home-land Badakhshan? Millions of Afghanis had been spent, but there is not a single Hotel in Faiz Abad, the capital of Badakhshan where a guest could stay for a night, there is no road to facilitate traffic of vehicular transport, forget about school, garden, and parks, what is the reason that there is no guest house with hygienic and sanitary systems in Faiz Abad. I will not mention about industrial works and about other provinces of the country, which support the government. Burhanuddin Rabbani may make an excuse or may already have some excuses. He cannot make any excuse as regards the provinces that I referred to except for negligence, inability, lack of any program and consideration. Whereas in areas under my control - I, an illiterate Pehlawan (Dostum) in spite of clashes with the government and Turan Ismail Khan, look, how many new works have been completed. How many buildings have been constructed at Mazar-e-Sharif and Shibarghan, roads have been improved and projects on construction of roads is going on. Very soon, Mazar-e-Sharif will have gas for fuel. Markets are lively. Law and orders situation is totally normal. The roads, where my personnel have been deployed, are safe for traffic. Factories are working and an airport was built in Shibarghan. There are suitable hotels. My

commanders make good and strong constructions. In my opinion, it is a beautiful area. Like others, whatever we collect we don't transfer that abroad. Commanders or others cannot lift and take abroad the buildings; they will remain in this country. We have aptitude for administration and leadership of the country and, in this regard, we are not behind others. What is the reason that we should not have appropriate place in distribution of power. You should convince me, I will accept that, otherwise what I demand that should be accepted, it is in your interest also”²¹⁸

Most of the followers of Jumbish-e-Mili were ethnic Turk. They thought that their status would be dubious in the eyes of every government as the militias under the command of Rashid Dostum are composed of ethnic Uzbek. A political organisation (Jumbish-e-Islami) may be useful to them. This trend had brought them closer. Some of the people in Jumbish, particularly Generals and army officers who had performed notable services in the previous regime, were worried about their destiny. They found the shelter of Jumbish as a haven and received remarkable material assistance as well. Local commanders generally called Pehlawan and mostly deprived of education and morality became rich and opulent. They had occupied most of landed properties and had raised most of hotels and buildings. They considered it without any doubt that they acquired affluent positions with the blessing of the Jumbish.

As mentioned, the Jumbish-e-Mili-Islami was on the decline. The people of Shibarghan province had more power and expenditures in that province more than any other province. On the other hand, the non-Uzbek allies did not like General Rashid Dostum who was affiliated with leftist organizations and the obvious dominant position of Uzbek. Internal intrigues, particularly among Pehlawans, and unfair distribution of wealth casually scratch their minds. The idea, although weak, prevailed about rotation of the leadership of the Jumbish.

²¹⁸ Interview of Dr Bashar, An expert on Afghan affairs living in US, with the author.

The Jumbish did not have any ideological base but wanted to work as an ideological group. Allies of General Rashid Dostum were not happy with the dominance of the defectors from the previous regime. They were moved temperamentally to demonstrate their feeling on an opportune moment.²¹⁹

Anyhow, deviation of the Islamic revolution warmed up the national issues. Nationalities developed worries for their own existence. Even regional relationship grew into a vogue, for example, the Nooristanis who had started struggle for integration on nationality basis demanded a united Nooristan. They achieved the province of Nooristan. The ideas of greater Nangharhar and greater Kandahar were afloat. In this context, General Rashid Dostum was able to make a place for Uzbek nationality in the line of nationalities, among which the Pushtun and the Tajik were in majority, the issue that would threaten unity and integrity of Afghanistan. It was proposed that Uzbek and other minor nationalities and their participation in affairs relating to their joint country should be considered in good will, fairly and justly, which would contribute to stability, national -unity and geographical integrity.

A delegation comprising Abdul Rahim Karimi, minister for construction, Sultan Hussain Khan, deputy minister for planning, Rasuli, deputy minister for constructions and two subject specialists from each of the ministries of construction and planning, was on a visit to Tashkent and Moscow to discuss with authorities of those countries construction of the Hairatan road. In fact, the delegation was assigned, besides the official business, to explore ways and means for strengthening relations with Uzbekistan and Russia, the delegation arrived at Mazar-e-Sharif on 7th February 1993 and held meetings with Moulavi Mohammad Alam, The Governor and General Abdul Malik chief of foreign relations of the Jumbish, whom the government wanted to join the delegation. In view of unfriendly relations of the Jumbish with the government, Abdul Malik met the delegation but declined the offer of joining it on the visit; He did not like to become a member of the official delegation, which might be interpreted in Uzbekistan that the Jumbish was working under the Kabul government. In meeting with the Governor, General Rashid

²¹⁹ Ibid.

Dostum had accepted Maulavi Mohammad Ata, who belonged to Jamiat-e-Islami, on certain conditions. Relations between the two were not good. General Rashid Dostum conveyed orders to him to make him understand that he was the boss and he should obey his orders. Hence, the governor was directed, to hand over the workshop of the ministry for construction to the army. The directive was issued at a time when the governor could not make any excuse or ignore it. The order of General Rashid Dostum must be obeyed, because the rival would think that he was looking for an excuse to justify removal of the governor. The workshop was transferred to the army of General Rashid Dostum in presence of the minister for construction.²²⁰

The delegation went to the factory of fertilizer to meet General Rashid Dostum. One of the guesthouses of Rashid Dostum was there. A short meeting was held with General Rashid Dostum in the evening. He received the delegation, as a foreign delegation in fact; there was nothing to ask General Rashid Dostum about or to give him any piece of information. He was informed of the visit. Rashid Dostum, whose guard also was composed of Generals, had the office furnished and decorated better than offices of other leaders of jihadi parties. During talks, he wanted to explain his opposition to the central government. He said that a vehicle or two of wheat for him were sent from Uzbekistan. Information was given, to the defense minister that sealed vehicles were coming on road from Uzbekistan to Mazar-e-Sharif, whereas two tons of notes were brought in airplanes and Dostum did not ask where that money had gone? For payment of salaries to my officials for seven months, about one billion and a few hundred millions of Afghanis were sent, which was a very ordinary amount. He told that he handled foreign relations independently and did not care for the central government and if necessary concluded agreements with them. He talked about his meetings with foreign delegates and revealed his draft contacts with them. General Rashid Dostum added that he had proposed sale of gas from Shabargarhan to Kyrgyzia and had held preliminary negotiations in that connection. In the last he indicated that Jumbish-e-Milli was not a government but was linked to the central government.

²²⁰ Interview of Mohammad Sediq Cahakary, Minister of information and Technology of Rabbani Cabinet, with the author.

Having criticized the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, General Dostum expressed his disgust against Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Masood and said that he was keeping a watch on what are happenings in Mazar-e-Sharif. The General expressed concern over and contradicted the accusations that Uzbekistan was supplying arms and ammunition to him or providing facilities for supply of arms by Russia to Mazar-e-Sharif for the Jumbish. He mentioned the two tons of money and wanted to say that Russia was helping the central government and not him. At this time, the General Rashid Dostum did not have sufficient information of the amount of the money. There was no need of two tons of money in sealed airplanes. He wanted to give impression to the delegation that there was no must of involvement of the delegation from the central government in the affairs in areas under his control. Inter alias, discussion on the Hairatan-Herat high way to link neighboring countries. Which was listed in the assignments of the delegation, was opened vainly. General Rashid Dostum made it clear that he would take decision as regards the Hairatan-Herat highway and whosoever was to responsible for area from Herat to Chaman.

General Rashid Dostum did not say anything about his visit to America scheduled in February 1993; it was known that he was preparing for that visit. Rashid Dostum was scheduled to go, along with some companions to Uzbekistan via Hairatan in February 1993. From there, he was to travel to Paris and then to US. The US invited Rashid Dostum directly as a ruler of a part of Afghanistan without informing the central government.²²¹ Involvement in the fighting had so crippled the Burhanuddin Rabbani government that it could not do anything but to silence. Invitation from US to General Rashid Dostum was considered to have been aimed at taking advantage of the situation through Rashid Dostum and his friends. During Rabbani government, invitations from foreign countries to Rashid Dostum and other influential people and their relations with those countries, government and parties, and tempting them to autonomy, provide causes for weakening of the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani and it was considered a step towards its fall.

²²¹ Ibid.

Changes that took place in Kabul and other cities due to transfer of power and change of the government were not visible in the areas under control of General Rashid Dostum. The people around Rashid Dostum one time supporters of communism and most of them belonged to KHAD. Members of leftist parties such as Sitam-e-Milli and its fractions, hang over around the General and his army. This group was not satisfied with Rashid Dostum and did not like his obedience to the dictation from Babrak Karmal, leader of Parcham party. They knew it, that they should take advantage of their duties in the system of General Rashid Dostum to explore ways and means for them in the future.²²²

The organization of Jumbish-e-Milli was composed of ethnic Uzbek, Tajik from Ismaili sect of Kiyani and a small number from other minorities. Uzbek forces under Pehlwan Ghaffar in Daulat Abad were the pillars of the system of General Rashid Dostum. Some Generals from the previous system were the pawns, which rolled and protected the wheel of the system of Rashid Dostum. These military officers and henchmen of Babrak Karmal maintained relations of the Jumbish-e-Mili with former Soviet Union. Some high-ranking officers from the previous regime kept contacts with both, Rashid Dostum and Ahmad Shah Masood. General Momin Tajik, allegedly the ideological profounder of the Jumbish, was counted among the influential people of this system, a number of mujahedeen of Hizb-e-Islami under Mohammad Naseem Mehdi were forming a part of the jumbish. A number of previous Mujahedeen had not joined the Jumbish-e-Mili. In spite of this defection to the Jumbish and their good relations, their differences and doubts regarding the Jumbish were not covert. They considered the Jumbish dangerous for them and felt ashamed of being under the leadership of the people from the previous regime against whom they had fought and had killed their relatives. It was not unexpected that they might prepare themselves for the day to display their anger and wrath.²²³

After the fall of Dr. Najeebullah regime, Rashid Dostum immediately won favor of Uzbek Ulema and wanted to provide cover of being a brave person, Muslim and fighter

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ibid.

for legitimate rights of ethnic Uzbek for his face known previously for being naughty, militant and killer. The nickname-Gilam jum of this group was blurred in the minds of the people of Afghanistan soon and it ultimately faded away in the Northern parts of the country. It, however, remained for some time in Southern and Eastern provinces. Gilam Jum was the nickname of a man of general Dostum, but it was later applied to all the people of Rashid Dostum for the sake of fluency and smoothness.

A number of Moulavies²²⁴ were seen in the system of General Rashid Dostum in Northern provinces. A number of them strongly supported him and considered his leadership Islamic. In February 1993 condolence meeting was arranged in the mosque of the shrine of Hazrat Ali 'Karamallah Wajhu' in memory of Maulavi Mansoor, who along with seven others was killed due to an explosion in his car. Some Mullahs praised Rashid Dostum and the Jumbish from the pulpit of that mosque. It would not be surprising if someone else had done so. The surprise strikes the mind that they support every strong man and militant, as they like and propagate that his system man and militant conforms to Shairat and issue fatwa.²²⁵ They confuse the poor people as to who is true and speak of Shariat. According to Allama Iqbal they (God forbid) surprise God and his Messenger (PBUH). This is not limited to the number of Mullahs who were loyal to General Rashid Dostum. A number of others also stand in this row. For example, Hizb-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Islami, both led by Muslim leaders, were at war. Most of the Ulema in organizations considered the stand of their respective organizations as Islamic and according to Shariat and the stand of the rival party as un-Islamic and contrary to Shariat and dubbed it as insurgent. It is worth mentioning that a number of Ulema had not

²²⁴ Mawlawi (also spelled: *Maulvi*, *Moulvi* and *Mawlvi*) is an honorific Islamic religious title often, but not exclusively, given to Sunni Muslim religious scholars or Ulema preceding their names, similar to the titles Maulana, Mullah or Shaykh. Mawlawi generally means any religious cleric or teacher. Usually, a Maulvi would have completed some studies in a madrasa (Islamic school) or Darul Uloom (Islamic seminary). In some cultures, the title "Mawlawi" indicates a more basic level of learning than other religious titles; "Maulana" or "Shaykh" often suggesting a more highly-qualified level of Islamic scholarship than "Mawlawi". It is commonly used throughout the Persian-influenced Muslim world, including Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia and South Asia (where it is pronounced as *Moulavi*), South East Asia and East Africa. The word Mawlawi/Maulvi is a Persian word, which itself is derived from the Arabic word "Mawla", which means, "master" or "lord".

²²⁵ Verdict according to Islamic injunctions

involved themselves in this practice and had escaped this riddle on the pretext of Ijtihad.²²⁶

The situation in the city of Mazar-e-Sarif was not bad. Business was going on. Markets were crowded. Stores and shops were full of merchandise. The merchandise of merchants arrived in the city via Hairatan port and then supplied to other parts. Tax at Hairatan port was important source of income of General Rashid Dostum. High taxes and blackmailing by commanders had raised the prices. General Rashid Dostum controlled his area independently. He did not inform the center government about his income and supports the idea of federation. He tried to give an impression that the law and order situation in his area was good, as compared to other areas, the economic condition had improved. Obviously, there was no complaint against General Rashid Dostum in Mazar-e-Sharif. People demonstrated their satisfaction and were busy in their own works. Civil and military officers considered that the system of the General Rashid Dostum was stable and they strived to devise further developments by all means. Army ranks were given liberally like Kabul, but not to everyone. In these areas, Rashid Dostum was called the Padshah [Military commanders in North of Afghanistan normally called as Padshah]. The people would call him Dostum Padshah. With Dostum, some had armed money and fame, whereas some others who were affluent in the past were on the decline.²²⁷

Armed men had gained good facilities. Labels of usurpation of properties of others had been stuck on some high-ranking officials in the province. For example, the kindergarten had been purchased by a commander named Ustad Atta and had been converted into his residence. Governor Maulavi Alam purchased one school at 9 million Afghanis and had acquired its ownership. Dr. Amir Mohammad Rayes, teacher in the Engineering University in this province confirmed these stories. He said; the house of Maulavi Mohammad was previously a government guesthouse. Another person in the name of Fateh Pehlawan referred to three-storey and four-storey buildings around the shrine,

²²⁶ Exegesis of Divine law on matters of theology and law, practice of religious jurisprudence

²²⁷ Interview of Mohammad Sediq Cahakary, Minister of information and Technology of Rabbani Cabinet, with the author.

which belonged to Pehlawans of the regime of General Rashid Dostum, Pehlawan Rasul and Pehlawan Ghaffar. They had purchased these plots from their owners by force. The building in proximity of the shrine was said to have been purchased by Pehlawan Rasul from its owner by force on payment of Afghans thirteen thousand lakhs (1,300,000,000(12000\$)).²²⁸

In those day-and-night celebrations, gambling was held, Buzkashi²²⁹ was played every day. It is said that bags of money were put in bid in the gambling. The minimum chal²³⁰ (bid), in the terms of gamblers, was not less than seven million Afghans (6000\$). Each commander had brought a large number of Buzkashi horses. It is said that one commander had brought three hundred horses.

Although there was no apparent opposition to General Rashid Dostum, in Mazar-e-Sharif, yet the sharp sight could perceive a serious threat to his system and his rule. Choked and silent opposition and potential suppression dissatisfaction prevailed among different groups. From discussion with a teacher of the Engineering University of Balkh Amir Mohammad, it appeared that dues, even in academic institutions, were not given on merits. Nepotism, tribal and ethnic affiliations were kept in view. Cadres of these institutions were not satisfied in this situation. Those who hold military power do make others do what they like and intervene even in those affairs, which were not, at all, in their jurisdiction, and issue orders, for example, in the university.

Differences of mujahedeen with the remnants of the Dr. Najeebullah regime under, the banner of Jumbish-e-Milli and leadership of Rashid Dostum in Mazar-e-Sharif had not

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ An equestrian game in which riders compete to gain control of a goat or calf carcass that has been decapitated and dehoofed. Buzkashi likely originated as an entertaining variant of ordinary herding or raiding. It is popular predominantly among Turkic peoples in Afghanistan but can be found in the Muslim republics of Central Asia and in parts of northwestern China. Buzkashi has two main forms. The traditional version, *tudabaray*, has no formal teams and is not played within clearly defined boundaries. Games often involve hundreds of riders, and the objective is to gain sole possession of the carcass and ride it free and clear of all other riders. The modern government-sponsored *qarajay* style involves two teams of 10 – 12 riders that contend on a defined field with goals. Beginning in the early 1950s, the Kabul-based Afghan government hosted national tournaments.

²³⁰ Chal means the amount of money put in the centre by one gambler and the rival is invited to similar action

yet ended. Some Mujahedeen had achieved authorities and posts in the system. This group was not content with the situation prevailing in the centre, or it received financial benefits or foresees from its thorough assessment that the revolution had slipped from its course. In this wave of opposition to General Rashid Dostum and remnants of the previous regime, they did not deem any action reasonable, because it might not yield benefits on the whole. The others who were not concerned about the reasons did not take any move, due to fear and weakness and were in wait of an opportunity.

Internal differences existed between big commanders of the Jumbish, most of whom were illiterate and were worried about more power, authority and money. Differences between the people attached to Khalq and Parcham were not ignorable. Leaders of the latter resided in Hairatan province close to Mazar-e-Sharif, General Rashid Dostum reined these differences so that they should not surface and become into reality in the field. Differences related to the factions of Sitam-e-Milli, present in civil and military setups of the Jumbish, were there but not so tense, because they were not so strong and, unlike people from Khalq and Parcham, they were deprived of encouragement from abroad or support from 'the countries with whom General Rashid Dostum maintained close relations. Khalqies kept upper hand in military system. Their professionals held good positions in land forces and air force. The system of Rashid Dostum might cracked without their presence. Parchams had share in the military strength of the General also, but their political and propagandistic men kept the system alive most of the decisions were proposed by them. They 'administered the system of General Rashid Dostum'. It appeared from the presence and conditions of the people of these factions in other countries and inside Afghanistan that the following method was applied to avert their differences.²³¹

Khalqies were engaged in their duties in Mazar-e-Sharif and activists of Parcham had been sent to neighboring countries and Russia to work there for the Jumbish and prepare conducive conditions for advancement of the interests of the Jumbish. It is evident that Parcham was run the political leadership while Jumbish and Khalqies were well placed in

²³¹ Interview of Col Sultan Imam, Ex ISI Col, with the author.

its military set up. Rashid Dostum knew that this policy would not cause elimination. Strong tribal units convince and enable Dostum to avert such a danger, on the other hand Dostum was satisfied that Khalqies and Parchamies were not liked by the people, they were not in a position to revive names of their respective parties.

Mutual rivalry among strong tribal leaders which led to strengthen one side beyond the limit and defeat the other ultimately turned into rivalry against the leadership of the Jumbish. For example, Pehlawan Rasul considered the existence of Pehlawan Dostum in the leadership of the Jumbish was indebted to his sacrifices. He had nominated his brother General Malik in the department of foreign affairs of the Jumbish as he wanted his share in political relations.

Jumbish, as a political and social party, had no contributing factor except for being ethnic Uzbek, which provided support and reason to its survival. Tribal commanders, how much strong they might be, were void of ideology, aim and political thinking. They might easily turn down in future any idea of the party except for the ethnic-oriented. In fact, Parchamies and Khalqies considered policies of the Jumbish-e-Mili as tools for their survival, and they were not in agreement with its strategy and idea. Non-Uzbek were also there among members of the Jumbish-e-Mili. They did not accept the idea of nationality as a theory, nor considered it beneficial to the Jumbish at national level. The Uzbek Mujahedeen, with some education and awareness who had ended their grudges against the Jumbish and live with them in coalition were not against the legitimate rights of Uzbek and never considered the Jumbish-e-Mili as the advocate of their desires. There were arguments that the Jumbish-e-Mili had no ground to survive as a political party. The Jumbish might exist as an ethnic group for some time by the support of Turkish countries just for survival. This influence prevailed in provinces where majority of ethnic Uzbek were visible.²³² Due to weakness of rulers and exploitation of ethnic and linguistic diversities by the parties, the country was exposed to foreign interference with risks to its geographical integrity and national sovereignty, and every nationality claimed to rule solely the country, and shed blood of other nationalities for achievement of that purpose

²³² Ibid.

and national values condemn them, then, the importance of ethnic-based party and ethnic-oriented ideology might stir in the wind, and it might become more powerful and influential.

In view of the situation, ups and downs cannot be totally ignored. The only hopeful reason for aversion of such an event was the spirit of co-existence and good relations among nationalities and tribes, which had been plagued to some extent. Recklessness on the part of rulers and armed men from nationalities, particularly the nationalities that considered themselves in majority or the minorities that listened to their foreign links, became the cause of such tragedy.

3.2 Rabbani Relations with Hizb-e-Islami (Hikmatyar) and Hizb-e-Wahdat

Hizb-e-Islami, which had expectedly retreated from Kabul, intensified fighting in Kabul on the plea of presence of Uzbek militia and other nationalities. It is estimated that more than 2,000 people in Kabul were killed in this fight. Most of the houses were destroyed, and the people were compelled to migrate to other places. They went towards Jalalabad, Peshawar and Mazar-e-Sharif etc. This fight did affect the militias. Most of the shells did not drop there but inside the city and houses. The people said that most of the personnel behind the heavy weapons were Khalqies. They were once friendly to the militias of Rashid Dostum. Now they were taking revenge upon the people of Kabul and Mujahedeen in the city. The pressure from Hizb-e-Islami enhanced the stand of militias in the eyes of the government. The brunt was borne by civilian population of Kabul and the windfall was collected by militias. Publicity and attacks on the Government convinced Burhanuddin Rabbani that he needed support of militias and it was necessary to deploy them in the line of defense.²³³

Iran, waiting for an opportunity, found the conditions conducive to attain more privileges for Hizb-e-Wahdat, the party of Shias and considered as a strong and religious supporter of Iran. Iran instigated Hizb-e-Wahdat to increase their demands and weaken Ittehad-e-

²³³ Roy Oliver, *Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War*, Princeton University Press, 1995, pp.45-120

Islami led by Ustad Sayaf considered as being pro-Saudi. This move was not in favor of the government. Burhanuddin Rabbani government decided to bring Hizb-e-Wahdat under control by force. Ustad Sayaf who was beside the Government of Burhanuddin Rabbani tried to convince the government that it was possible and easy to achieve. It was, however, proved later that it was not possible even with heavy losses in life and material. The leader of that party, Abdul Mazari, surrendered to the Taliban at the risk of life but did not surrender to the Government of Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masood.

The clash between Ittehad-e-Islami and Wahdat turned into a clash between the government and the Wahdat. Hizb-e-Islami exploited this condition, established relations with Wahdat and, thus, extended his move in the west of Kabul under the control of Hizb-e-wahdat. Other parties like Jabha-e-Nejat-e-Milli, Mahaz Milli, Harkat-e-Inqilab of Moulavi Mohammad Nabi, Hizb-e-Islami of Moulavi Khalis who were alarmed by the offensive attitude of Jamiat-e-Islami and self-conceit of Ahmad Shah Masood were not serious in condemning Hizb-e-Islami. Their closeness in those days to Hizb-e-Islami was not deniable. A joint communiqué of these parties was signed and the Jamiat considered it a kind of coup d'état.²³⁴ Hizb-e-Wahdat also joined and supported Hizb-e-Islami in the fight between Hizb-e-Islami and Burhanuddin Rabbani government. Consequently, Hizb-e-Islami, which was confined to Chaar Asiab, was able to move towards the west. The prowess of the Amir of Hizb-e-Islami and the hindsight of some authorities of the Burhanuddin Rabbani government, particularly commanders of Shura-e-Nazar, resulted in the alliance, although ostensible, between Hizb-e-Wahdat and Hizb-e-Islami.

At the apex of the war of Hizb-e-Islami against Burhanuddin Rabbani government, this idea cropped up that Islamabad is supported Hizb-e-Islami and incited it to fight. Intervention of some other countries in this fight could not be overruled. This question is pertinent to be raised, why Pakistan supports the war against the government, which was established after hard struggle in Peshawar and the Peshawar Accord was signed by leaders of jihad? Why that power wants Hizb-e-Islami in power when its leader was

²³⁴ Ibid

absent from the meetings held for the Peshawar Accord and the representative of that Hizb put the seal awkwardly in the foot of the said Accord.

It may not be far from truth that the Government of Pakistan supported Hizb-e-Islami during jihad. This Hizb received more aids and performed certain important tasks so much so that other parties blamed Hizb-e-Islami that it was tool in the hands of Pakistan and is staunch supporter of that country, and whatever Pakistan wanted Hizb-e-Islami will do it; in particular the support extended by ISI [Inter Services Intelligence of Pakistan] was an undeniable fact. In Pakistan, Hizb-e-Islami carried out certain jobs that other parties could not do. Presence of the Hizb in Peshawar (Pakistan) confirmed these blames. With all these, followers of the parties were convinced that Hizb-e-Islami was an organized and disciplined party; obedience and respect for ranks with active and determined leader were there. The Hizb had the qualities which a strong party needed.

Gulbudin Hikmatyar, head of the party, denied such blames from time to time. He gave his arguments and defended his position through the publications of the Hizb, particularly daily *Shahadat*²³⁵. He argued that in many important cases other parties supported and followed the policy of Pakistan despite their engagement in activities in the interest of their own and the nation. Hizb-e-Islami had taken clear stance according to the will and policy of the party and the nation, for example, in the case of occupation of Kuwait by Iraq other parties of Mujahideen supported the policy of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan sent their people to the war under the command of Americans and their allies, whereas Hizb-e-Islami rejected that and took a stand against that. The Amir of the Hizb enumerates some other similar occasions when the Hizb had opposed and acted against the will of Pakistan. Wherever and whenever it was under pressure, even then it did not ignore the interests of the party and the nation. Gulbudin Hekmatyar had rejected the Peshawar Accord, which divided the tenures of presidency between Mojaddedi and Rabbani at the behest of Pakistan, and accepted that only under compulsion.²³⁶

²³⁵ A daily news paper of Hezb-e-Islami party (Hekmatyar)

²³⁶ Interview of Rahimullah Yousafzai, An expert on Afghan affairs and Bureau Chief of The News International, with the author.

The arguments of those who thought of Pakistan's intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and intensification of the war between Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and Ahmad Shah Masood in Kabul to overthrow the Islamic government were, that the Burhanuddin Rabbani Government considered itself independent and wanted to rule independently. The government did not give any attention to opinions and expectations of Pakistan, Burhanuddin Rabbani government established relations with others including India, the enemy of Pakistan in the region and Russians. This policy of independent of Burhanuddin Rabbani government annoyed authorities in Pakistan, particularly members of ISI. They felt that their painful efforts for a few years were wasted and thought of bringing Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, old and confidential friend, into power. Authorities of the said organization (ISI) wanted to weaken the Government of Burhanuddin Rabbani and compel it to obey their orders. Some people thought that Ahmad Shah Masood was a dubious character and was considered hostile to Pakistan. His relations with India and some other countries, which were against Pakistan, made a serious problem for Pakistan.²³⁷

Those Pakistanis who supported the Peshawar Accord did not feel fear of the four-month presidency of the Amir of Jamiat Burhanuddin Rabbani. They speculated that Burhanuddin Rabbani should stay in power for four months and then, with formation of a shura of the Jamiat including one or two commanders, the power would transfer. They knew about the lack of understanding in that setup. They found a situation quite different from what they imagined. Ahmad Shah Masood inflicted a technical blow on the members of the shura of the Jamiat and kept them away from the base of the power and decision-making. Leader of the Jamiat, Burhanuddin Rabbani, was able to solve this problem although he was aware of its consequences. Most of the followers of Jamiat considered Ahmad Shah Masood as the only person with capability to inflict defeat on Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. The organizational structure of the Jamiat had lost its value and, instead, Shura-e-Nazar caught the eye in Kabul. Some of the Jamiat leaders joined that shura. Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was unable to fill up that gap, considered that if this situation continued to prevail he will no longer be a symbol. Sooner and later this

²³⁷ Ibid.

dangerous stub will have to fall. Burhanuddin Rabbani also was worried about his own safety. He wanted to raise forces in Kabul under his command. He initiated strengthening the 'Republican Guards' and brought people from Takhar and Badakhshan provinces to take part in fighting against the enemy and defending the positions. To some extent, this action helped him.²³⁸ Anyhow, support of Pakistan to Gulbudin Hikmatyar was a proven fact. Later, both the sides committed acts that substantiated the doubts and worsened the relations. Some parties made efforts to fill the gap and explore a way to end the differences between the two organizations. Most of these parties carried pro-Hikmatyar seals on their foreheads. One of these parties was Jamaat Islami-i-Pakistan led by Qazi Hussain Ahmad.²³⁹

3.3 Peace Efforts by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Jalalabad Shura

Pakistan was attached to the 14-year period of Jihad in such a way that it could not ignore it easily. Pakistan initiated efforts, in collaboration with Saudi Arabia, to persuade the warring parties to return to negotiations for a peaceful solution. Avenue was set in Islamabad for negotiations and then the crowded delegations from both parties were invited to Makkah (Muslims Holy place in Saudi Arabia) so that they should take oath in the House of ALLAH to set aside their differences and act upon the present agreement. The door of the House of ALLAH (KABBA) was opened for them. They performed *nawafil* and shed tears (expression of penitence). However, the devil accompanied them everywhere, even in this holy house, too, it was on their shoulders. On return to the country, the tears had not yet dried on their cheeks and the words of the agreement were still wet, when the same differences and behavior resurrected and all hopes of the nation were dashed. All the parties joined this chore and shared its rewards and punishments. The guarantees of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were spoiled. Hizb-e-Islami extended war front to the west, the place was under the control of its ally, the Shiaa party of Wahdat. Hizb-e-Islami took advantage of the change of the battle and escalation in fighting in that area and diverted attention of the government from Charassiab and Logar.²⁴⁰

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ The Pakistan times (Daily), Islamabad, September 1, 1993



May 25, 1992: Ahmad Shah Masood (2nd from left) signing agreement with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

In this war in which the government had gained upper hand, the shura of Jalalabad initiated intermediation. This shura invited the jihadi leaders to attend the parleys at Jalalabad. The leaders accepted that invitation. The shura of Jalalabad comprised representatives from jihadi parties of three provinces Kunar, Laghman and Nangharhar. Hizb-e-Islami, on the basis of its strength in these provinces, had got remarkable share in this shura. People from the Hizb-e-Islami were holding important offices in these provinces. Despite this heterogeneous composition, the shura of Jalalabad apparently obeyed the government and received huge funds and budget from the centre. This shura received notable income from the customs at Torkham (Pak-Afghan border) and did not care for instruction in this regard from the government. This mediation demonstrated independence of the Jalalabad shura from the central government and stabilized more its position. It considered its position as an organization in power. It was rumored that if the leaders did not reach any agreement at Jalalabad, they would be detained there.²⁴¹ The rumors gained plausibility that jihadi leaders were detained as hostages for an imposed

²⁴¹ Ibid.

decision. In some northern provinces, it was criticized. Ustad Sayaf came to Kabul on the pretext to stop the fighting there. He was then a staunch supporter of Jamiat-e-Islami and used disdainful language about Gulbudin Hikmatyar. A decision was taken at Jalalabad which allowed Burhanuddin Rabbani to retain presidency for another one and a half year with Gulbudin Hikmatyar as the Prime Minister. The defense ministry under the command of Ahmad Shah Masood was to be administered by Burhanuddin Rabbani and the interior ministry by Engineer Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai from Ittehad-e-Islami to be given to Hizb-e-Islami. Gulbudin Hikmatyar knew that placing the defense ministry under order of Burhanuddin Rabbani would not make any change in the power and interference of Ahmad Shah Masood, but ostensibly his demand for removal of Ahmad Shah Masood from the defense ministry was met. Later Gulbudin Hikmatyar agreed to accept Ahmad Shah Masood to be within the defense ministry, but Ahmad Shah Masood did not take any interest in participation of the Amir of Hizb-e-Islami in the cabinet. This decision stripped Ittehad-e-Islami of the power by allocation of the interior ministry to Hizb-e-Islami, the power, which that party did not consider of any importance. Ittehad-e-Islami could not use it as a tool of pressure against others. Jamiat-e-Islami headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani convened a shura, called it the *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-aqd*. Before convening of this shura, a commission was set up with members from *jihadi* parties to decide its structure and role and prepare an act for it. Jamiat-e-Islami strove to gather its supporters in this shura, and it was done like this. On different occasions, other parties except Ittehad-e-Islami of Ustad²⁴² Sayyaf boycotted that. The said shura gave two-year more to Burhanuddin Rabbani for retaining the presidency, but did not take any decision as regards the Prime Minister. Ustad Sayyaf, who waited for this slot, could not get any advantage of this shura. This shura inflamed more the raging war and strengthened the position of the Jalalabad shura. The existence of the Jalalabad shura was aimed at nothing else but disbandment of the *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd*. Decisions of the Jalalabad shura regarding the extension of the tenure of the president, appointment of Prime Minister and removal of certain ministers, in fact, annulled decisions of the *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd*. In spite of all this, the Jamiat and Shura-e-Nazar referred to the *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd*

²⁴² A persian word means Teacher

as a legal body. The said shura placed some of its members in Kabul as a parliament, but they had nothing to do but killing of time.²⁴³


In those days some less important events took place with ignorable impact on the government and its opposition. Fighting continued to weaken each other by all means, overtly as well as covertly. Propaganda against the President and the Prime Minister was carried out by radios of Hizb-e-Islami and the government, while Hizb-e-Islami was holding the portfolio of the prime minister in Kabul through a representative of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. This was a glimpse of the situation in the centre of the country and the performance of the government of Mujahedeen in that period.

3.4 Kabul was divided between warring parties

The area of influence of Burhanuddin Rabbani government and its allies, Ustad Sayyaf, Pir Gailani, Maulavi Mohammad Nabi and Rashid Dostum was from Pul-e-Charkhi to Hood Khel and through Jada-e-Bagh-e-Bala from Micro-royan to Paghman. Most of the areas of Khair Khana were in control of the government. Taimani and some other crosses were held by Hizb-e-Wahdat, considered as allies of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. Bagram, Hood Khel, Siah Sang, to Koh-e-Sher, gate of Qala-e-Zanburak up to Deh Mazang were in control of Hizb-e-Islami. Bala Hissar and the centre of Kabul were under the influence of the government, which were normally beaten by armed people of Hizb-e-Islami deployed in Zanburak Fort. In Deh Mazang, Karta-e-Chahar, Kota-e-Sangi, Mahtab Qala and Dar-ul-Aman were ruled by the people of Shiaa parties such as Hizb-e-Wahdat and Harkat-e-Inqilab of Mohsini. Kartysay and Jamal Mama and Kabul University were under the forces of Ahmad Shah Masood deployed in the fort of Koh-e-Asamai and in a part of Jamal Mania. Extensive fighting, shelling and bloodshed took place in this city, which was safe for a long time from the ongoing war in the country.²⁴⁴ Hizb-e-Islami, once having more fronts in the Northern areas, had not more than one or two fronts in those plateaus. Other fronts in those regions joined Ahmad Shah Masood.

²⁴³ The Pakistan times (Daily), Islamabad, September 1, 1993

²⁴⁴ Interview of Mohammad Sediq Cahakary, Minister of information and Technology of Rabbani Cabinet, with the author.



Kabul's Map:

3.5 Rabbani Government and the situation in Provinces

During Rabbani government Eastern provinces²⁴⁵ and western provinces²⁴⁶ were not under the control of central government, in these provinces each group and front was independent and their relations with the Governor and the system depended on the power and strength of the Governor or the party to which the Governor belonged. These provinces received budgets from the central government from the undefined funds. In the South Western part of the country, Turan Mohammad Ismail Khan, Governor of Herat where the people called him Amir-ul-Momineen, held the power. He had established good administration in Herat and adjacent provinces of Herat, thus, earned fame. Differences existed between him and other influential people in those provinces. There were people in Herat, who were attached to other parties, had joined Amir Ismail Khan. The people of Hizb-e-Islami and its strong front suffered defeat at the Shindand airport, and its facilities including a number of jets and helicopters fell in the hands of Amir Ismail Khan. That victory bolstered him up and lifted him to a position to think of competing with Ahmad Shah Masood. The defeat of Hizb-e-Islami at Shindand was a very serious problem for that party. Had this incident taken place at a time when someone else other than Gulbuddin Hikmatyar was the leader of Hizb-e-Islami, he would not be able to secure his existence any more. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar did not lose self-control and was not frustrated by the great loss and the loss of effective forces. He continued his activities. The Amir of the Hizb-e-Islami did not fear accountability in the organization on account of this serious defeat and great losses, because no one would question him about the event. One month before the fall of Shindand, a number of commanders of that airport, who were on duty from the time of the previous regime, came to Peshawar and stayed for some time on invitation of Dilju Hussani in the office of foreign publications, which was situated in Hayatabad Peshawar and was comparatively well equipped. They demanded money from Hizb-e-Islami for payment of salaries to the personnel of that unit

²⁴⁵ Nangharhar, Laghman, Nooristan

²⁴⁶ Balkh, Miamana, Mazar Sharif

and their requirements. Their demand was not met and they returned disappointed to Shindand. After some time, Shindand fell and the news was published.²⁴⁷

Most of the governments in Northern provinces belonged to Jamiat-e-Islami. These Governors did not give due attention to state affairs. Instead, they were doing more for securing their chairs. They were involved in intricate politics. They had not done any notable work. The situation in Baghlan was somewhat different. Areas from Doshi and Pul-e-Khumri to the crossing leading to Mazar-e-Sharif were under the forces of Syed Kiyan, belonging to Ismaili sect and allied with Jumbish. Syed Jaffar, son of Syed Mansoor Naderi, was governor of this province. The capital of the province had been shifted from Baghlan to Pul-e-Khumri. The industrial state of Baghlan, which was the capital of the province, was administered by Mamur Ghayur and Engineer Bashir of Hizb-e-Islami. They had appointed Mamur Ghayur as Governor of this province. Nahrain a district of the province of Baghlan was controlled by Haqjoo, a commander of Jaimat-e-Islami. In spite of deployment of strong fronts of Hizb-e-Islami in Badakhshan and Takhar and Mahaz-e-Milli in Kunduz, the administration of these three provinces was in the hands of Jamiat. Fronts of these parties were engaged in skirmishes and grievances, objections and demands against the government, but do not oppose its functions and administration. The militant and aggressive fronts in Takhar, which were attached to Hizb-e-Islami during the days of jihad, were in control of Ahmad Shah Masood or defeated.

In Samangan province, Jamiat and Jumbish played important roles. Although the Government of Mazar-e-Sharif had been appointed by the Jamiat, yet the real power and administration were in the hands of the Jumbish. Hizb-e-Islami, Wahdat-e-Islami and Harkat-e-Inqilabi of Mohsini also had shares in the power. Commanders of the Jamiat, in spite of having the governor from this party, were not unhappy with this organization.

²⁴⁷ Interview of Mohammad Sediq Cahakary, Minister of information and Technology of Rabbani Cabinet, with the author

Administrators of Shibarghan, Sar-e-Pul, Maimana, Jauzjan and Faryab were from the Jumbish. Fronts of other parties just marked their presence in these areas.²⁴⁸

In Ghazni, Kandahar and other Pushtun-populated areas, elements from that nationality influenced the power. In Paktia, Moulavi Mansoor of Hizb-e-Harkat who supported the government seemed in dominant position as compared to other parties and tribes.

The power was very rare, most parts of the cities of Afghanistan were dark like the future of the residents. A number of commanders, having not received salaries and perks had cut off the power line and stopped their generators. Main roads in the North and South had been blocked by people of Hizb-e-Islami. Consumer goods, fuel and commercial merchandise were rarely imported from North and South. The transport vehicles were forced to pay toll taxes in Jalalabad and at some points on the road, At the customs house in Jalalabad, one vehicle was supposed to pay about 500,000(400\$) Afghanis irrespective of the kind and weight of the load on it. The taxes on the way at Laghman and Sarobi were not less than the above amount. The road on the North which links Kabul to Mazar-e-Sharif was plagued by similar fate. Some gunmen stopped vehicles and commercial goods on one pretext or the other and extracted money, as they desired. In spite of road blockades, robbery and taxes, fuel and consumer goods were available in the city in abundance but at exorbitant rates, one liter of petrol for six thousand Afghanis (3\$) and one liter diesel for three thousand Afghanis(1.5\$). Due to soaring rates of fuel, the fare of transport had also risen. Income of the people was on the decline. Walking and cycle riding, which were useful for the health of the poor people, were common and were practiced daily without consultation of a doctor. People were forced to travel long distances on foot, for example come to the city from Khair Khana. Some made a group to pay for a taxi amounting to 1,500 Afghanis to arrive in the city. City service buses were less and the rates were not fixed. One service charged 50 Afghanis from Pashtunistan Cross to Micro-royan, and another service demanded a hundred Afghanis. City services were not sufficient. Transporters had taken their vehicles off the road due to rising prices of fuel. Financial condition and social morality had been

²⁴⁸ Ibid

shaken. Everyone, who could, think of snatching a thing from the other or getting it anyhow.

Afghanistan: Provinces



Administrative map of Afghanistan:

Monetary system was very bad. The banks didn't give cash to account holders and customers; if they did it, it was in very small amounts. The crowded bank premises looked like the reception counter of a cinema hall, which had imported a film from another country. Account holders and customers who wanted to take their money abroad sought recommendations or gave bribe. With 300 millions Afghanis in the account, one could hardly get approval for withdrawal of 5 millions in a day. The Bank did not pay

five million Afghani in five weeks. These were the conditions of the Banks. In those days, with the market rate of a dollar was 1250 Afghanis, a relative of a baron purchase it at 1150 Afghanis and cash it the next day from the bank. It is said that some other people also indulged in this practice, which contributed to the rise of the rate of dollar. The order for issuance of such a big amount from the Bank was given by authorities higher than the President of the Bank, which the Bank could not issue. Capitalists withdrew their money by all means, exchanged in the black market and transferred it abroad. The commanders with bills would go to the bank with gunmen and threaten some officials.

The economic condition of the country and the living condition of the people was from bad to worse. The surprising aspect of the bad economic condition and law and order situation was the swelling crowds of people in the markets. These swelling crowds in markets were not due to increasing job opportunities, activities and increasing incomes and purchasing power of officials. Most of the government units and civil officials were in Kabul whose expenditures were arranged by various means and borne by the government. Most of the market-visitors were from these government departments. Businessmen who dealt with government departments earned high profits. This moved the people to bring consumers goods against the odds with hopes for more profits, and, thus, swelled the crowd.²⁴⁹

In the prevailing conditions, denial of decisions and rules had become order of the day. The country was just like a jungle, in which everyone considered himself a tiger that interpreted the law and rule, took decisions and implemented them. Who-so-ever likes, he announced his will as the law and rule in the interest of the state. The state and the ruling Jamiat party held resources of strength and power and they were in a position to feel themselves stronger than others. Jamiat-e-Islami that had settled in the seat of power considered it a mistake to leave it so easily. As long as possible, it strived to explore by ways and means for retaining the power. Contest for power did not allow attention to the situation and condition of the people. The living condition of the people had become

²⁴⁹ John K Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism*, London, Pluto Press, 1999, pp.45-55

miserable, particularly of those who depended on manual labor for daily wages. The market had become dull and most of the government offices were closed. Bakers and public services carried on their work almost reluctantly. Such a condition was much painful for the residents of Kabul during the winter. Government servants were in a good condition as regards daily necessities and transport. They received assistance from the offices or the high-ranking people to whom they were attached. Stories of plunder, which was common previously, were still heard, because goods for plunder were not abundant as in the past. The notoriety of plunder had seen some ups and downs. Kidnapping of people was another practice that had become a fashion of the day. Most of the kidnapping was going on between Pushtuns and Hazaras, although it had affected other ethnic groups as well but at a low scale and that was not based on ethnic diversity. On the other hands, Hazara kidnappers held even non-Pushtuns and Pushtuns had non-Hazara hostages, but they were in a small number and their faults were not considered serious. People made stories of kidnappings depicting the callousness and lack of conscience of the kidnappers and the uncouthness of these actions. These stories were told in sarcastic way. It is said that every flat-nosed person who passed through the area of Pashtuns was considered Hazara and kidnapped and put to torture. Many flat-nosed Pushtuns fell in the trap. They were put to test that raise smoke from their heads to prove that they are Pushtuns. Or it was said that in Hazara areas controlled by armed people, the traveler whose face did not resemble Hazara's was asked 'what was it?' If that poor man said 'it is krut' pronouncing 'qrut' as 'krut' than there was no need of further investigation about his identity. He was considered Pushtun and liable to be marked with red (hot) iron. Anything could happen to him it was happened, whether he was Uzbek or Turkman or from another group that did not make difference in pronouncing 'q' and 'k'. In fact, each side kidnapped innocent and helpless people from the other side, who had to pass through its area for some work. Common men from the same ethnic groups did not like such kidnapping and hated it. Most of kidnappings were purported at financial gains or revenge. People complained of kidnapping not only against the armed people but were perturbed more by their carefree and loathsome attitude and wickedness.²⁵⁰

²⁵⁰ Mohammed Nabi Azimi, *Ordu va Siyasat*, pp 606-609

This was a glimpse of the conditions of the residents of Kabul. In those days, the people were worried about the undetermined future. There was no soul at peace in Kabul. Whatever happened to the King, it happened to the beggar. Wherever one was, he did not know what to do. The mind was so disturbed that it could not think of anything but fear and worry. A minor slip of tongue may flare up in a brawl. Those who had courage to act and take decision in such a situation and were able to take decision, their advice was to pack and leave the war zone and move to some other place, where as they thought, there was no fighting. Tens of handcarts and hundreds of people carrying quilt on their backs and some utensils under the arms, with children ahead and wife and sister in the rear, were seen on the roads, moving hither and thither like the weaving shuttle. They pushed their way through the crowd. This group had lost senses. They didn't ask about the situation in the area to which they were going. They returned to their dwellings on hearing the news that the fighting had abated as they had no other place to stay. Not a long time lapsed that the fighting raged and they were put in a worse situation.²⁵¹

That enlightened Muslims, who knew the value and respect of fighters and martyrs of *jihad* and understood the importance of sacrifices of lives and properties given by those respectable people steadfast, faithful, humanitarian and patriot persons for establishment of an Islamic government, restoration of peace and welfare of the people, was shocked to see that all these miseries, hardship, savagery, misfortune, cruelty and extortion of money were put in the account of the state and the government and the Islamic regime. Salt was sprayed on this wound that people of the former Communist regime raised their heads and said we were better, our regime was better than the Islamic regime, law and order situation was maintained in Kabul, plunder was not of that amount, poverty was not at that level and so much pain was not then felt. This misconception started when *Mujahedeen* entered Kabul and occupied government posts and this was considered as Islamic. Each new official was considered an embodiment of Islam. His actions were compared to real Islam and no discrimination was felt on the earth.²⁵²

²⁵¹ Ibid

²⁵² Roy Oliver, *Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War*, Princeton University Press, 1995, pp.55-98

3.6 Problems for Rabbani in Shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-aqd

There existed differences of opinions among the Jihadi groups, Ulema, etc. and people about the name and nomenclature of the council. The arguments of some Jihadi parties were that an Islamic council should have an Islamic name and it be given name and established according to recognized Islamic traditions. Nationalists in Jihadi parties, who called themselves nationalist parties, insisted that the name of this council should be Loya Jirga²⁵³. Their argument focused on the point that Loya Jirga is an Afghan tradition of the past and the present. Our forefathers solved their national and important problems at this forum. We had sufficient experience in Loya Jirga and had many important jirgas on record in the history. Even Pushtun tribes in villages solved their problems in tribal Jirgas. They knew the Jirga and its principles. In that situation, it was better to take advantage of this tradition. This group wanted that the present council should also be convened on the same lines that were following in the past in convention of a Loya Jirga comprising spiritual leaders, influential people, tribal chiefs and a number of nominees of the government from the countryside. The *modus operandi* of nomination of representatives and members to historical Jirgas in Afghanistan was not absolutely the same. There were modifications, which were out of the scope of this treatise. Despite these modifications, the spirit of rules and law regulating the nomination remained similar. A number of enlightened people and Afghans abroad, in West and India, supported Loya Jirga and propagated in its favor. For a number of Jihadi leaders and groups, the Loya Jirga was a tool to bring back the former King to power and make a way for his return. These parties, as Hizb-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Islami, rejected the Loya Jirga. But these parties didn't agree on the *modus operandi* for convention of a council to elect a leader. The Amir of Hizb-e-Islami had been insisting for a long time that the leadership and the council should be elected to follow the example of the election of the four Caliphs and the legislature should be elected by adult franchise. A number of Moulavi Sahibs [Moulavi Tarakhail, Moulavi Shinwari, and Moulavi Haji Gul Agha] didn't consider the elections as Shame and pleaded that an incompetent person might be

²⁵³ The Loya Jirga is a council of tribal chiefs, convened for the first time by Mir Wais at the time of the rebellion against the Safavid Empire. Later the Loya Jirga became an assembly of tribal chiefs, religious leaders and notables gathered to endorse a new sovereign or a constitutional change.

elected by the people. The inept contestants might use their financial resources, tribal and political influence to push the people to the corner and get their votes. It had been observed in the past that such people had returned to the parliament who knew nothing of the religion of Islam, even the basic obligations which every Muslim is bound to know. Correction of certain faults was easy and some other could not be rectified easily. However, election by people of those who didn't have manners to represent the society was a fact, which had been observed in elections held previously. Due to insincere proposals for holding elections and the reservations explained above, the concept of *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd* the name being Islamic and had precedent in the history of Islam came up. The commission comprising representatives from jehadi parties discussed it thread bare and drafted an act with good points.²⁵⁴

Opposition to the shura started from its very inception. It was thought that the Islamic government, i.e. Jamiat-e-Islami, by virtue of the government position and the influence that it wielded in provinces, was striving for remaining in power and its leader retaining the presidency. Hence, it convened such a shura. This shura was looked at with skepticism. The way the people discussed, the Jamiat-e-Islami of Burhanuddin Rabbani decided to convene this shura at any cost. It was decided to convene the *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd* in Kabul on 10 December 1992 and President Burhanuddin Rabbani handed over power to it. The *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd* could not meet as scheduled due to continuation of fighting, inclement weather, disappointment of parties in coalition with the government, non-arrival of nominated members from provinces and unsure participation of representatives from Mazar, Jowzjan, Faryab provinces and other areas under the influence of General Rashid Dostum. According to the decision of the commission for establishment of the *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd*, members of this shura were to be elected by the people. This decision was not implemented. Jihadi organizations in provinces, after long discussions, decided to introduce members according to their shares to the *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd*. The visible difference between

²⁵⁴ Rubin Barnett, *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State*, London, Yale University Press, 2000, pp.51-98

this shura and the previous shuras of mujahedeen was that, the leaders of organizations nominated members for the previous shuras and councils, keeping in view, to some extent, competence and knowledge of the representatives coupled with their influence in the organization and the areas they belonged to. This time, commanders of the parties in provinces took in hand nomination of representatives and nominated their favorite figures. In the setup of this *shura*, majority of its members were relatives and favorites of the commanders. On 24 December 1992, about one thousand representatives from the countryside arrived in Kabul to participate in Shura deliberations. Delegates also brought their bodyguards.²⁵⁵ With a look at the people in hotels in which delegates were staying, the observer would find that the members of the *shura-e-ahl-e-hal-o-'aqd* were white-bearded mullahs, landlords, influential figures, commanders and some educated persons. Some old-aged were also seen among the delegates who found it difficult to move and scale the stairs of the hotels.

The persons who were able to represent the people, and people would vote for them in elections if ever held, were members of *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd*. Those mentioned above had no relations with them at all. At the time of gathering of representatives of *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd*, efforts were made to preclude its convention. But the people of Jamiat foiled them. On 22 December 1992, four days before the gathering of the representatives in Kabul, fighting started in Kabul. It was said that the people of General Rashid Dostum had left the area of Bala Hissar to the people of Hizb-e-Islami. Armed men of Hizb-e-Islami had taken over Chaman Hazuri and the road. Radio Meshed called it a clash between the people of Rashid Dostum and Shura-e-Nazar. Sporadic clashes between Hizb-e-Islami and the Islamic government in Pul-e-Charkhi continued. The clashes in those days were aimed at sabotaging the convention of *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-*

²⁵⁵ The number of their guards varied according to their status and means. They ranged between one to twelve, one would have one guard and the other twelve who engage two Datsuns to move about. The ridiculous aspect of this scenario was that some guards kept their own body guards. The guards of some people were aged, of some middle-aged, of a number young and of a number youth and beardless. Some of these guards looked vigilant, sturdy, mannered and pious. A number of these servants looked like monsters, having long hair, shaved or trimmed beards and bandoliers around their chests. Kalashnikovs and Kalakovs around their necks looked just like their ornaments. Bravery and grandeur of a group were commendable. Some of them were somewhat away from morality and humanity as if they had not yet stepped into the sphere of humanity.

'*aqd*. Meetings of the representatives of the government with leaders of Jumbish proved fruitful. Mohammad Naseem Mehdi, Mohaqqiq and Maulvi Mohammad Alam Governor of Mazar, belonging to Hizb-e-Islami, Hizb-e-Wahdat and Jamiat-e-Islami respectively and allied with the Jumbish, had moved to Kabul to attend the session of *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd*. None of them were able to follow the policies of their former organizations. They were under the command of General Rashid Dostum, leader of the Jumbish. The reason for delay in participation of delegates from the areas under the influence of Jumbish-e-Milli in *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd* was that the Jumbish-e-Mili demanded that delegates from the provinces under its influence should be counted as representatives of Jumbish-e-Milli. Jamiat-e-Islami did not agree to this demand and tried that representatives from these provinces should not attend the shura as representatives from an organization or a party but as representatives from these provinces. Delegations visited Mazar-e-Sharif in this connection. The Jamiat-e-Islami wanted to attain consent of General Rashid Dostum through ethnic Uzbeks. A delegation comprising Dr Syed Mohammad Mosa Tawana, Abdul Rahim Karimi and Musleh was sent to Mazar. The last two were Uzbek from Takhar and Badakhshan provinces. The ongoing fighting in Kabul and meetings of the delegation in Mazar forced a conclusion that the said delegation should be received unofficially as the delegation from the Jumbish. Delegates from those provinces moved to Kabul as the delegation from the Jumbish to attend *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd*. The said delegation as the delegation from Jumbish-e-Milli met Hujjat-ul-Islam Abdul Ali Mazari leader of Hizb-e-Wahdat through Ayatullah Fazil at Kabul. Hizb-e-Wahdat did not announce the outcome of this meeting.²⁵⁶ Hizb-e-Wahdat proposed that each of the warring party, Hizb-e-Islami, Jamiat-e-Islami, Jumbish-e-Milli and Hizb-e-Wahdat, should appoint three highly placed representatives to negotiate a cease-fire. Likewise, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar leader of Hizb-e-Islami and President Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of Jamiat-e-Islami accepted this proposal. The highly placed people of the Jamiat were determined to convene the shura. A day later, however, President Burhanuddin Rabbani looked double-minded and indecisive in this regard. The meeting of *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd* was postponed for a week. Forty-five delegates from foreign countries, who had been invited, were waiting in Islamabad. The outcome

²⁵⁶ The proposal of Hizb-e-Wahdat was announced through BBC

of meetings and talks with rural representatives gave a delicate indication to the fact that President Burhanuddin Rabbani, lacked determination in convention or postponement of the shura. There were people who had narrowed their circle around Rabbani to disable him from independent thinking. Besides other business, the shura extended the tenure of Burhanuddin Rabbani. Perhaps, he might have envisaged that the conclusion of this shura may not be advantageous for the destiny of the nation, future of the power and his party. This was something Burhanuddin Rabbani had no courage to express. General conditions of Kabul during the session of the *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd* had not changed. Convoys of vehicles carrying consumer goods and fuel arrived in Kabul from Jalalabad. There was no scarcity of these things. The clashes raised the prices of everything. In the last clashes, fighters of General Rashid Dostum and his ally Hizb-e-Wahdat were held responsible for the tension as compared with Mujahedeen and their allies. Armed persons of the Jumbish-e-Mili and Hizb-e-Wahdat in Microroyan, Taimani and Qala Fatehullah Khan, which were under their control, stopped people wearing pakol (cap) and released them bare-headed. In order to ridicule jihadi people, Pakols were piled on roads for exhibition. The personnel of the Jumbish also shaved beards of those who happened to pass by them in those days just to cool down their anger. The plunders committed by them aggravated the situation. During the clashes that took place between the Islamic government and Hizb-e-Wahdat forces before meeting of *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd*, many houses and buildings were also torched, besides massacre, kidnapping and taking away hostages. Most of the state and private buildings, banks, offices, shops and stores were razed to the ground particularly in parts of Chandawal and Jada-e-Maiwand from Sepoy Gumnam to Avicenna Hospital, and in the vicinity of pul-e-Artan. These areas were smoldering for days and the smoke was rising up to the sky. This situation followed the attacks by Shura-e-Nazar on the positions of Hizb-e-Wahdat. Destruction in other places, silo and Karta-e-Mamureen, was carried out by Hizb-e-Wahdat. Whatsoever was lying in the central silo was looted by people of Hizb-e-Wahdat. A group of Hizb-e-Wahdat snatched bags of flour and wheat but they did not find vehicles for transportation. They were not sure that the area would remain in their control for a few hours more. The market rate of one bag of wheat was 26,000(20\$) Afghanis. They demanded five thousands Afghanis from passersby, and, thus, the silo was emptied. Clashes continued politics was also

resolute, although it was crippled to move on along the war. In the thickness of war, faltering political activities also continued news of which were broadcast from numerous channels.²⁵⁷

Some patch up efforts were undertaken when ambassadors of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan held meetings with representatives of Ahmad Shah Masood and Pir Gailani and with Mohammad Naseem Mehdi as representative of Jumbish-e-Milli. They wanted to meet representatives of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar also. One analysis was this that four groups (Hizb-e-Islami, Wahdat-e-Islami, Mahaz-e-Milli and Harkat-e-Islami of Maulavi Mohammad Nabi), were conspiring against the Islamic government or they were with the coalition government.²⁵⁸

In those days, most of the people of Jamiat-e-Islami were tired of and disappointed with the stand of Hizb-e-Islami. Members of the Jamiat didn't give importance to participation of Hizb-e-Islami in the session of *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd* and were self-satisfied that without participation of that party they could do their work and could resist the opposition from it. Burhanuddin Rabbani too, was unhappy with Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, and didn't consider talks with them useful before convention of *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd*, although their participation in the session of *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd* could enhance importance of the *shura* irrespective of the outcome of deliberations.

Kabul Radio and television aired a statement of Syed Nurullah Ammad, Secretary of Jamiat-e-Islami and president of the session of *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd*. Wherin it was announced that letters had been sent to all leaders with request to attend the *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd*. The invitees, according to broadcast/telecast, were reminded of their responsibilities towards the people and state. The date fixed for the inaugural session of *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd* was 29 December 1992. On 29 December 1992, the session of *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd* started in the hall of the foreign affairs ministry. President

²⁵⁷ On 26 December 1992, BBC announced

²⁵⁸ On 28 December 1992, BBC announced

Burhanuddin Rabbani delivered a keynote address highlighting the achievements of his government during his term of office. The inaugural session was adjourned until next day due to non-arrival of some leaders. The agenda contained acts and appeasement, that's all.²⁵⁹

The session of *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd* started. Its real purpose was election of the president of the state. The people gathered there and went around the ballot box. There was one candidate, Burhanuddin Rabbani and one box. Every member put his vote in the box and went out to his lodging place to take lunch and say prayers. Polling took a long time due to a large number of voters. Opposition votes were there but ignorable and not worrisome for Burhanuddin Rabbani. In the polling session, no leader except Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ustad Sayyaf was present. The chairman of this session was Chief Justice Maulavi Fazli, a Pushtun from Paktia and belonging to Harkat-e-Islami. There was no possibility of rejection by *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd* of the election of Burhanuddin Rabbani, for another two years. He was elected as president with majority of votes. Burhanuddin Rabbani did not attend the session of *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd* next day i.e. 31 December 1992. Ustad Sayyaf came and, probably, waited for debate on presidency, left the session when he noticed the absence of Burhanuddin Rabbani and that there was nothing of importance on the agenda. Discussion on problems relating to religion etc. in the meetings indicated that the business of the council had been completed. The *shura* was unanimous only in case of the selection of Burhanuddin Rabbani for second term. In other matters, the smoke of differences polluted the atmosphere. The management of *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd* knew well that continuation of the session of the *shura* might lead to uncontrollable tension. They closed the office of the *shura*. Four fifth of the delegates were relieved and one fifth were asked to return to Kabul after vacations. A number of them returned to Kabul after vacations and they were looked after for some time although there was no business, council and office. A number

²⁵⁹ Wise and educated people in Jamiat-e-Islami hoped that *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd* would alleviate the hardships. They drew conclusion about the outcome of the *shura* by wordy arguments, although they believed like others that *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd* would not bear the fruit and would create problems. There was no difference between the chat in streets and markets and the opinion of people as regards the situation and that would have no influence over the decision regarding its *modus operandi*. In the past, even through the history, we had not considered people or their views.

of these representatives left Kabul on their own and the others were told that it would be better for them to forego the perks of the membership.

Messages of greetings to Burhanuddin Rabbani from members of the Jamiat in provinces poured in incessantly. These messages greeted the success of Burhanuddin Rabbani and expressed high words for the nation. Members of the Jamiat-e-Islami looked happy and considered election of Burhanuddin Rabbani by *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd* as a mandate from the nation. On the contrary, the opponents and allies of the government considered the election of Rabbani as fake and members of *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd* as people affiliated with the Jamiat or those who were tempted with offers, and did not consider them legitimate. Leaders of Jihadi organizations, such as Maulavi Khalis and Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, expressed their opposition. They made their stance conditional. The Hizb-e-Islami propagated that convention of this Shura was declaration of a new war. Opinions of Abdul Ali Mazari, leader of Hizb-e-Wahdat and Maulavi Khalis leader of Hizb-e-Islami, were published in newspapers. The former considered *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd* and election of Rabbani as illegal and the latter considered *shura-e-ahl-o-hal-o-'aqd* as un-Islamic and gave a *fatwa* that acting on its decisions was prohibited although Maulavi Khalis and Maulavi Din Mohammad met President Burhanuddin Rabbani instantly to extending felicitations to him on his election as the president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.²⁶⁰ In this way Burhanuddin Rabbani extended his tenure of presidency.

3.7 Rabbani and the Problem of Election of Prime Minister and Formation of a Cabinet

Following the disputed election of the President the next challenging moment for President Burhanuddin Rabbani was to name Prime Ministers and the Cabinet. Burhanuddin Rabbani was expected to name a cabinet better than the previous one. From the beginning, Burhanuddin Rabbani was pondering the issue that the head of the cabinet or the Prime Minister should not have the power to end his influence over the cabinet.

²⁶⁰ Interview of Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Aamir Jamaat Islami Pakistan, with the author.

Burhanuddin Rabbani was aware of those types of governments in the world and knew that this depended on nomination of the Prime Minister. Nomination of a strong Prime Minister was helpful as well as dangerous for him. On the other hand, coalition parties Mahaz-e-Milli and Ittehad-e-Islami, without demonstrating their desire, considered themselves eligible for the post. Each one was to accept if the post was offered to. Rumours were there in official circles that Burhanuddin Rabbani wanted to form a government acceptable to the west. Burhanuddin Rabbani knew that nomination of Pir Ahmad Gailani could help him to achieve the goal, and nomination of Sayyaf as Prime Minister would deprive him of the support of the west and at home the wahdat and Jumbish will not be happy with the decision. He was very cautious with the decision. On the other hand he feared that the personality like Pir Ahmad Gailani, if nominated, would strengthen his position in the Western countries.²⁶¹

Pir Ahmad Gailani was, on the other hand, heard saying that some time back President Burhanuddin Rabbani had offered prime minister ship to him.²⁶² In response, Pir Ahmad Gailani proposed conditions for competence and freedom of work. Pir Ahmad Gailani considered that nomination of people like Rawan Farhadi²⁶³ would be useful only in case of any stable government in the country and that the Prime Minister could rely on that. In the prevailing conditions, nomination a Premier was of no use that could not help the task. Burhanuddin Rabbani was enmeshed in difficulties as regards nomination of the cabinet and its head, particularly at a time when destiny of the parliament was doubtful. This was the most difficult case before him. He could appoint head of the cabinet in haste. Nomination of ministers was difficult, but that was not so much agonizing, as in case of appointment of the Prime minister. Burhanuddin Rabbani was pondered that ministers of the cabinet should not be annoyed and also the organizations in coalition. The easiest way before him was to seek cooperation of Mujahedeen who had taken part in formation of previous government. The easiest way was power sharing or allocation of shares to organizations. It was natural that this action would create the government like

²⁶¹ Interview of Dr Bashir, An expert on Afghan affairs living in US, with the author.

²⁶² From his interview with BBC dated, 1st January, 1993

²⁶³ Representative of Rabbani government in UN

the previous one. Burhanuddin Rabbani understood that such a cabinet would not be able to handle the affairs, as he wanted. The cabinet would create problems and would not heal any pain of the country. Changes were made with much ado but of no avail. The cabinet that could give clear support to Burhanuddin Rabbani could not come into being.

Military and economic conditions were bad; those who had armed groups and military units had tied hand of the ministers behind their backs. Even the most expert and technocrat might also not be able to rid himself from the unbreakable clutch in such conditions. Ministers from organizations and parties, in fact, did not obey unconditionally the orders of the president. Placing the order from Burhanuddin Rabbani on the table, they would consider the interests of the party and organization and the view of their leaders. Every minister considered his ministry as the property of his party and worked according to his own will. Unfortunately, some ministries had been turned into public inns. Henchmen of ministers and their guards were important figures roaming inside the premises of ministers without any hitch and hindrance instead of the shuras of the departments and directorates.²⁶⁴

The ministry of foreign affairs was distinguished from other ministries as regards discipline and educated officials. From outside, the establishment of this ministry looked nice, as compared to other ministries, but its administrative conditions, when assessed, was miserable. Its discipline did not conform to the status of a ministry of foreign affairs. Department did not give attention to their performance. Officials did not attend their offices regularly and on time. Some officers were infected, idle. Appointment continued just like the flood. The number of jobless in the ministry exceeded the authorized establishment. No qualifications were considered for appointments, Nepotism, fraternity, approach to authorities and political affiliation set performances in the qualifications.

²⁶⁴ Interview of Dr Bashar, An expert on Afghan affairs living in US, with the author.

Competence and experience were not considered in appointment of some officials on posts. Even the age limit was ignored. The foreign ministry, which was a share of Mehaz-e-Mili, had the sole right to appoint its own people. Members of Jamaite-e-Islami, the ruling party, were not pleased with its share in this ministry. The officials in this ministry in the previous government were far better. They did not consider themselves as part of the system of Mujahedeen and were happy for the reason that if this ministry went to another party, they would be removed from their jobs due to prevailing grudges against them. The new cabinet could not improve administrative and executive affairs. Nepotism, misappropriation of the assets of the ministries, plunders and bribery had become a common scenario.

CHAPTER 4

CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF RABBANI GOVERNMENT

The terms "failure" is often used synonymously to describe states in the midst of debilitating turmoil. This usage is erroneous. One may think of states as falling within four categories, strong, weak, failing, and collapsed. Nor are these categories static. States move in and out of them fluidly, earning their label based upon their performance, which will vary with time. The overarching criterion for determining the status of a given state is its ability to deliver political goods and services. States fail when such goods and services are not supplied. Civil war is then a symptom of state failure, not a cause of it. The most important political good is the provision of national and international security and the preservation of order. Other goods include: implementation of the rule of law, existence of institutions of political freedom, regulation of arteries of commerce and communication, provision of an economic framework conducive to growth and prosperity, and such things as medical services, power, running water, and control of the environmental commons. However the best means of judging is whether it can project power beyond its capital. Does the state have control over its borders, its countryside, its roads and rivers? Is highway robbery commonplace? Are the roads potholed?


In case of Afghanistan under Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, following proved to be the major challenges:

4.1 INTERNAL CAUSUES

4.1.1 Afghanistan was divided among different warlords

Afghanistan was divided into warlord fiefdoms and all the warlords had fought switched sides and fought again in a bewildering array of alliances, betrayals and bloodshed. The predominantly Tajik Government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani controlled Kabul, its environs and the north east of the country, while Ismaiel Khan controlled six provinces in the West centering Herat. In the east on the Pakistan border, three Pushtun provinces were under the independent control of a council or Shura of Mujahedeen commanders

based in Jalalabad. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar controlled region to the south and east of Kabul. In the north, the Uzbek warlord General Rashid Dostum held sway over six provinces and in January 1994 he had abandoned his alliance with the Burhanuddin Rabbani government and joined with Gulbuddin Hikmatyar to attack Kabul. In central Afghanistan, the Hazzaras controlled the province of Bamiyan. Southern Afghanistan and Kandahar were divided up amongst dozens of petty ex-Mujahedeen warlords and bandits who plundered the population at will.²⁶⁵



The Areas, which were under control of different groups and parties when Rabbani took power in 1992.

- ◆ Rabbani and Masood forces ◆ Different commanders and Shuras
- ◆ Gulbuddin Hekmatyar ◆ Abdul Ali Mazari (Hizb-i-Wahdat)
- ◆ Abdul Rashid Dostum ◆ Commander Ismaiel Khan

²⁶⁵ Rubin Barnett, *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State*, London, Yale University Press, 2000, pp.99-125

Kabul was divided among the former Mujahid groups and the militias, whose overriding concern became short-term personal and group gains instead of those of society. The Rabbani government represented the country, but it was unable to extend direct rule over it. After Kabul fell, all of the garrisons and provincial capitals submitted one after the other with the cooperation of the military and the civilians of the defeated regime. In Herat the well-known commander Mohammad Ismail Khan predominated; he soon disarmed other groups, expelled the militias from Herat, and maintained law and order throughout the province. Also, as the guardian of an important frontier province, he showed vigilance about the intrigues of Iran. Ismail Khan was more popular and effective in Herat than any other governor was in his own province. Ismail Khan Controlled five provinces that were Herat, Badghis, Ghowr, Farah, Nimruz. General Rashid Dostum dominated the northwest provinces around Mazar. But as parts of many of these provinces also were in the hands of various Islamic groups, and because Rashid Dostum (as the commander of the Uzbek militias during the resistance period), had fought the mujahedeen, the potential for clashes there was great.²⁶⁶

In the major provinces of Kandahar, Nangrahar and Ghazni, local notables and Islamic groups set up joint councils. Gul Agha Sherzoy, Abdul Qadeer and Qari Baba headed these councils, respectively. Essentially, each maintained peace in its region, and the country remained quiet. Kabul maintained educational, financial, and other links with these local governments, each of which began to assert its authority over its own domain in its own fashion with empty coffers and small income but abundant weapons. Kabul also sent them money when it received it from Moscow where it was still printed. But to establish real authority over the provinces, Kabul needed an effective government, a steady source of income, and international help. Before it could procure these, the government had to assert its authority over the city itself, which had been the bone of contention among the armed groups.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁶ Ibid.


²⁶⁷ In the confusion that followed the fall of the regime of Dr. Najeebullah, eleven armed groups entered Kabul and its immediate environs. These included the seven Peshawar-based groups; the Islamic Movement, led by Shaykh Asif Muhsini; the Islamic Unity, led by Abdul Ali Mazari; and two militia

In Kabul Khair Khana and the central part up to Dehmazang were controlled by the Jamiat Islami of Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masood and the Supervisory Council; from the International Airport up to Bala Hissar was the domain of the Jawzjan militia lead by Rashid Dostum; the eastern and southern parts were dominated by the Islamic Party of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; the western part (Karta-e-Char, Meer Wais Maidan, and beyond) was controlled by the Islamic Unity; and Khushal Maina and beyond were the fiefdom of the Islamic Union, led by Sayyaf. Each group hoisted its own flag in the area under its control; Arabs, Pakistanis, and Iranians wandered about with their Afghan groups inside their own domains. As Rahimulla Yousafzia a famous analyst writes, *“Neither the state nor any group was able to guarantee security. This is because none has the power to order anyone beyond its own domain.”*²⁶⁸

groups, the Jawzjan militia led by Abdur Rashid Dostum, and the Kayan militia led by Sayyed Ja’far Nadiri.

²⁶⁸ Interview of Rahimullah Yousafzai, An expert on Afghan affairs and Bureau Chief of The News International, with the author.

KABUL CONFLICT 1994-5 - FACTIONS' MILITARY POSITIONS



(www.afghanistanmap.com.kabul.org)

4.1.2 Fighting for control of Kabul

After peace talks between Ahmad Shah Masood and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar on May 25 1992, the government initially agreed to name Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as Prime minister, but the agreement collapsed in less than a week, when President Sibghatulla Mujaddidi's plane came under rocket fire as he returned from a trip to Islamabad on May 29. Sibghatullah Mujaddidi claimed that both Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's forces and former agents from the Dr. Najeebullah government had conducted the attack, and that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar had earlier threatened to shoot down his plane.²⁶⁹ Meanwhile, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar continued to demand that Dostum's Uzbek militias leave Kabul (which might then allow him to seize the city and expel Masood's forces).²⁷⁰ By May 30, Jamiat (Rabbani and Masood) and Jumbish (Dostum) forces were fighting with Hekmatyar's forces in the south of the city. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar began shelling and rocketing Kabul in early June, hitting all areas of the city, and Jumbish and Jamiat forces shelled areas to the south of the city. Meanwhile, Sunni Ittihad and Shii Wahdat factions in Kabul began fighting with one another in west Kabul.

4.1.3 Ittihad Islami (Sayyaf), Hizb Wahdat and Jamiat Islami in West of Kabul

In early days of fighting Hekmatyar's forces and its allies forces were driven out from Kabul, while skirmishes continued in west of Kabul between Sayyaf forces and Wahdat forces, shooting rockets at each other, killing each other and engaging in street battles were the order of the day, each groups were trying to dislodge the other from various neighborhoods and governmental buildings, which was under their control. As the fighting going on in the civilian setting areas, caused high number of casualties and led to widespread destruction of homes buildings and infrastructure. Due to battles these buildings were disintegrated into rubble. Due to fighting of 1992-1996 much of the west of Kabul remains in ruins. There was no clear sign that explains which side had started the fighting between Sayyaf forces and Wahdat forces. The fighting between Sayyaf

²⁶⁹ Associated Press, Kabul, May 31, 1992

²⁷⁰ For an overview of Hekmatyar's public statements during this period, see Sangar, *Neem Negahi Bar E'tela'fay-e Tanzimi dar Afghanistan*, pp.115-116

forces and Wahdat forces started when both forces started tearing the pictures and posters of their respected leaders that is Sayyaf and Mazari which in turn led to the arguments between the two side's troops, as the result of the arguments and tearing of posters and pictures by the forces the conflict started between the forces. General Mohammed Nabi Azimi who was served in communsit army and was cooperating with Rabbani government to create national army, in his 1998 memoris said about the beginning of fighting between Sayyaf forces and Wahdat forces as:


*“ Initially the fighting between Sayyaf forces and Wahdat forces of Hazaras began on 31 May 1992, First four top members of Wahdat's forces were killed in the area near the Kabul Silo by Sayyaf forces, those four killed were Sayyid Ismail Hosseini, Chaman Ali Abuzar, Vaseegh and their guard, these three men were the members of the central committee of the Wahdat party. Shura e Nizar of Mosood forces informed Wahdat froces that Sayyaf's men had killed these people. Mean while car of Haji Shir Alam a top leader of Sayyaf forces was stoped by Wahdat forces near Pole Sorkh, after releasing them, there was firing at the car which killed one of the guard of Haji Sher Alam, in this way the battle started between Wahdat and Sayyaf forces in west of Kabul”.*²⁷¹

Beside other resons there was high tension between Wahdat forces, who were predominately Shiaa Muslims, on the other hand, Sayyaf forces whom were Sunni Muslims and whose members follow an ultra conservative Islamic creed, Wahabbism, Wahabbies sees Shia as heretical. Sayyaf was supported by Saudi Arabia directly or indirectly, some of the Arab Mujahedeen were also with Sayyaf forces. On the other side a great deal of tension was also caused by the influece of Iranian military advisors and intelligence agents to sopport Wahdat forces and Hazaras. Iran was trying to maximize Wahdat's forces and influence the Rabbani government for more shares in government

²⁷¹ Mohammed, Nabi, Azimi, *Ordu va Siyasat (Army and Politics)*, Peshawar, University Press, pp.665-77

for Hazaras. Saudi agents directly or indirectly supported Sayyaf forces to gain more shares in government and to pressurize Wahdat forces.

When fighting erupted between the forces of Wahdat and Sayyaf usually Jamiat commanders, representatives of Mujadidi or Rabbani tried to ceasefires between the two, some time officials from International Committee of the Red Cross negotiated and made the ceasefires which did not long last and the fighting again erupted. In July 1992 Wahdat forces attacked Jamiat Islami forces and hit the civilian areas, then Masood's forces launched retaliatory artillery attack on Wahdat forces in west of Kabul killing numerous civilians, other parties in Kabul also joined the fighting at various times serving to intensify the conflict, Some time Harakat Islami forces joined hand with Wahdat against Sayyaf forces, and Masood's forces cooperated Sayyaf forces against Wahdat and Harakat forces, first few weeks of June 1992 was particularly bad as the forces of Hekmatyar were also targeting the city from the south, in this way the fighting of cat and mouse continued in which the losers were the poor Kabuli civilian.



Kabul Province and Surrounding Areas

Source: www.timesonline.com.kabul.maps

4.1.4 Rocketing and Shelling of Kabul by Hezb-E-Islami

During those days West of Kabul was not only the danger zone as Wahdat forces and Sayyaf forces fought with occasional involving of Masood's forces. From the South of Kabul Hekmatyar's forces continued to attack on the city with artillery and rockets which were always landed in the city as a whole.²⁷²

At the end of June, 1992 formally Rabbani took over the presidency from Mujaddidi as was agreed in the Peshawar Accord.²⁷³ After Rabbani took over the presidency Hekmatyar refused to joint the government and Hekmatyar's forces increased their rocked and shell attacks on the city, the conditions of the city were such that anyone in the city could be hit at any time and at any place, rockets and shells would hit offices, bus stations, schools, markets or homes. In August 1992, Hekmatyar's forces launched a new phase of rocket and artillery attacks, bombarding all areas of the Kabul city held by Rabbani, Masood, Dosum and Sayyaf forces, the aims of this new attacks was to force Masood and Rabbani into a political compromise with Hekmatyar's forces, as it was not possible for Hekmatyar to launch a full scale invasion on the city due to lack of enough forces. Due to this fighting hundred of homes were destroyed, about 1800 to 2500 persons lost their precious lives, and more than thousands were injured.

Due to fighting the Presidential palace and numerous government buildings were hit as well as the headquarters of the Red Cross and numerous building were destroyed. In 1st August 1992, Kabul's airport came under rocket attack from Hekmatyar's forces, the reason was give by Hekmatyar's as these attacks were a response to the government's attacks on southern Kabul, on 2nd August 1992 about 150 rockets hit different areas of

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Human Rights Report, correspondent with the British Broadcasting Corporation in Kabul in 1992, April 12, 2004.

Kabul, the government blamed Hekmatyar on the attacks. On 5th August 1992 rocket attacks had killed 50 people and injured nearly 150 people. On 10th August 1992 there was fighting between Rabbani and Masood forces against Hekmatyar's forces. The Rabbani government claimed that Hekmatyar's forces attacked from three sides that is Chelsetoon, Darullamman and Marranjan mountains. On 11th August 1992, about more than a thousand rockets hit various parts of the city, the air port sustained at 250 hits. The people of the city were escaping from the city, Pole Charkhii prison had become a refugee camp. On the response to Hekmatyar's attack Rabbani forces attacks Hekmatyar's positions to the south which were also hitting civilian areas in which a large number of people were killed, injured or displaced.

Hamid Karzai a deputy foreign minister in Rabbani government told medial on 9th August 1992:

*"I don not know what is going to happen..... We are killing one another, it is senseless"*²⁷⁴

On 20th August 1992 the chief of the UN mission in Kabul told media that it's a terrible situation, the government had no longer controls anything, there were no law and order in the city. Water and electricty had been cut off and workers of WHO were afraid of spread of epidemics. The streets of the Kabul entirely deserted excpted for armed forces and armed men. Due to Hekmatyar's attack more than 500000 persons left Kabul UN chief added. Fighting continued rest of the year, in October 1992, the leader ship council set under Peshawar accords voted to extend Rabbani's term for 45 days, until December but due to fighting the council failed to meet again. Rabbani forces continued battle with Wahdat forces in west of Kabul, near Kabul University, causing a lot of killing and injuring people and damage the buildings and infrastructure. During those days Dostum was trying to find some kind of understanding with Hekmatyar, although Hekmatyar

²⁷⁴ Associated Press, Kabul, August 9, 1992

always attacked Kabul on the pretext of the presence of Dostum militia in Kabul. Due to internal and international pressure Rabbani tried to convene Shura on December as it was decided in Peshawar Accords to choose next government or to reelect himself as president. However the council was not representative of all the warring groups or the general Afghan population or Afghan tribal elders. When voting began many of the invited members boycotted the voting, those include representatives of Wahdat, Hizb Islami and Jumbish Milly, but Rabbani was reelected by his allies, proxies and supporters for another 18 months.

The opposition groups including Hekmatyar, however did not accept the outcome of the Shura, after re-electing of Rabbani by the council Hekmatyar refused to accept the outcome of the shura and vowed to fight Rabbani and Masood forces, Wahdat also rejected the decisions of the shura and formed an official alliance with Dostum and Hekmatyar forces. On the month of January 1993 once again the fighting erupted between different forces, Rabbani and Masood forces attacked several Hekmatyar's positions to the south of the city, Hekmatyar's forces restarted rocket and shelling attacks on the city center. Jamiat forces and Wahdat forces blamed each other for starting the fighting. A journalist Mir Waise Jallel called those fighting as: *"Complete madness of warring groups"*



Dar-ul-Aman palace in Kabul before the civil war (1992-96)



Dar-ul-Aman Palace in Kabul after the civil war (1992-96)

(Source: www.RAWA.com)

The chief of the United Nations mission in Kabul told journalists on August 20, 1992, “It’s a terrible situation.” The government no longer controls anything; there was no longer law and order. The streets were entirely deserted, except for armed soldiers. Water and electricity had been cut off for nearly a week and workers from WHO [the World Health Organization] were afraid of an outbreak of epidemics. The United Nations estimated that approximately 500,000 persons fled Kabul by the end of the summer for safer areas inside and outside of Afghanistan, primarily because of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s rocket and artillery attacks.

Kabul suffered relatively less intense fighting after the August 1992 blitz on the city, but serious firefights and shelling rocked the city throughout the later part of the year. In October 1992, the leadership council set up under the Peshawar accords voted to extend Burhanuddin Rabbani’s term for forty-five days, until December, on the grounds that the summer fighting had made the summoning of the council impossible. Jamiat-e-Islami forces repeatedly battled Wahdat in the west, near Kabul University, causing further casualties and damage. At the same time, there were increasing signs that Dostum’s Jumbish faction was starting to negotiate with Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami, despite the fact Rashid that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar had initially opposed Rashid Dostum, and used Dostum’s presence in Kabul (as a former communist government official) as a pretext for opposing Ahmad Shah Masood.

In December 1992, Burhanuddin Rabbani convened the council of representatives required under the Peshawar Accords to choose the next government or just reelect him as president.²⁷⁵ The council, however, was not representative of the different warring factions or the general Afghan population. Many of the invited members boycotted the vote, including representatives of Jumbish-e-Mili, Wahdat and Hezb-e-Islami. Burhanuddin Rabbani was “reelected” by his supporters, allies and proxies in the meeting, and stated his intention to serve as president for another 18 months. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, however, refused to accept the outcome of the council, and vowed to dislodge Burhanuddin Rabbani’s government, and Ahmad Shah Masood’s forces, in the

²⁷⁵ See Sayyid Alamuddin Assir, *Elal-e-Soghoot-e-Dolat-e-Islami-e Afghanistan Taht-e Ghiyadat-e Ustad Rabbani dar Kabul* (“*The Reasons for the Fall of the Islamic State of Afghanistan Under the Rule of Ustad Rabbani in Kabul*”), Peshawar, publisher unknown, 2001, pp.40-67

coming months. Wahdat rejected the new government as well, and soon made an official alliance with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Jumbish-e-Mili, for the most part, stayed on the sidelines.²⁷⁶

Fighting between Jamiat, Hezb-e-Islami and Wahdat flared up the week of January 19, 1993. Jamiat forces attacked several Hezb-e-Islami positions to the south and southeast of Kabul early in the week, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's forces soon restarted rocket and shelling attacks on the city center. Heavy fighting broke out later in the week between Wahdat and Jamiat forces in west Kabul, near the Intercontinental Hotel and the large agricultural compound west of Macoroyane neighborhood, known as "the Silo," as well as in other places in the west. Wahdat and Hizb-e-Islami forces were now cooperating.²⁷⁷

In statements given to journalists, the two opposing sides Jamiat on one side and Wahdat and Hizb-e-Islami on the other side blamed each other for the resumption in hostilities. Over the next three weeks, thousands of Kabul residents were wounded and killed in the fighting, according to health officials interviewed by Human Rights Watch and others who spoke with journalists at the time. Some of the last diplomatic offices in Kabul were evacuated, including the Turkish, Iranian, Chinese, and Indian embassies.

The fighting grew worse as weeks passed. Journalists working in Kabul at the time told Human Rights Watch that the hospitals they visited were constantly full, with scores of wounded civilians and soldiers brought in daily. Many of the dead were never brought to hospitals at all. A journalist recalled the general level of chaos at the time, and drove from the city center to west Kabul to see the fighting. He narrated the scenario thus:

Darullamman, in west of Kabul rockects were coming and hitting all around areas and places. It was difficult to know that from where these rockets are coming from. The scene

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ Yunis Qanooni, in 1993 a senior official in Jamiat and the government defense ministry under Masood, told journalists in Kabul the first week of February that Wahdat and Hezb-e-Islami were now loosely aligned with each other.

was terrifying, when you went from Charassyab in the south west of Kabul you will find rocket launchers and other weapons and Hekamtyar's troops were stationed there. On the Bibi Mahru hill there were attacks all the time. In the fighting many of the shells and rockets fired by all sides were clearly hitting civilians areas on a regular basis and most of the victims brought to the hospitals were in fact civilians.²⁷⁸ By the end of first week of February, hospital sources in Kabul reported 800 deaths and more than 4000 injuries from the first week of February to 19 January 1993, the number of casualties and death was much higher because most of the families did not bring their deaths to hospitals.

The new alliance of Wahdat forces with Hekmatyar forces was a new challenge for Rabbani government. As Wahdat had positions in central Kabul including west of Kabul and areas in the eastern part of the city, where most of the government buildings were there. Sayyaf forces had their headquarters in western hills of Paghman province, Wahdat had controlled over the peak of Afshar hills, north of the Paghman road, this position of Wahdat made the positions of Wahdat strong militarily wise.

In February 1993 Rabbani, Masood, Sayyaf commanders decided to take actions against new alliance of Hekmatyar and Wahdat, the program was to attack Wahdat's main positions in west of Kabul specially their positions in Afshar mountains and to east of Afshar mountains in the residential areas.

The plan was of a united and coordinated over all attacks on Wahdat's headquarters located in Polytechnics University and at near Afshar mountains in west of Kabul. The specific program was to occupy the headquarters of Wahdat by Jamiat and Sayyaf forces, by capturing these areas the government forces may link up to west of the city and there would be easy access to Paghman headquarters of Sayyaf forces. The operation, Afshar in February represent the most integrated use of military force undertaken by

²⁷⁸ Armin Kobel, the chief of ICRC, told journalists that 368 wounded were admitted to Kabul's hospitals on February 10. On February 12, a doctor at an ICRC hospital told an Agence France-Presse journalist that the total dead citywide in the period (civilian and combatants) was probably around 5,000.

Rabbani government. Masood defence minister of Rabbani government wanted to capture leader of Wahdat forces Ali Mazari and also he wanted to capture the head quarter of Wahdat forces by this quardinated attack. Masood and government of Rabbani wanted to consolidate their positions in the areas controlled by government froces by linking up to west part of Kabul controlled by Sayyaf forces.

Wahdat officials knew about the government plane and most of the families of Wahdat party left the Afshar areas before the attacks. The key point of the operation was Afshar mountain it self situated above the Afshar areas. The strategy was that Jamiate forces was to take controle of the peaks of Afshar mountain, before moving on Wahdat forces positions on the sotheast areas. Before attacks head of Afghan intelegence Agency headed by Fahim paid several commanders in the areas to the north and west of Afshar mountain to cooperate with government forces. When the attacks began government and allied forces seized Afshar's peaks and the forces of Sayyaf entered the areas and captured Academy of Social sciences and clear the way from Paghman to central Kabul. Wahdat forces left south into west Kabul, leaving the Hazara civilian areas under the Sayyaf forces whom were mostly pushtun.²⁷⁹ Before attacks began Ahmad Shah Masood convened a meeting at a military base in Badambagh in Kabul, in the meeting senior commanders of Sayyaf, Jamiate and other small commanders were present and they talked and decided about the attacks plane. Next day Sayyaf met his commanders in Paghman to discussed and share the program of attack, Sayyaf's important commanders including Zalmy Tufan, Abdulla Shah, Haji Shair Alam, and Mulla Taj Mohammad, beside these big name small commander also present in the meeting.

Afghan Justice project reported that another commanders meeting were held under Masood in a house in Karte Parwan near Continental Hotel in which Masood,Rabbani,

²⁷⁹ Afghan Justice Project, Addressing the Past: The Legacy of War Crimes and the Political Transition in Afghanistan, January 2005, AJP report, p.27

Sayyaf and Afghan Intelligence Chief Fahim was present, this meeting was held a night before operation started that is on 12 February. Before the attacks began government forces positioned artilleries on the peaks of Ali abade hills mountains of Mamoriene. Sayyaf forces already has positione artilleries in Qargha areas and on the border of Paghman to the west of Afshar mountains. The weapons deployed by government forces in the areas of Makroyan, Television mountains, Intercontinental Hotels, and Kabul Zoo included BM 22, BM 40, and BM 12 rocket launchers. Beside these rocket launchers Sakar 18 rocket launchers, 82 mm mortars, 120 mm mortars and D 30 105 mm Cannons were deployed to hit Wahdat forces.²⁸⁰

Government forces under the command of Masood also put tanks in areas where their cannons were firing against the targets, there was continous firing of rockets and cannons aimed at the Afshar areas on the days of February of 1993. One of the residence of Afshar told to Human right watch activist that most of the firing and bullets of the rockets and cannons repeatedly fell on the civillian homes below the Afshar mountains to west and north west of Wahdat head quarters that is Academy of social sciences. It was February 11, 1993 that the government of Rabbani under command of Ahmad Shah started Afshar operations, government forces got controlled of Afshar mountains, Jamiate and Sayyaf forces attacked a massive barrage of artillery and rockets at the areas around Afshar, much of the barrage hit civillian homes in which number of inocent people were killed, as the days passed Wahdat forces fled to south away from Afshar areas and its head quarters. Sayyaf forces and Jamiate forces fill the gap and and enter the areas which Wahdat forces left out.

Government forces in the early morning captured toptof the mountain, from there they fired down into the Wahdat areas, when Sayyaf forces entered the areas controlled by

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

Wahdat killed Hazaras on the street, Hazaras were running out of Afshar areas, the street were full of the people running away from the areas.

It was not possible to know that how many civilians and how many forces were killed in Afshar campaign, it was not possible to come to know that how many men, women and children were abducted. It was the summer of 1993 that Rabbani government came under Hazara pressures to assign a commission to investigate about killings, abductions and destructions. The commission was comprised of civilians appointed by Rabbani government and Wahdat leaders, this commission received complain about 800 arrests during the operation, in these missing persons most were men between 10 to 25 years with small number of older men. The commission later released about 100 to 120 persons and ransoms were paid to Sayyaf forces holding them to secure their release, but the fate of 600 to 700 hundred people were not known. The commission reported that about 80 to 100 people were killed in the streets during Afshar campaign. Although many women were also abducted but due to honour and shames, the families did not report that to the commission.

The commission estimated that about 5000 houses were looted by forces during the Afshar operation. After this operation the path of the war changed, The Mujahedeen started war against Russia in 80's and continued after signing of Geneva Accords in 1988, After Russian withdrawal the fighting continued, after disintegration of Russia the communist regime fell to the Mujahedeen, all of these war fought on the basis that Mujahideen were against communists, but Afshar operation changed the path of the war now it was ethnic war on one side there was Sunni muslims fighting against Hazaras whom were in minority in Afghanistan, Pushtun was against Hazara's, so a kind of ethnic war started. During Taliban this ethnic war continued between Pushtun against Tajiks.

Due to some mediations in late February 1993 a peace deal was signed which was short live, in this peace deal Hekmatyar was granted a position of prime minister in Rabbani government but he did not enter Kabul and did not take charge as prime minister. Due to this agreement there was peace for some days.²⁸¹ By the end of the March 1993 Hekmatyar's forces once again fired at Jamiate and Sayyaf positions in the city, violence continued through the year, men, women and children died, buildings were destroyed but no one think of the peace and strive for that, the ultimate victims were the innocent people of Kabul.

Mean while through efforts of Haji Qadeer and other commanders on 20th May 1993 Jalalabad Accords was signed, in which Masood step down as defence minister, Rabani wanted the defence ministry under him,²⁸² while Hekmatyar wanted defence ministry under unaffiliated person who had not taken part in fighting. After signing of Jalalabad Accords, Commander Ahmad Shah Masood took away his head quarters to Jabulus Seraj in Perwan north of Kabul. Masood had more than 15000 thousands men under him, he had still controlled the government forces of about 25000 thousands men patrolled the city and the streets of Kabul. Due to presence of Masood forces in Kabul Hekmatyar wary of entering Kabul, as Masood felt insecure to go to Jalalabad for the meeting. Both Masood and Hekmatyar did not trust each other to a degree that made accommodation between them impossible. Hekmatyar was sworn in by Rabbani in paghman in June 1993 as prime minister, Paghman was under control of Sayyaf, as Hekmatyar felt insecure in Kabul he kept his office in Darol Amman and chaired the cabinet meeting in his strong hold Chaarasiab south of Kabul. It was not possible for his minister to go to Chaarasiab for cabinet meeting once they were attacked and abducted in Pul Charkhi areas of Kabul.

²⁸¹ Afghanistan's defense minister from 2001-2004 and a key military ally of the United States during operations against the Taliban in late 2001

²⁸² Interview of General Hamid Gul, ex- DG ISI, with the author. (The interviewee flew into Kabul in February 1993 and took part in negotiations)

When both Masood and Hekmatyar failed to defeat each other than look long term views about their positions and strategies and thinking for alternatives sources, the result was that there was a lull in the fighting, for months the city remain relatively calm and free of rocket firings, bombings and siege. Some of the embassies of friendly countries reopened in Kabul hoping for peace and stability, and some of the refugees from Paksistan returned to Afghanistan. It was strategy of Masood that when there were some kind of peace he prepared himself for war, that is why he was thinking of fighting. On November 1st 1993 Masood and his allied forces attacked the positions of Hekmatyar in Taghab valley which is situated about 45 kilo meters north east of Kabul. The program was that from Taghab he can controle Sarobi which was strong hold of Hekmatyar forces, Sarobi is situated on the main high way of Jalalabad and Kabul and was supplying electricity power to Kabul. For Hekmatyar and Masood Sarobi was an important place military and economic wise, had Masood been able to captured Sarobi he would be able to split the domin of Hekmatyar forces and weakened them.

Taghab was defended by commander Zardad Khan under supervision of Hekmatyar, commander Zardad Khan was supported by five thousands forces including Arab mujahedeen, Pakistani mujahedeen and some other foreigners whom were with Hekmatyar, Taghab Safi tribes changed hands many times between different contenders, one part was dominated by Jamiate another by Hekmatyar and some by Sayyaf. Masood forces were fever in numbers but air force of Masood was attacking Hekmayar's positions, the air planes bomborded local areas of Sarobi and demage homes and mosque but Hekmayar forces defended Taghab front bravely. When Masood forces attacked Taghab Safi's tribe sopported Hematyar forces and Masood failed to achieved his goals. In this fighting Dostum forces were not supported Masood and was neutral. In this fighting more than 800 people were killed and more than 1500 injured, after this fighting Hekmatyar's forces moral were high and were confident that Masood cannot

defeat them. In January 1994 a new alliance in the name of Shura-e-Ham Ahangi (Coordination council) was formed in which Hezb Islami, Jumbish Milli, Hezb Wahdat, and Mujadiddi party was the members. After forming of a new allinace in the name of Shura-e-Ham Ahangi Hematyar's forces planed over all attacks against Masood forces, this round of fighting was one of the fierce on in the history of civil war in Kabul.²⁸³

When attacks began by new allinace against Rabbani government initially Rabbani's forces retreated but soon reorganise and recovered part of the Kabul air port. Mean while Sayyaf forces supported Rabbani and Masood forces. Government forces war planes from Baghram airport bombarded the positions of Dostum in Marangan Tapa, air port and Bala Hissar port. While Dostums air power from Mazar Sharif bombing the presidential palace, the radio station, ministry of defence and other places of military importance. Mean while rockets were hitting the city from all dirctions, on the 3rd of January 1994 rockets were coming to the city like summer rain, during the fighting it was not possible for the people to come out from their houses and many injured died at home due to severe fighting because people could not bring the injured to the hospitals. Acording to an observer alone on the first day of attacks about 200 civilian had died, and most of the dead bodies were buried in places nearby homes. Through out the month fighting continued, by January 21 more than 9500 injured had been admitted to hospitals and more than 800 had been killed. In this fighting Hekmayar's forces also attacked at Miawan Jada in the central part of Kabul but the attacks were failed and Rabbani and Masood forces defended their positions bravely,, Gradually the war slow down after month of January. Government forces were supported by 25000 recruits, and they were stationed at different fronts, the Kabul river was divided between government and

²⁸³ After the Supervisory Council clashed with the forces of the Islamic and National Movement led by General Dostum in Mazar on 31 December 1993, Dostum's tanks and artillery units in Kabul advanced on the airport, the radio and television stations, and the presidential palace at 5am in the morning, on 1 January 1994 under the command of General Raofi

opposition forces, no one had dare to attack other and get farward position that is why they were rocketting and bombarded oppostion forces positions and no side were willing to advance on each other to endanger their lives that is why both sides pressurised other side by rockets and bombs.²⁸⁴ The Rabbani government had ceased performing as there had been no offices and no employees, food stuffs and essential goods were short. On political front four parties that is Islamic Unity of Mujadidi party, Khalis group, Gailin group and Hizb Islami of Hekmatyar united against Rabbani. They made coordination council and asked Rabbani as well as Masood to to resign and trasnfer power to an interim set up made by members of all parties. The council also pressurised that leaders of both parties Hekmatyar and Rabbani should not be part of the interim set up, and this set up will try to prepare the ground for elections. Rabbani in surprise move announced that he is ready to transfer power to the representative council either organised by United Nations or OIC. To accpet the Shura demand was another poly by Rabbani to extend his rule till 29 December 2004, as he did before when he extended his term untill December 12 1992. Rabbani's opponent suspected that once again he wanted to prolong his rule, there for they distrusted his as wel as Ahmad Shah Masood, and Ahmad Shah Masood and Rabbani distrusted Hekmatyar.²⁸⁵

Because of the delaying tactics of Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masood Pir Gailani, Mohammadi, Khalis, Mohsini also distrusted him, it was indedd the crux of the crisis and only Abdul Rab Rasool Sayyaf had alliance with Rabbani and Masood. The nature of the alliance was evident of the distrust, the core alliance was consisted of Dostum and Hekmatyar whose forces were fighting against Rabbani and Masood, other groups supported Dostum and Hekmatyar diplomatically, morally and militarily. This alliance

²⁸⁴ The senior leadership of Jamiat at the time included Mullah Ezat (Ezatullah), a commander in Paghman; Mohammad Qasim Fahim (the head of Amniat-e Melli); Baba Jan; Anwar Dangar; Gadda Mohammad; Baba Jalander; Haji Almas; Gul Haider, and Bismillah Khan.

²⁸⁵ Afghan Justice Project, Addressing the Past: The Legacy of War Crimes and the Political Transition in Afghanistan, January 2005, AJP report, pp.29-44

was negative alliance and was, as the result of the policies of Masood and Rabbani, this alliance was against Rabbani government and especially against the policies of Rabbani as the head of state and against Ahmad Shah Masood as the strong figure in the government.

The policies of President Rabbani had raised many questions about his integrity, Rabbani's efforts to prolong his tenure in office as President of Afghanistan, his acceptance of Shura settlement and resolution, all were seen by opposition as a tactics to extend his terms of office.

Masood refused to accept the proposals and cooperations for maintaining peace and security by commanders, Rahmatulla Safi, Abdur Rauf Safi, Haqqani, Abdul Haq, General Yahaya, Rahim Wardak and Naoroze. Masood's refusal to accept the proposal showed to maintain power in his hand and pursuit the private agenda of his own. One of the agenda of Masood was to stop Prime Minister Hekmatyar of entering Kabul and block him; General Dostum one of the main allied of Masood distanced himself from Masood because Masood refused to give his share of billions of Afghani which he received from Moscow. Masood wanted Dostum to obey him while Dostum wanted to act independent that is why Masood used money to win influential commanders. Dostum played an important role in ousting Najibulla regime and also protected Mojadidi and Rabbani by alliance with Masood, there for he wanted more share and power in government that is why he was well known as King maker in those days, distance himself of Masood and Rabbani and made an alliance with Hekmatyar and Shura Hamahangi. ²⁸⁶

4.1.5 Disrespect and Violations of International Humanitarian Law by all warring groups

The civil war and armed conflict of 1992-96 in Afghanistan was internal armed conflict in which Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law applied to

²⁸⁶ Interview of Rahimulla Yousafzia, with the author.

government forces and private armed groups, Many thing happen in this period which can be called as war crimes, the attacks in which civilian were killed, intentionally targetting the civilian areas and civilian objects are all violations of international humanitarian law and discribed as war crimes. Targetting and treating an entire city as a military target is a violations of International humanitarian law. International humanitarian law stresses the warring parties or groups to take precautions to protect civilians against the attacks, including ways and means of warfare that avoid loss of civilian casualties and to cancel or suspend those attacks which are causing unnecessary civilian losses. The deliberate killing of the civilians and populations, through shelling, bombing, artillery attacks all amount to crimes against humanity. Combatants, individuals and civilians were criminally responsible for war crimes they committed. Afghan commanders were liable for war crimes committed; by the orders of these commanders crimes were committed. Commanders of Sayyaf, Jamaite, and Wahdat in west of Kabul regularly and intentionally targetted civillians and civillians areas for attacks. These commanders made little efforts to stop civillian death or to stopped attacks on civillians populations.²⁸⁷ Artilece three common to the four Geneva conventions, which are applicable in non international armed conflects requires the human treatment of civilians and detained combatants. Arbitrary deprivation of murder, tourture, rape, murder and other ill treatment violate the laws. These law also prohibits “pillage” which is defined as taking of private propery forcibily from an enemy subjects and other form of theft.

Article three of Geneva Conventions also defined other forms, theft, adverse treatment and unlawful deprivation of liberty of civilians on the basis of ethnicity or other distinctions are all violations of laws. There is greate evidence that Sayyaf forces and Wahdat froces in Kabul kidnaped many persons in the years of Rabbani government.

²⁸⁷ The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflect, Oxford Universtiy press, 1995, pp.120-22

Most of the kidnaped person killed or disappear by these forces; this was confirmed by the families of these effected people. Some of those kidnaped persons after released revealed that they were mistreated and tortured by these forces. Arbitrary, deprivations of liberty, torture, murder and other mistreatment committed by Sayyaf forces and Wahdat forces amounted to war crimes and war against humanity. Mazairi the leader of Wahdat forces and Karim Khlaili Mazari's assistant were involved in abuses of Kidnaped persons, Karim Khalili acknowledged taking Pushtun civilians as prisoners. Mazari defended the abduction of prisoners by stating that Sayyaf forces had first captured Wahdat forces. As for as Wahat, its forces during Afshar campaign involved in targeting civilian population, civilian objects, torture, killings and other brutal treatment, abductions, rape, forced disappearances, pillage, forced labor and looting. As there was compelling evidence that Sayyaf senior commanders involved in the Afshar campaign were involved in violations of humanitarian law during the war. Sayyaf the overall leader of Ittehad party was involved in these crimes directly or indirectly. As the leader of the party Sayyaf had the authority and controlled the commanders during Afshar campaign. One of the witness Karim Khan said, that he saw that Sayyaf himself controlling and coordinating his forces during the meeting which was for the campaign of Afshar. Sayyaf had a meeting in Paghman a day before the Afshar campaign, he was also present in a meeting with Masood and Rabbani held in Hotel intercontinental on the second day of the Afshar campaign on 12 February 1993, there for Sayyaf leadership role and his present and involvement in the planning campaign placed him in the position of being directly involved in the abuses of humanitarian law.²⁸⁸ Sayyaf's famous commanders

²⁸⁸ Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 31, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Second Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 85, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950.

Zalmay Tofan, Shir Alam, Mulla Taj Mohammad, Abdulla, Abdulla Shah, Abdullah Wardak, Khanjar and Patang were involved in fighting in west of Kabul and were involved in kidnaping, killing and torture of civilians, and they violated the international humanitarian law. One of the witness Shair Zaid interviewed by Human Right watch said that he was kidnaped and put into forced labor work in Paghman province which was under Sayyaf, Shair Zaid spoke to Commander Zalmay Tofan while he was in their jail and requested for medical help they refused to offer him medical help. Shair Zaid also claimed that Zalmay Tofan, Abdullah Shah also leading Sayyaf forces in fighting. Various Rabbani commanders, including Fahim, Masood, Bismillah Khan, Baba Jan, Baba Jalander, Kabir Andarabi, Ahmadi Takhari and Mulla Ezat were directly or indirectly involved in Afshar campaign. According to one of the official Qasim Khan working in Rabbani government, General Fahim, chief of the Afghan Intelligence of Rabbani government had controlled many posts in the Afshar campaign, Fahim directly involved in decision making of Masood and Rabbani there for he is liable for crime against humanity. The same official also said that Anwar Dungeer and Mulla Ezat were also involved in Afshar campaign. One of the side effect of the violence and war between Sayyaf forces and Wahdat forces through out 1993-94 was breeding another terrible problem of ethnic abductions, Sayyaf forces kidnaping and abducting Hazara's and Tajiks, while Wahdat forces under Mazari holding Pushtuns for exchange of prisoners and ransom.

General Nabi Azimi in his book quoted that two forces that is Sayyaf and Wahdat engaging in abductions, Sayyaf forces kidnaped and abducted Hazaras and Wahdat forces abducted and kidnaped Pushtuns where they saw each other. When these forces captured the civilians they pulled out the fingernails of prisoner, cut of legs, cut of hands, even they were not scared to hammer nails into prisoners head. The prisoners were kept in containers and after that these container were set on fire, injustice, cruelty and

inhumanity began and became a chronic disease, honor and humanity were crucified, Many of the abducted persons never seen again. Some of them manage to be released on ransom money, however after exchanges or personal interventions by government officials or religious or tribal leader with connections to those detained some were released. Khushal Khan another victim of abduction from Jalaabad was interviewed by Human Rights Watch, Regardless of his Pushtun ethnicity, Khushal Khan was put in custody with thirty or forty Hazara prisoners who said that they were in prison on the basis of their ethnicity.

Khushal Khan explains his experience that some of Sayyaf men belonging to Paghman Province came to my home and took me to their center. They were searching for my brother in Law, not finding him they took me instead of him as a prisoner. Khushal Khan said those armed men took me to their center which was in Khushal Khan Mena, Khushal Khan Mena was the headquarters for the electric buses which is located near the Sillo. Khushal Khan said that those armed men put him in a room and they told me that they would keep me there for a night then I would be released. Khushal Khan said that the name of the commander was Turgul, but the next day there was fighting between Sayyaf and Wahdat forces. During the fight Sayyaf forces brought 15 to 20 Hazara civilians as prisoners and kept them in the rooms along side of my room.²⁸⁹

Those Hazara's were not fighters, they were civilians, young and old, Later in the night when there was calm outside, Sayyaf forces entered those rooms and shot at the Hazaras with Kalashnikovs. In the early morning the fighting got severe, there was a lot of firing, and rocket firing from both sides, Sayyaf forces were on the losing side they were talking of escaping, one of the men asked in Pushtu from Commander Turgul that what

²⁸⁹ Mohammed Nabi Azimi, *Ordu va Siyasat (Army and Politics)*, Peshawar, University Press, p.609

should be done with these Hazaras? Tourgul replied “Go and shoot them all”, Khushal Khan said that Hazara’s were not understanding what they are talking about, I as a pustun understand their aim, I was standing near the door, when I heard this I ran away and hide from the door in one of the corner of the room near the wall. Mean while a person came with Kalashinkove and start firing on the prisoner, he just fired randomly in the room, immediately about ten person were killed and four were wounded. No one was moving all of us were trembling with fear, the commanders fighting out side called on the person who was firing to come back to fight with them, so the men left the door and went back for fighting. Khushal Khan said the next time when the troops came by he rushed to the door and said to the guy “ Please listen, I am not Hazara I am Pustun and I was not arrested with them” Khushal said than they put me in another room because I was not Hazara, Khushal Khan said that he don’t know what happened to those Hazara’s whom were inside the room. Khushal Khan’s some relatives who knew some members of Ittihad party went to Paghman province to visit Sayyaf to plead for release of Khushal Khan. The relatives of Khushal Khan told Human Rights Watch that Sayyaf ordered his commander to release Khushal Khan. Sayyaf told one of his party minister who was member of cabinet of Rabbani government to release Khushal Khan, the minister ordered commander Tourgal to release Khushal Khan. A series of events shows that Sayyaf had knowledge of Ittihad’s commanders who had regular detention of civilians and the commanders always obeyed Sayyaf’s order.

The civillians whom were detained by Sayyaf forces and Wahdat forces compelled to work, tortured or mistreated. A doctor working in a hospital saw detainees after their release that there were sign of beating in their bodies. The released persons narrated that they were mistreated and beated when they were in custody of Wahdat forces. Abdul Haq a famous commander during Jihad time and served as police chief in Kabul in 1992 told Mir Waise Jalleel a BBC reporter in 1992 that both Wahdat and Sayyaf forces tried to

arrange prisoner exchanges between them in the first week of June 1992, but after exchanges took place it stop because both sides saw that the prisoners had been mistreated and tortured. The commanders of Jamiate Islami, Wahdat, Jumbish Milli and Hezb Islami Hekmatyar all had detained civilians usually for ransom, Anwar Danger a famous commander of Masood deeply involved in kidnapping schemes, another jamiate commander in the name of Kasim Jangal Bagh was also involved in abductions and hostage taken for ransom. Jumbish Milly and Jamiate commanders and forces regularly engaged in kidnapping and killing of prisoners in 1992 and 1993, this was confirmed by Human Rights watch report. Some of the business men and merchants in south east of Kabul and around Bala Hissar in April 1992 were looted by Hekmatyar's forces, this report was confirmed by Human watch officials and news papers of that time.

During the period of 1992 to 1993 diplomatic residencies and embassies were also targeted by armed men of different groups. Reports confirmed that complexes built for government employees in Macroyan were the center of looting specially by Uzbek forces under General Dostum. Fida Mohammad an Afghan journalist wrote in his report that he saw General Dustum's Uzbek troops looting the shops and houses, it was easy to recognize them by their clothes and features, Fida Mohammad further write that he saw some men carrying refrigerators on their backs, air conditioners and other things alike and were smiling, they put these in a truck and left the scene. Fida Mohammad also confirmed that the President House was also looted by Jamiate and Jumbish forces, these troops went in and were taking furnitures, carpets and other things.

An official of Shura e Nizar told about kidnapping and looting of Kasim Jangal Bagh a mid level commander of Rabbani's Jamiate Islami Party told that Kasim Jangal Bagh's troops were responsible of looting kidnapping and raping of girls in Macroyan and Wazir Akbar Khan areas. Operational commander of this commander was Bismilla Khan, but he was directly reported to Ahmad Shah Masood and was giving and supporting by Ahmad

Shah Masood directly. Commander Kasim Jangal Bagh had houses, cars and everything but his troops were poor and needy so they snatched what ever they found from people. The troops with commanders were not paid so they were robbing and snatching.

A journalist worked in Kabul through 1992-94 described his experience of seeing a number of houses in the west part of Kabul that were looted by Rabbani forces, these forces getting every thing, roof beams were torn out of the buildings, telephone wires were torn from the ground , electricity wires were torn out, , and they sold these in bazar in less than half prices.

Commander Muslim one of the senior commanders in Jamiate Islami party and worked in Afghan ministry of defense told to Human right reporter about the looting by armed forces in Kabul, he said, that every society has its robbers and thieves, Afghans are not different, we accept that there is disorder, there is chaos but it's no worse than Los Angeles, he was refereing to the large scale of looting and riots which had broken out in April 1992 in Los Angeles.

Salman Khail one of the Rabbani government official said about looting by Jamiat forces in 1992-1994, that one of the commander in the name of Rahim "Kung Fu" was a killer and robber and a thief in another word he is criminal, Salman Khail also said that commander Rahim was involved in killings of Wahdat forces and Hazara civilians and children and women during an operations against Wahdat forces in 1992.

Health worker of Wazir Akbar Khan Hospital and other Hospitals told Human Rights Watch that rapes and other forms of sexual violence were commonly committed against children and women who were captured by Sayyaf and Wahdat forces in 1992-1994, as well as generally during the hostilities of other forces around Kabul at that time. These militias and armed forces of all political parties were involved in the abuses, hospital sources included. Human Right Watch reported that political parties, militias and forces were involved in abuses, those parties included, Sayyaf, Wahdat, Hizb Islami of

Hekmatyar, Masood and Rabbani forces and Jumbish Mili forces during the period of Rabbani Government.

Abdul Rabb Rasul Sayyaf was commanding his forces during Rabbani government and was ally of Rabbani and his party members were ministers in Rabbani cabinet. Wahdat and Sayyaf forces were busy in fighting in west of Kabul and Sayyaf forces repeatedly lounched attacks against Wahdat forces in west of Kabul, Sayyaf forces fired small and heavy weapons indiscriminatley within the dense civilian population of west of Kabul, during these attacks Sayyaf forces failed to distinguish between military targets and civilian objects. In several cases Sayyaf forces intentionally targetted civillians or civillian areas with rockets fire and gunfire and mortar fires. Sayyaf forces engaged in abduction based on ethnic grounds usually directed at Hazar people, many of the hostage taken by Sayyaf forces were mistreated and forced to work, there were clear evidence that during Rabbani period Sayyaf forces engaged in killing of Hazara civilians and kidnaping of Hazaras.²⁹⁰ Sayyaf's commanders were involved in the killings and abductions of civilian and they were liable for crimes against Hazar people, Sayyaf commanders were also involved in ethnic persecution and they killed raped and kidnaped Hazara population, during Afshar operation most of prisoners taken by Sayyaf forces were on the basis of their ethnic identity. The failure of Sayyaf commanders to stop their forces of looting, murder, pillage and raping the women and boys were openly vialations of internaional humanatiarian law by these forces. The failures of these commanders to prevent the abuses by their forces could make them responsible. Abdul Rabb Rasul Sayyaf as a leader of his party and he had effective controle over all his commanders and forces directly implicated in the indiscriminate and abductions and targetting of civilians. Thus Sayyaf had overall controle of his forces that abuses and committed the crimes against

²⁹⁰ Wahdat commanders in Kabul included Abdul Wahid Turkmani, , Sedaqat Jahori, Mohsin Sultani, Tahir Tofan, and Commander Bahrami. Wahdat's two main commanders in west Kabul were Shafi Dawana ("Shafi the Mad") and Nasir Dawana ("Nasir the Mad").

humanity. As allied of Rabbani government Sayyaf was in regular contacts with his forces and commanders, he had powers to release prisoners he had power to sign an agreement with other parties and their commanders had to obey, this was confirm by an official Hamidulla worked in Rabbani government.²⁹¹

Abdul Ali Mazari was over all commanders of Wahdat forces and Abdul Karim Khalili served as Mazari's deputy during Rabbani period.

During 1992-93 Wahdat forces under the command of Abdul Ali Mazari repeatedly launched attacks in west of Kabul against Rabbani, Masood forces and Sayyaf forces. Wahdat forces intentionally or in interntionally targetted civillian areas with rockets, mortar fires and gunfires. During these attacks Wahdat forces failed to make efforts to distinguish between military target and civilian objects, and often they fired heavy and small weapons into the dense civilian population setting in west of Kabul.

Wahdat forces were engaged in a practice of abductions and arbitrary detentions, their targets usually were pushtuns, Pushtuns were mistreated and forces to workd for them, many of the pushtuns and other prisoners were executed by Wahdat forces. The commanders belong to Wahdat targeted non Hazara civilians for killing and abduction on ethnicity basis. There were evidence that prisoners taken by Wahdat forces were mostly pustune and belong to Sayyaf party. Wahdat forces also involved in number of acts of pillage, murder looting and in violation of international humanitarian laws.

²⁹¹ Ittihad commanders included Shir Alam, Zalmay Tofan, Abdullah Wardak (former minister of martyrs and disabled in President Karzai's interim 2002-2004 cabinet), Mullah Taj Mohammad (as of mid-2005, parliamentary candidate, head of political group called the Kabul Citizen's Counsel; governor of Kabul in 2003-2004), "Doctor" Abdullah (as of mid-2005 a commander in the ministry of defense; no relation to Dr. Abdullah, the current foreign minister of Afghanistan), and Abdullah Shah (executed by the Afghan government in April 2004). Other commanders reported to hold senior positions were Khanjar (deceased), Patang, Jaglan Naeem (as of mid-2005 reported to be serving as an official in the ministry of interior), Abdul Manan Diwana (as of mid-2005 reported to be governor of a district in Sare Pol province), Noor Aqi (reported to be serving as an official in the ministry of defense), Amanullah Kochi, Shirin, Mushtaq Lalai, and Mullah Kachkol (as of mid-2005 reported to be parliamentary candidate and commander in the ministry of defense).

Some of the Wahdat officials confirmed that they arrested some civilians on the basis of ethnicity it was part of the Wahdat policy or kind of plane which was made by leaders. There for Wahdat commanders also be liable for crimes against innocent people of Kabul specially Pustunes. Commanders of Wahdat were failed to stop or prevent the forces to abuses there for could make them responsible for violations of international humanitarian laws. .²⁹²

Hezb-E-Islami was headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, this party had more than six thousands (6000) forces in Afghanistan and was one of the opponent of Rabbani government, Hekmatyar forces consisted of Firqa Sama (Sama Division), the Lashker e Isar, and small groups under different commanders. The command structure of Hezb e Islami were Shura Nizame (military council) under direct orders of Hekmatyar, this council consists of 12 members, Faiz Mohammad and Kashmir Khan were Kabul based commanders, Sabawoon was chief of staff of Hezb e Islami, but later he was replaced by Kashmir Khan. Toran Khalil was chief artillery officer who supervised rocketing and shelling Kabul during 1992-94. Hezb e Islami forces repeatedly and regularly rocketed Kabul, they used artillery and rockets in a way that they intentionally targeting civilian residence rather than military targets. These forces made Kabul as unified military target there for they were shelling every where, whether it is civilian residence, hospitals, schools or other places, they just closed their eyes and fired into Kabul. These acts of Hekmatyar's forces were war crimes, the crimes against humanity. This way of attacks against civilians demonstrated the abuses of human right and Hekmatyar's forces violated international humanitarian law. It also showed that Hizb forces violated international humanitarian law in many cases, Hekmatyar's forces often used BM 12 rockets, BM 22, BM 40 rocket launchers and Saker missile rockets in their attacks on the city, these kind of rockets are not designed for accuracy in such kind of combat. Hezb e Islami forces fired

²⁹² HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH interview with R.N, Photojournalist, New York, December 18, 2004

artillery at civilian areas and target Kabul as a whole, the use of such kind of rocket within Kabul have been violation of international humanitarian laws by Hekmatyar's forces. Hekmatyar's forces also involved in pillage, murders and looting in violation of international humanitarian law, As Hekmatyar and his commanders had overall control over the Hezb forces there for their failure to stop and prevent the abuses could make them responsible for abuse of international humanitarian law. As Hekmatyar was the sole military and political leader of Hezb e Islami party and was in command of all his forces, there for he abused all international humanitarian law and he is responsible for crime against poor people of Kabul. Jamiat and Shura-e Nazar forces were in overall command of Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani and Commander Ahmad Shah Masood. Important commanders of Rabbani and Masood were Bismilla Khan, Fahim Khan, Baba Jalandar, Baba Jaan Ahmad Takhari, Kaber Andarabi and Mulla Ezatullah, Rabbani and Masood forces were culpable for many of the abuses. .²⁹³

Jamiat and Masood forces alleged abuses to war crimes implicated in general criminality, killings of civilians, numerous robberies. Jamiat and Masood forces in 1992 to 1996 targeted civilians, civilian areas in western Kabul for attack, and these forces did not distinguish between areas of military target and civilian areas.

Jamiat forces and Masood forces used imprecise weapons system including UB 16, Sakr rockets and UB 32 and S 5 airborne rocket launchers onto tank turrets, the use of such weapons were violations of humanitarian law. Some of commanders of Jamiat and Masood forces involved in abduction and killing of Hazara's civilian in 1992 to 1994. During Afshar campaign in 1993 Jamiat and Masood forces and commanders liable for the abuses international humanitarian laws along with Sayyaf's forces against Wahdat

²⁹³ HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH telephone interviews with numerous Afghan journalists and observers in Kabul, May 2005; AJP report, January 2005, pp. 28-29

forces and Hazara populations. During Afshar campaign in 1993 Fahim chief of Afghan intelligence service had controlled military forces and he was one of the important commanders under command of Ahmad Shah Masood. Ahmad Shah Masood and General Fahim during Afshar campaign controlled military post of Television Mountain in Kabul, they were planning the operations of Afshar campaign and took part in negotiations with Harakat commanders to gain their cooperation before this attack. Younis Qanooni was also one of the important members of Masood and Rabbani and he had his part in decision making process.

One of the important figures in command and structure of Jamiat was Fahim, during Afshar assault Fahim was responsible for special operations in support of the offensive and participating in planning of the operations. Baba Jalandar was reported to have participated in the operations along with Mohammad Ishaq Pansheri, Khanjar Aakhund, Haji Bahlol Pangsheri, Mushdoq Lala and Ahmad Badakhshani. Anwar Danger and Mulla Ezatulla abuses the civilian of Hazara's during Afshar campaign, this was confirmed by Justice Report and many individuals. Rabbani as head of the Islamic State of Afghanistan was also involved in decision making process, Rabbani was present when Afshar attacks plan was drawn, so he is directly or indirectly involved in the process and he had his part in decisions, so Rabbani along Masood abuses of many international humanitarian law and human right law. The failure of Rabbani and Masood to prevent and stop the abuses done by their forces make them complicit in the violations.²⁹⁴ Abdul

²⁹⁴ Military commanders included M. Qasim Fahim (Afghanistan's defense minister 2001-2004; holding a symbolic position as "Marshall for Life"); Baba Jalander (Director of the Afghan R C S from late 2001-2004); Bismullah Khan (as of mid-2005 the chief of staff of the Afghan Army); Gul Haider (as of mid-2005 a general serving in the defense ministry); Younis Qanooni (ex minister of education and national security advisor in President Karzai's 2002-2004 cabinet; as of mid-2005 the chief of Nehzat-e Melli, a political party, also known as Afghanistan Naveen). Jamiat Islami commanders in Kabul included Mohammad Baba Jan (chief of police in Heart(2005)), General Abdul Momin and Basir Salangi (chief of police in Kabul in 2003 and chief of police in Wardak province), as well as other commanders Kabir Andarabi (until mid-2005 a senior ministry of defense commander, stationed in Bagrami; as of mid-2005 a police official in the ministry of interior), Baz Mohammad Ahmadi (as of mid-2005 an official in the ministry of defense), Mullah Ezat (parliamentary candidate; as of 2005 a senior ministry of defense

Rashid Dostum commander of Uzbek forces and famous in the name Gellam jam forces and was known as king maker during that period was leading his forces in Kabul²⁹⁵. His forces involved in numerous pillage, looting and murders of people, Initially he sided with Masood to fight against Hekmatyar forces, than he changed side and made an alliance with Hekmatyar to over throw Rabbani government, his forces were involved in murders of people, looting of the houses, kidnaping and raping, and killing of the people, Dostum forces totally abused Violations of international humanitarian law. Dostum and his Commanders failed to control his forces to stop or prevent abuses make them responsible as a matter of command responsibility. Mohammad Asif Mohseni the leader of Harakat party also involved in abuses of civilians, Hussain Anwari and Ali Javeed were the main commander of this party, they were the ally of Rabbani government and involved in decisions making of Rabbani government, so their leader were liable for abuses the ordinary citizens of Kabul.²⁹⁶

commander), Panah (reportedly deceased), and Anwar Dangar (joined the Taliban in 1996 and was killed in Peshawar in 2004).

²⁹⁵ DOSTUM was serving as a senior general in the ministry of defense and was exercising significant political and military influence in the north of Afghanistan. Secondary Junbish commanders in 1992-1995 included Abdul Chirik (deceased), Majid Rouzi (senior military official in the Junbish faction), Mohsin Hodayun Fouzi (senior official in the ministry of defense), Jura Beig (reportedly deceased), Rasul Pahlavan, Zeini Pahlavan, and Rahim Pahlavan.

²⁹⁶ Members of President Karzai's interim cabinet, 2002-2004; Anwari was appointed governor of Kabul in 2005; Javeed is now the political leader of Harakat Islami Afghanistan. Harakat leaders, though not a primary force in the abuses, were implicated in several cases where violations of law occurred.



(Source: www.RAWA.com.org)

(Ahmad Shah Masood, Qasim Fahim and other commanders of Shura-e-Nezar with Parchami army generals Nabi Azimi, Noor-ul-Haq Ulomi, Asif Delawar and others.)

In short, one can say that violation of International human rights were not respected by all warring factions; there was no rule of law that is why violation of humanitarian law was also one of the factors attributable to the fall of Rabbani government.

4.1.6 Monetary and Economic Policies of Burhanuddin Rabbani Government

The printing of currency remained probably the single most important source of state expenditure. Banknotes printed under first contract in Russia and then by the American Banknote Company continued to be delivered on weekly basis to the Burhanuddin

Rabbani government. The resulting devaluation of the Afghani and inflation were so severe that the government introduced new currency notes. Under Dr. Najeebullah the official exchange rate had been 50 Afghani to one dollar, and the largest bill was the Afg. 1,000 note. By the summer of 1991, the Afghani was trading at about 1,000 to the dollar, and it continued to fall. Burhanuddin Rabbani government issued first a 5,000 and then a 10,000 Afghani note. Each time it did so the currency fell further. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar forbade the use of the AF. 10,000 note in bazaars under his control. The former communist ethnic Uzbek warlord of northern Afghanistan, Abdul Rashid Dostum, had his own notes printed after breaking with Burhanuddin Rabbani in January 1994. By September 1996, when Kabul fell to the Taliban, the Afghani was trading at 17,800 to one dollar. Furthermore, the Afghani was worth even less (25,600/dollar) in Dostum's de facto capital, Mazar-i-Sharif, indicating the lack of a national market.²⁹⁷

This partial regionalization of the monetary economy reflected the regionalization of the real economy. Each region, controlled by a different warlord grouping, was more integrated with the neighboring state than with the rest of the country. The northern militias that had grouped themselves around General Abdul Rashid Dostum controlled the trade with the newly emerged states of Central Asia through the bazaar of Mazar-i-Sharif and the customs point at Hairatan port. A variety of small commanders in Badakhshan, allied with some of the Islamic forces who had fled from Tajikistan, controlled the opium crop of Badakhshan, which moved north through war-torn Tajikistan with the help of corrupt officials and members of the Russian border troops and CIS peacekeeping forces. The Arsala clan (Haji Abdul Qadir and his brothers) was at the center of the commercial development of Jalalabad, profiting from Nangarhar province's skyrocketing opium production and using the Jalalabad airport as a center for the import of goods from Dubai for smuggling into Pakistan in alliance with Afghan and Pakistani Pushtun truckers and the local administration of the NWFP. Herat under Ismail Khan turned into a boom town for trade with Iran and transit trade coming overland from Dubai (transported by the same trucking networks) and out to Pakistan by the southern

²⁹⁷ Holsti Kalevi, *War and the State and the State of War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp.88-95

route. Southern Afghanistan became the largest opium producing area of the country, possibly the world, as well as an entrepot for the smuggling of goods into Quetta, some over land and some via the Qandahar airport. The continued prevalence of petty warlordism and continual infighting in the area, however, imposed high costs on traders in the form of tolls and tribute.²⁹⁸

4.1.7 Internal Opposition to Burhanuddin Rabbani

After the establishment of Burhanuddin Rabbani government, first it was Ahmad Shah Masood and his supervisory Council which stood supreme, as the security of Kabul and other Jamiate dominated areas rested in their hands. Without them, the organization's political wing could not have played a central role in establishing a government. The upshot of this was a desire by supervisory Council to have a determining share in the power structure and substantial input in shaping Burhanuddin Rabbani government's policies. Yet those senior Jamiate functionaries who had returned with Burhanuddin Rabbani from exile wanted their expertise to be recognized, and to fill most of the important governmental and bureaucratic posts.²⁹⁹

The second difference arose from ethnicisation within each of the Jamiat's party wings. Although the supervisory council and the political wing of Jamiat contained representation from a wide range of non pushtuns, in the growing atmosphere of distrust which had beset the Afghan nation in general, and the Jamiat in particular, ethnic loyalty to both Ahmad Shah Masood and Burhanuddin Rabbani rapidly came to take precedence over the need to develop a multiethnic administration and military force. Whereas Ahmad Shah Masood became more and more reliant on his core Panjsheri supporters, Burhanuddin Rabbani surrounded himself largely with staff and armed personnel who had come from his native Badakhshan province. This gave rise to divisions even within the supervisory Council and the Jamiat party, as well as between them, and to plotting by factions against each other in ways, which served the interests only of those who resented any form of Tajik rule. Jamiat-e-Islami of Rabbani members and supporters could be divided into three broad categories, the core who were ethnically loyal to either Ahmad

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State and Collapse in the International System*, Lahore, Vanguard Books pvt, Ltd, 2002, pp.45-59

Shah Masood or Burhanuddin Rabbani, the middle circles whose loyalties were questionable but who, for reasons of political expediency, were allowed to penetrate the administration at some strategic points, and those who were ostensibly supportive of the Burhanuddin Rabbani administration, but mindful of maintaining the possibility of supporting Gulbuddin Hikmatyar or whoever else could triumph in the power struggle between the Rabbani-Masood camp and the Hezb-e-Islami. This was hardly a recipe for stability.³⁰⁰

The third concern was the relationship of Burhanuddin Rabbani and governor of Herat Ismaiel Khan. On the one hand, the alliance of Ismaiel Khan with government was a source of comfort for the government, and on the other hand, his growing stature and strength as the Amir of Herat of all western Afghanistan ultimately became disconnecting for some of the Kabul authorities, especially Ahmad Shah Masood. This, together with the fact that Ismaiel Khan rapidly succeeded in transforming Herat into a peaceful haven with a thriving social and economic life, prompted some in Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masood camp to view the governor power with the degree of disdain and jealousy. Jamiat's, specially Ahmad Shah Masood's, clumsy attempts to gain a strong foot hold in the running of Ismaiel Khan's administration led to bad feelings between them, thus damaging the close cooperation which was required to enable them to develop a stable and strong national government.

The fourth factor stemmed from the fact that, once Burhanuddin Rabbani assumed the presidency, he formally resigned as the head of the Jamiat Islami party in order to depoliticize the office of presidency and free himself from party restrictions and accusations of political bias. In reality Burhanuddin Rabbani remained very closely attached to the Jamiat leadership and more specifically to his Badakhshi clique for loyalty and support. As his power base remained confined to the Jamiat, he simply could not depoliticize his position. Thus his resignation as the head of Jamiat-e-Islami had two unforeseen consequences. On the one hand, during the years of resistance he had grown to personify his position within the party, it caused a great deal of confusion among those of his supporters who had little understanding of party politics and were traditionally accustomed to the personalization of politics. On the other hand it did nothing to reduce

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

his vulnerability to accusations of political bias and ethnic cronyism, a fact which came rapidly to permeate Rabbani's administration at all level.³⁰¹ The armed men who supported the Islamic State under the leadership of Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani and fought for that were scattered and disunited. On many occasions, they provided necessary information to the opposite side and thus made instruments for defeat and losses of their comrades-in-arm. They guided the rivals to sensitive points by confidential means. The groups that supported the government of Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani received such blows several times. The government knew about the affairs but had no alternative except for silence and tolerance.³⁰²

4.1.8 The System of Government was shattered

In its last days, the Communist regime of Mohammad Dr. Najeebullah was cut off from all the provinces. Jihadi forces and remnants of the regime administered areas under their control at their will. They did not repent what had happened and what was going to happen, but captured places, which they considered profitable. The power, transferred by a number of ministers and generals to Burhanuddin Rabbani and his large size delegation was, in fact, equal to zero. There was nothing to be considered. The regime did not hand over military forces to Burhanuddin Rabbani. The remaining military forces of the regime were independent and re-organized to hold areas and they obeyed their own commands and not the President of the State. Most of the central districts of Kabul were under the control of similar forces. In other parts of Kabul, opposition parties and parties of Shiaa deployed forces, which had blocked the ways on the government people. The President House once called Arg and then Peoples House as well as Gulkhana Palace. Were the two places in the control of the President whereas other buildings and gates were under the control of rival groups. Highly placed and responsible people of the regime and party had already deserted ministries. Their seats were vacant. Ministries with armed forces had joined Jihadi groups or other forces. Burhanuddin Rabbani could not

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² Interview of Mohammad Sediq Cahakary, Minister of Information and Technology of Rabbani Cabinet, with the author.

solve this problem; Burhanuddin Rabbani could only appoint a number of new ministers who lacked understanding and experience.³⁰³

4.1.9 Out of Control Armed forces

When Burhanuddin Rabbani Government was established, the army, police and other forces of the regime were not in control of the government. The units, which still maintained military importance, protected themselves by supporting various Jihadi groups and personalities and other defense institutions fell under the control of Jehadi groups and commanders. They lost their importance and the government could not use them. Burhanuddin Rabbani could bring these forces under his control, but he could not succeed to retrieve the usurped military facilities from the Jihadi parties and commanders. Instead, the groups and parties occupied government offices and buildings. The government was unable to get them back.

Another problem of Burhanuddin Rabbani Government was the powerful national forces under General Rashid Dostum in Mazar-e-Sharif and General Momin with substantial power at Hairatan. Similar commanders existed in the Eastern, Southern and Western parts of the country. Every one of them, having realized the weakness of the Central Government, considered himself Amir or King of the area under his rule. The government could not restrict the power of those rulers, but rather strengthened them. Instead of fearing the state, they hurled threats at the government in cases where they differed. This state of affairs also moved the mujahedeen away from the central government. Although they vehemently pledged loyalty to the state, yet they had no patience at all to see anything happening against their expectations.³⁰⁴

In the East, under Haji Qadir the Eastern Council was formed with elements loyal as well as opposed to the government of Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani. In the west, General

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ Barnet R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghansitan State and Collapse in the International System*, Lahore, Vanguard Books pvt, Ltd, 2002, pp.65-85

Ismail Khan was holding on to his own emirate. In Kandahar, Ghazni, Eastern and Northern provinces, other commanders established their rules. A part in the North was in control of the forces of the previous government. Mujahedeen either did not rely on their strength or, under the guidance of their leaders, did not consider it useful to fight against them. These parts of the country had been almost cut out off the country and they had set up their own systems of administration. Arms and ammunition left behind by the Communist regime fell mostly in the hands of unworthy and anti-state elements. These were later used indiscriminately against the government. Each of these armed groups held a part of Kabul and ruled that. For example, the ruler of Micro Royan I was one person and of Micro Royan-III was another person. One person and group held one street another held the other street. A number of them never considered themselves as subject of the government. These rulers controlled movements of people in their respective areas. The situation in the west of Kabul was different, there was another government. Suburbs of Kabul were full of opponents who brought Kabul under fire.

All the problems that the regime of Dr. Najeebullah had such as, differences, disunity, maladministration, non-cooperation, etc., were passed on to the government of Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani. The country needed a person who could understand and evaluate the situation and be able to sustain the hardship and treat this malady as early as possible. Unfortunately, the person who held power of the country could not realize this aspiration of the masses. The government system in the last days of the regime of Dr. Najeebullah did not exist de facto. Economically, it was bankrupt. The country was ruined, cities and towns burned, poverty and helplessness prevailed and education was corrupted by alien's ideas. The heritage of the communist regime was passed on to the Islamic government.

Despite backwardness, poverty and illiteracy, the country had the foundations necessary for administration of the country and solution of social problems. In spite of deprivations in the wake of changes of regimes, something still remained that these foundations needed. At the time of replacement of the previous regime by the Islamic regime, most of these facilities were ruined. Offices, departments, ministries and institutions were in the worst condition. Establishment of the new regime reanimated hope for improvement of

the situation. It was hoped that the period of gloomy state of these foundations and institutions would be shortened. Unfortunately, this aspiration was not realized during Burhanuddin Rabbani Government and the situation worsened. An expert on Afghan affairs commented thus:

“The differences of Masood, Hikmatyar and other Jihadi leaders were due to their attachment with different organizations and this did not allow these few people to arrive at an agreement and select one of them their leader. Had they followed principle and taken advantage of their wisdom, there would have been no chance for the gunmen but to obey them and not to flout their orders.”

Civil war bloodshed and fighting among different groups convinced the Afghan nation that these leaders and commanders could do nothing else.³⁰⁵

In Afghanistan, the army was in a different position. It was based from the very beginning, on loyalty to the king and the family and was, probably, commanded by an important member of the *royal family*. The army gave rare attention to patriotism. In fact, the army in Afghanistan knew about the master but did not know about his friends and enemies. The army of Afghanistan did consider the British as its enemies, in spite of three wars in one century, occupation and disintegration of their land. The Soviet Russia, on the other hand, was innocent and friend in spite of continuation of efforts by her for occupation of a part of its land. Such a mindset of the army prepared ground for the Soviet Union to easily extend influence in Afghanistan. The army lost contacts with the armies of the Muslim countries and the nominal level of cooperation with Turkey in professional matters. Instead, it extended relations with the Soviet army. In this background, the Russian influence in the army was visible. Most of the young Afghan soldiers returned their homes on completion of tenures of their army service, with nothing else but stories of home-service, beating in training center, a few sentences relating to the system, some names of officers and some knowledge of old rifles. They did not learn

³⁰⁵ Interview of Rahimulla Yousafzai, Bureau Chief of the News International, with the author.

what should inspire them to know the friends and enemies and boost their spirit of devotion, bravery and sacrifice for the sake of defense and development of their country.

The republican regime of Sardar Daud had come into being with the support of some soldiers. In order to placate them, Sardar Daud took some irregular actions in the army and the defense system; one of them was promotion of *Khurd Zabitan* (*Sub inspector*) to *Zabitan* (*Inspector*). During that period the army wanted to inculcate the name of Sardar Daud in place of the King in the minds of the soldiers so that they should perform their duties as loyal to him.

During Communist regime, Nur Mohammad Taraki, from the very beginning of his rule, recognized slavery, loyalty to and love with the Soviet Union, as the basic criteria for the government service. On that account, made changes in the army. In the rule of Daud *khurd Zabitan* was made *Zabit*. In this system according to the above criteria every one could become any one as he liked from *Dagarwal* to *General* and even higher to that. With little modification of the standard, the same trend prevailed in the system of Burhanuddin Rabani government also.

The army of Afghanistan during the era of Communism was not a national army in the real sense and not even independent, and was under the command of Russia as a unit of the Soviet forces. The army of Afghanistan during Communism was advised and directed by two thousand Russian military advisors and experts.

The Soviet Embassy in Kabul provided the political leadership to the army of Afghanistan and the military leadership were held by the advisers in the army of that country. How could people in this army think of independence in the presence of 125,000 armed Soviet soldiers, who supervised and ruled them and were their benefactors as well. They did not know what to do but perform "attention, stand at ease" and military salutation only until the Russian army disappeared from the scene. Hence, no Afghan soldier thought of it, he did not display his independence. The soldiers, who did not accept such disgrace, deserted or joined Mujahedeen.

Russian advisers not only dictated the Afghan armies and officers, but also dictated the President of this country. Some officers of the Soviet army, who had served in Afghanistan on similar posts and compiled their memoirs, have articulated their roles in commanding the system and army of Afghanistan and have attributed the selection of the successive Presidents of Afghanistan to the armed forces and the Soviet intelligence. For example, an extract from a book³⁰⁶ explain the situation:

*"Babrak Karmal was then at Bagram at the base of the parachute commandoes regiment (commanded by Sirdevkev) under the guard surveillants of section 9 of KGB. In the evening of 27 December, Andropov contacted Karmal and congratulated him on behalf of his own self and Leonid Brezhnev on success of the second phase of revolution and his election as the president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan".*³⁰⁷

The above quotation reveals that the first phase of the revolution had been accomplished by Russians and they had elected the President of the revolutionary council also, and then they accomplished the second phase of the revolution and nominated Babrak Karmal as the president of the revolutionary council.

*"Andropov, who was the supporter and guardian of Karmal, had discussed this point (excessive drinking) several times with him, but his advice did not work. It is also brought to light that the Secretary General of the party was not competent to steer the situation in the planned direction, but the Soviets were not in hurry to replace him, as he had been installed in this chair on the recommendation of KGB."*³⁰⁸

Hence, it is out of question to assume that the armed forces, which were not capable of defending their presidents, would be able to defend independence, security and geographical integrity of the country.

³⁰⁶*Toofan dar Afghanistan* written by Alexander Liakhifski, pp.⁷⁷⁻⁹⁹ (an adviser who served in the Soviet army in Afghanistan).

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

The Government of Afghanistan under Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani inherited an army which was placed in such a situation. The army that fell in the hands of Islamic Government was in such a disorganized form that the Generals and Defense minister of the Islamic Government did not recognize it as an army before the fall of the regime.

For its survival, Rabbani Government could not unite the army. The scattered remnants of the army were with different groups and parties and took positions at different places against Rabbani government. Famous and powerful commanders thought of taking the reins in hands and looking after their affairs independently. In the last stage of Jihad, meetings and consultations of the commanders, their contacts abroad with rival groups as well as the government of Kabul, all, reflected that there was no trustworthy leadership. They thought that the army deserved more to conduct political affairs also. In view of the financial and military assistance, these commanders did not want to weaken their connections with the leaders, on this account; these contacts did not show the desired result. It was imperative for the commanders to stay close to political figures and not to take their places, in spite of sustaining great hardship and difficulties during Jihad. The commanders, in fact, staged a coup d'état in the revolution by adopting politics and cut short the life of Burhanudin Rabbani government.

After the success, the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani was not only confronted with the problem of the army cadre, it was also in need of assistance to the system in all trades and cadres. Educated cadres existed in Jihadi organizations. Had they, on the whole, supported the Burhanuddin Rabbani government, the Government would have not been in this stage. Most of them did not agree with the system and maintained their allegiance to their respective organizations. They resorted to weakening of the government and preferred inactivity to activity and became spectators. Even the educated lot in the ruling Jamiat-e-Islami did not cooperate with the party as a united army. The leadership did not give due attention to this plight. Ministers and heads of the department did not care for rules and regulations and merit particularly while making appointments in their respective ministries and departments.

The government paid the bills and guessed, on that account, that establishment were full, having gathered surplus staff and qualified people. Naturally, the work and efficiency suffered, carelessness, idleness and vulgarity created every day new difficulty and problem for Burhanuddin Rabbani government. This situation let the water flow down to run the grinding machine of enemy of the government. Propaganda against the people in the government spread to mix with reality. The government could not discharge its original functions of maintaining law and order in the country, solving the problems of the people and improving the standard of life of the people. The existence of the government had no sense for the society. It was running fast towards its end.

During Rabbani period, politically motivated killing took place by different groups, notably the 29 July 1994 murder of the BBC correspondent Mir Wais Jalil (Afghan), whose fearless reporting had outraged the Hezb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar) and Burhanuddin Rabbani government.

Mir Wais Jalil BBC correspondent



(Source: Personal collection)

4.1.10 Dissident Jihadi Groups

The regime of Dr. Najeebullah created disunity among the Mujahedeen groups by payment of money, bribe, involving them in vulgarity and propaganda and diverted a number of Jihadi groups from their path. These groups carried out activities in the name of Mujahedeen. These groups of miscreants may also be counted as a legacy of the Dr. Najeebullah regime left over to the Burhanuddin Rabbani government as, later on, they played great role in widening differences, creating chaos and lawlessness. A list of 3000 such commanders was handed over to Burhanuddin Rabbani who, allegedly had contacts with former Dr Najeebullah government.³⁰⁹

The government followed the tactics of Russians in attracting and winning these commanders and group leaders by creating differences among them, and in case of inter-groups confrontation, promised help to the party willing to enter into an agreement with the government. Sometimes, both the parties were contacted separately, lured into agreements, and financed them to continue the conflict, killing and prolong the disorder. These types of people were blinded by offers of bribes, arms and ammunition of their choice and, thus, snared into the baleful net of the government. The KHAD network used sluts, trained in the party, to obtain documents and perform other acts that would restrain the party to an agreement from defying orders of KHAD in future and renounce his agreement. There were rumors that Babrak Karmal had given order to a number of female workers of his party to priorities' prostitution, espionage and eavesdropping in performance of their activities, because their survival depended on such sacrifices and selflessness. Their party assigned this difficult duty to them and hoped for their success. Most of these prostitutes were members of KHAD. The informed people in Kabul do not contradict this rumor.³¹⁰

³⁰⁹ Interview of Mohammad Sediq Cahakary, Minister of information and Technology of Rabbani Cabinet, with the author.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

Conspiracies against Burhanuddin Rabbani government was a routine affairs as is evident from extract of an interview:

“In the meeting of General Dostum, General Momin and other proKarmal Generals with Shura-e-Nizar of Masood on the fall of Dr. Najeebulla Government and expulsion of the forces of Hizb-e-Islami from Kabul, it was decided that they would get fifty percent share in the administration of Rabbani government. After the aim was achieved, Masood and Rabbani ignored that decision. Babrak Karmal, his brother and supporting General met at Haiarattan and concluded that Ahmad Shah Masood had betrayed them for which he should be punished and made to understand that he could not perform any action without their cooperation. Now that he has become arrogant he is liable to be given a lesson to understand that he is nonentity. Babrak Karmal directed General Dostum and said that ‘You are no more obliged to help him. Your forces should act independently where ever they are. He cannot strike you. Our friends (Russian) will cooperate with you’”³¹¹

With the success of Mujahedeen and the fall of Dr. Najeebullah, those who lived in areas under the control of the communist government, or those who were constrained to surrender to the rule, were mentally disturbed. Hundreds of thoughts and hundreds of superstitions obsessed their minds. They feared the rule of the Islamic regime. They were mentally disturbed, who had cooperated with the regime, which derided the national traditions and religious injunctions, and now stood defeated at the hands of those who followed the religion, ethics and traditions. The shock of material losses and deaths of relatives and friends was not going to exhaust. They were not sincere in recognition of the Burhanuddin Rabbani government, as they did not see any government in the world established through Jihad. In the beginning, they thought of certain assumptions such as a society like this creates problem for the government, which wants to deliver.

³¹¹ Interview of Dr Bashar, An expert on Afghan affairs settled in US, with the author.

4.1.11 Obscene situation in the Kabul

Immoral people can be found in every big city. This is natural. In the opinion of rural people, the moral situation in Kabul during the periods of the governments before the Communist regime was open to question. This judgment was based on the differential conditions between the city and the village. Many affairs, which are considered parts of ethics in the village and to which the people are fanatically attached, lose significance in the city and seldom catch attention. It is a proven fact. However, effecting changes in a leap in ethical, customary and traditional values of the society becomes very difficult and prove futile. Despite having suitable facilities at hand to rule, Amanullah Khan was forced to abdicate the throne due to such policies. This time the communist regime wanted according to Babrak Karmal to see the ethical difference between the Soviet human being and the Afghan human being. The ugliest phenomenon was that the communist regime considered 'woman' as the nucleus of ethical issues and problems, and perceived that moral values change with the change in woman. Whereas, issues and problems related to woman are customary and traditional parts of social values and not the whole of them. This type of concepts hinders evolution of important social values. They are thrown to the winds. The communist regime considered bare head and bare legs of the woman, dancing and singing, and her mixing up with men as examples of the ethical change in the society and considered it an art. On the first and the last birthday of Nur Mohammad Taraki, daughters of high-ranking officers of the regime performed dancing and singing before the guests and ambassadors in Kabul. Taraki expressed astonishment. He turned his face to a guest and said; "*I didn't believe that Afghan girls are so good artists.*" The film of that celebration made by radio-television under the title of *Do roz pey darpey* (Two consecutive days)' was exhibited.

Dr. Najeebullah repeated what Babrak Karmal had sown. He not only corrupted adeptly the ethical condition in Kabul but also among the Mujahedeen groups, which had entered into agreements with him. That was ethical situation in which Burhanuddin Rabbani

government found itself. And that kind of situation was not acceptable to the people and Rabbani government failed to control the situation.³¹²

4.1.12 Problem of Leadership

In Afghanistan, the people in mountains and deserts, cities and villages, declared support to Jihad against the tanks, guns and aircrafts of the Russians with utmost devotion, bravery and steadfastness, and proved that. The people, who had offered lives and properties for success of Jihad against Russians and sovereignty of religion and pushing out the non-believers and their agents who had destroyed the country, did not find a trustworthy leader, a man really free of greed, desire for dignified status and prejudices.

Presence of foreign troops and irreligious posture of their hirelings restrained the people from thinking of the outcome of these sacrifices, and understand that without a capable leader the day would come that they would bite their own hands, but, at that time, in a state of bewilderment they would not find any remedy for their pains. On the other hand, the urgency and spread of the revolt of the nation prepared ground for the growth of leaders. If the revolt starts from a fixed point and that point were the real cause of the revolution, it would have been easy to find a single and popular leader. It was easier in the beginning of a movement to find a single leader than making a leader through selection or election in the middle of the movement or at the time of success. Had the revolution a single and popular leader in the beginning, there would be no long lasting and dangerous problem during the succeeding stages.

In Afghanistan, attention was not given to this important and big task in the beginning. Despite hectic efforts, wastage of time and spending of lot of money, a leader could not be made for a fixed time. This was the deep chasm that caused the fall of the Burhanuddin Rabbani regime and burial of raw desires along with sacrifices and devoted struggles, and Afghan people floundered hopelessly in that cliff. During the course of struggle, it was possible to find such a person, but a blunder wasted that possibility.

³¹² Interview of Mohammad Sediq Cahakary, Minister of Information and Technology of Rabbani Cabinet, with the author.

Although in later stages some aspirants for power considered this problem and tried to solve it, but it was too late. Their efforts fizzled out. Those who desired leadership or had the capability of leadership, knocked at this door and posed as being loyal and obedient to seek monetary and military assistance from foreign countries and supply them to the militants in the field, who were made helpless and needy in stations and camps of their leaders. They were deceived. This approach deceived the aspirants for leadership and made them believe that these militants loved them and that they were their leaders and Imams. They had not felt the need that they, their henchmen and relative should go and spend some moments beside the wounded and killed people in the bloody scenes and under firing valleys, to know about their plight and experience some hardship for a short time. Ultimately, this gap also widened to such an extent that leaders outside the country earned titles of depot-holders and storekeepers. It is mentionable that some leaders had sustained serious losses through the course of revolution but permanent stay abroad hid their sacrifices from the sight of others.³¹³

4.1.13 Indifference towards spiritual leaders

In Afghanistan, in order to defame the Muslims, Kabul university prepared various kinds of blames and put many seals on their images, and raised the slogan of “Muslim youths are reactionaries” louder than any other loud blame from the enemy of the Muslim nation of Afghanistan and it was never silenced in past.

In Afghanistan vast coverage was given to propaganda against the Mullah. The Mullah was known as the symbol of backwardness, calcification, idleness and indolence, who, for his livelihood, counts the moments in wait for charity and offering. Some time they express respect for the Mullah and say to him that “*you are not the man of this world; you are a holy personage and from the other world.*” They are very stupid who are deceived by this praise, which is worse than criticism. The most ignominious trend is the division of these Ulema into two schools and creation of distrust and hatred between them. Hence,

³¹³ Barnet R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghansitan State and Collapse in the International System*, Lahore, Vanguard Books pvt, Ltd, 2002, pp.65-78

Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani was also a religious scholar and most of his companions are qualified in various religious disciplines having received Degrees of qualifications in various disciplines of religious studies from famous and experienced Islamic universities. They are not considered Ulema by traditional Ulema, who have spent their lives in the hostels of Madaris to study old sciences. The madrassah-qualified Ulema do not count them in their ranks. On the other hand, the school-qualified Ulema were called 'enlightened'. When this group of Ulema occupied the chair of power in the country, no word was heard that the Ulema had taken over leadership of the country. Some ones even whispered to their audience, in order to defuse the idea of depicting the government under the leadership of Rabbani as backward, that Mullahs did not have any role in this government and they would gradually be compelled to retire to their sanctuaries. On the other hand, those who were educated out in madrassa and were prepared to offer sacrifices for the rule of Islam and had taken position rationally against the forces and conspiracies of enemies could not fill up the gap created between the Ulema of madrassa and those of the school. This gulf was created by the enemies of Islam through propaganda. Professor Niamatulla Shahrani, a minister in Karzia government once said that he believed that the moral condition of Kabul in the era of Rabbani government was such that nobody could imagine that his government would last for more than five months. Apart from that, the officials of the Rabbani Government ignored the intellectual level of Afghan society, while bringing the Ulema's and Mulla's out of their sanctuaries and place them in fore front of the people.

4.1.14 No Proper Preparation for Running the Government

The Mujahedeen, in spite of having established schools or madrassa in areas under their control, had not given serious thought to culture, civilization and ultimately, statesmanship and defense of the country. They supported a small number to continue education abroad. All these actions were without any program and proved worthless. They did not perform any remarkable deed to raise the standard of general education and national culture, and did not give serious attention to statesmanship and governance. No

remarkable achievement was made to raise the standard of general knowledge and national culture.³¹⁴

The Jihadi movement stirred up political awareness of the nation and the nation did not make a difference between foe and friend. Lack of literacy did not hinder recognition of friend and foe or to define friend and foe. However, lack of literacy affected their caliber of thinking; while defining friend and foe, they could not plan their reaction and mode of action against their affection and conspiracies. Even the leadership circle of the state could not relieve itself of this difficulty and took its step out of the mud. This circle took actions that pleased the enemy and ashamed the friend. The reason behind this mistake was shortage of officials and technocrats in the circle of leadership to plan strategy and streamline the policy execute and follow up that. If there were any, their trade did not carry importance and worth. Dr. Lafari an ex Professor of Kabul University gave the following description of the situation:

“If words and logic poured out of the barrel of the rifle and the tip of the pen fired and bled, what would be the result and the end? Mujahedeen did not think to use the rifle tomorrow, in case of success, in service of thought and idea. They did not envisage that if thought and idea were placed, after the success, in service of the rifle, it would create difficulties. After establishment of the Islamic government, the entire cabinet was engaged in service of the rifle”

During the course of Jihad, the primary object of importance was the rifle, and, in fact, it should have been, so as to prepare conditions for inspiration of Islamic perception. At that time, more attention was given to the rifle so that the gunman could discharge his duty. Mujahedeen did more in this regard. Whatever they had and whatever they got were devoted to the rifle and the gunman. Even those who had talents and intellect took up the rifle and offered their lives courageously in the trench and embraced ‘martyrdom’. There

³¹⁴ Interview of Rahimulla Yousafzia, An expert on Afghan affairs, with the author.

was no criterion with organizations for assessment of talents and placing everyone in the right position in line with the injunctions of the Holy Quran which require that:

"It is not right that all the faithful should go (to war) at once. Some of them should, and some should stay behind to instruct themselves in religion and admonish the others when they return so that they may take heed" ³¹⁵

In the light of what has been discussed, Burhanuddin Rabbani government, being the product of the struggles of all Mujahedeen and the fruit of the struggles of every individual Afghan, did not enjoy cultural support to strengthen its pillars and protect its stability.

4.1.15 Policy Making Bodies of the Government

There were several uncoordinated bodies for making decisions instead of a unitary policy making body. Each of the decision-making bodies, having its own wing, had its particular approach to the solution of a problem. They could freely and unconditionally discuss dispute or agree issues with whosoever they like in order to influence foreign promises and undertakings. There were rumors that this trend was the cause to uproot the Islamic government from Kabul. It is said that the visit of Ms Robin Raphil, US Deputy Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Istalif (North of Kabul to meet Masood) was not much distanced from the exit of the Islamic government. Some people opined that this visit took place without permission of the president of Afghanistan. She held discussions with important figures of Afghan government to convince them that the existence of the Islamic government in Kabul was a hurdle on way to solution of the crisis. The exit of the government from Kabul will pave way to implementation of the plan of de-militarization of Kabul region and prepare ground for negotiations on establishment of a government with obvious role of jihadi commanders.

The weak administrative role of President Burhanuddin Rabbani was another factor that confined his regime to movements on the surface of the chessboard. This was a part of

³¹⁵ Chapter 9 Tauba (Repentance), verse 122: the QURAN.

the internal situation, which forced Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani to take each step towards the fall.

During the four years i.e., 1992 to 1996 Rabbani acted as President of Afghanistan but the actual power was in the hands of Ahmad Shah Masood, who controlled the military, judiciary and bureaucracy. The policy was in the hands of Ahmad Shah Masood and President Rabbani had no other option but to follow that policy.

4.1.16 Unmanageable National Problems

False imagination of Professor Rabbani and his companions could rid them of the fear they were obsessed with. His government was accused of promoting regionalism and ethnicity. This blame was so much publicized that it became a key factor contributing to the flight of the Islamic government from Kabul. Other nationalities and tribes criticized Professor Rabbani that he, for the sake of his chair and power, approved continuation of usurpation of their legitimate rights. The government of Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani was confronted with some of them, which prompted armed clashes resulting casualties. It is observed that Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, by postponement of the solution of the issue of tribes and nationalities, did not achieve anything but his government's as well as his own isolation.

Had Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani taken up this issue in a sensible way with conviction utilizing the academic influence of *Ulema*, experts and intellectuals, awareness of the chiefs of nationalities and tribes with the cooperation of parties and organizations for discussion and let the nationalities and tribes avail of its benefits, it would have been a great achievement and his government might have not seen the tragic end. In case of opposition, he would have to head for the same destiny. Any government failing to give such issues their due and fair attention would face similar consequences like that of the government of Professor Rabbani.³¹⁶

³¹⁶Interview of Dr Bashar, An expert on Afghan affairs settled in US, with the author.

4.1.17 Abandonment of the Slogan of the Resistance Time

Jihadi organizations repeated slogans of fairness and justice and establishment of an Islamic government. Each *Mujahid* and member talked of 'the government of Umar^{RA}'.³¹⁷ With the formation of Islamic government, this perception was wiped out from the mind and this slogan from the tongue. Phrases of fairness and justice, equality, brotherhood etc were abandoned. Every party accepted only that Islamic system, which is run by its group, party, Amir or leader. Many of them interpreted Islamic system and shariat as the system and shariat and tariqat under the rule of their leader or the one from their nationality or ethnic group or from their region. Otherwise, the system is non-Islamic, strange and puppet.

Abandonment of Jihadi slogans and the resultant disappointment among *Mujahedeen* from the Government of Rabbani deprived the state of real supporters. It was natural that false pretenders could neither support leaders of the Islamic state nor could defend it. Sidelining the objectives and slogans of the period of Jihad was another important factor that contributed to accelerate the downfall of Burhanuddin Rabbani Government.

4.1.18 Failure of Rabbani to gain support of Moderate Pustuns

Another problem for Burhanuddin Rabbani was that moderate pustuns shied away from supporting it against Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, opting in general for neutrality. In some cases this was understandable, especially amongst those who walked away from engagement in the political conflicts because they were revolted by the Afshar massacre. The moderate pushtun Abdul Haq, who had been designated Kabul police chief in the post communist distribution of offices, felt that he was totally undermined by the power of the shura-e-nizar forces, although the real problem might have been that the policing function remained difficult to discharge seriously when the law and order problem of the

³¹⁷ UMAR (umär') or Omar (o'mär) (581–644), 2nd caliph. At first hostile to Islam, he was converted by 618, becoming an adviser to Muhammad. He succeeded Abu Bakr as caliph without opposition in 634. In his reign Islam became an imperial power. The Muslim generals pushed conquests far and wide—into Syria, Egypt, and the Persian Empire. Umar also laid the administrative base of the empire, creating the office of kadi and establishing fixed taxes. He reopened the canals of Mesopotamia and the waterway from the Nile to the Red Sea. Umar was assassinated by a foreign slave. He had appointed a group to select his successor, and the choice fell on Uthman.

city was the product of a wider anarchy. And he was not the only moderate pushtun to feel that he was being marginalized or even excluded. Where there was no functioning of State, those who hold offices without institutional power would almost inevitably develop such feelings.³¹⁸

In other cases, the stance of the moderate pushtuns simply suggested that they were more pushtuns than moderate when it came to the crunch. For some denouncing Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masood as power hungry “fundamentalists” was a way of reconciling the tension between ethnic and ideological strands of identity. Although it did involve a certain cognitive dissonance since, whatever else one thought of the pattern of rule under Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masood, it did not reflect a serious attempt to establish an Islamic government.

Other simply viewed Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masood as ineffectual, although the irony of Pushtuns blaming Tajiks for not suppressing predatory warlordism amongst Pushtuns, especially when the Tajiks were themselves being attacked by a pushtun extremist was not lost on all observers. A more frequent charge, not made only by moderate pushtuns, was that Ahmad Shah Masood showed a lack of political judgment to match his military skills, with the rift with wahadat especially in mind. However, it was not otherwise clear as to that alternative strategy the cities would have recommended for a Defense Minister confronted by an externally backed total spoiler in circumstances of state collapse.³¹⁹

4.1.19 Rapprochement of Burhanuddin Rabbani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

Rabbani in 1992 had called Gulbudin Hekmatyar a dangerous terrorist; at times he seemed willing to treat him as if he was little more than a wayward Kabul University student. May, 1996 was a time when the two reached an agreement at Mahipar Sarobi, a district near Kabul after the rise of Taliban. In this agreement, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was once again provided the office of Prime Minister by Burhanuddin Rabbani. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar assumed office on July 26, 1996. The architects of this rapprochement were the Pakistani politician Qazi Hussain Ahmad of the Jamaat Islami, and General Hamid

³¹⁸ William Melay, *The Afghanistan Wars*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2002, pp.215-33

³¹⁹ Ibid.

Gul. The agreement caused fury among many Jamiat-e-Islami (Rabbani group) supporters and Taliban welcomed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to Kabul with a ferocious rocket barrage during his swearing in ceremony. Burhanuddin Rabbani seems to have felt that bringing Gulbuddin Hekmatyar into the government would “broaden its base” through the granting of a key position to a Pushtun. But Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was not the kind of Pushtun Rabbani needed, since his base had never been regional or tribal. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar could be brought back only because he was weak, too weak to function as a “total spoiler”. The agreement was attractive for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, since it rescued him from the political abyss into which he had been thrust by the Taliban in February 1995.

The dangerous which the Mahipar agreement held for Burhanuddin Rabbani became clear within four months. Not only did the return of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar tarnish the legitimacy of the Rabbani government within Kabul, but more importantly it prompted all out Pakistani support for the Taliban, which proved crucial in their ability to overwhelm Kabul in September 1996. It also led Burhanuddin Rabbani to pressurize Ahmad Shah Masood into the military dangerous step of expanding his defensive lines to cover Hekmatyar’s bases when the final Taliban attack came, Ahmad Shah Masood’s forces were simply spread too thinly, and left Kabul with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani and Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996.³²⁰

4.2 EXTERNAL FACTORS

4.2.1 Rivalry between Neighboring Regional and International States

With the disintegration of Soviet Union, the US dilemma as how to contain Soviet expansionism was over. US government, which during the Afghan crisis was so committed to fight out Communism, changed its policies in the wake of New World Order created by the Soviet demise. The US policy clearly revealed that it, once again, reverted to pre-Soviet-Afghan war stance, that was based on the dynamics of minimal engagement in the country. In the following years, the US was mostly involved in

³²⁰ Ibid.

Afghanistan only through the UN initiatives and foreign NGOs, which were mainly delivering humanitarian work.³²¹ In case of the UN, some of its measures were significant such as the efforts of UN Secretary General's special representatives, Mehmood Mestiri and Lakhtar Barahimi, who, in spite of the fact that they could not bring about a major breakthrough, made serious attempts during 1993-98 to the resolution of Afghan crisis.³²² Very rarely the US government sent its high officials for addressing or monitoring the volatile Afghan situation. For instance, Congressman Hank Brown, a member of the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Relations for South Asia, who visited Kabul and other power centers in 1996, became the first elected representative to come to Afghanistan in six years.³²³ Similarly, Robin Raphel, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, did not go beyond Islamabad to review US policy towards Afghanistan. Mr. Richard Robertson, who visited Afghanistan for a day of parachute diplomacy in April 1998, took up several issues with the Taliban government. However, his main item of concern was to pursue the government and the opposition to convene the Lemma meeting for the resolution of deadlock on the question of establishing a broad-based government at Kabul.³²⁴ But, nothing significant came out of these efforts of the US officials.

It was doubtful whether the United States and other major powers would effectively back the UN plan. Robert Oakley, the former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan and who was also concerned with Afghan affairs, held that “*the political future of Afghanistan is no longer of interest to the U.S.*” This was the official line, but since the dissolution of the Soviet Union the U.S. administration had shown no evidence to the contrary. The United States and other powers had even forgotten the role that Afghanistan played in the dissolution of the “evil empire” and the end of the cold war, events that made it possible for world governments to improve their economies for the first time in four decades. Their Afghanologists as well as men and women of the mass media had turned their backs on Afghanistan. They all had left a former friendly people in their vulnerable moment to the mercy of their scheming neighbors. Feeling betrayed, the disillusioned Afghans had

³²¹ Barnet R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation Of Afghanistan*, USA, Yale University, Press, 2002, pp.147-55

³²² Ahmad Rashid, *Taliban*, Lahore Press, 2002, p.65

³²³ *Ibid.* pp.42-70

³²⁴ *Ibid.* p.45

become bitter about them, particularly about the U.S. administration, whereas during the resistance they lauded them for their support.³²⁵

In the wake of US estrangement from Afghanistan, regional countries plunged into the conflict and tried to exploit the situation in order to maximize benefits for themselves. In this connection, Pakistan, Iran and Central Asian countries remained more involved. India from the very beginning of establishment of Burhanuddin Rabbani government tried to establish relations with the Afghan government. Pakistan made arrangements to put in place the interim Afghan government led by Sibghatullah Mujaddidi after concluding the Peshawar Accord which was announced on April 26, 1992.³²⁶ The Islamabad Accord of March 1993 was another attempt to enable the interim government bring end to the fighting of warring factions. It was, again, a foreign sponsored accord, which was initiated by Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, these relentless experiments to bring about political stability in Afghanistan did not succeed.³²⁷

In the years following the February 1989 Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Islamabad continued with its interventionist approach toward Afghanistan. The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, nonetheless, proved fatal for Dr. Najeebullah. Deprived of Soviet arms, money and diplomatic support, he decided to resign, placing his hopes on the endeavors of the UN mission to arrange a peaceful transfer of power.³²⁸ This gambit foundered as the US and the Pakistan backed Mujahedeen, scenting total victory, pressed for a military solution.³²⁹ The desertion of his powerful Interior Minister Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum to the anti-communist cause in April 1992 triggered the collapse of Dr. Najeebullah's regime. A broad-based Interim Government headed by Sibghatullah Mojadedi that was set up under Pakistan's pressure in 1989 assumed control of Kabul and proclaimed the establishment of Islamic government in Afghanistan.

³²⁵ Interview of Brig (Retd) Muhammad Khan, Director General A.T.D.C, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Islamabad Pakistan, with the author.

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation Of Afghanistan*, USA, Yale University, Press, 2002, p.27

³²⁸ *The Nation* (Daily), May 8, 1987.

³²⁹ Ibid.

Afghanistan's new leaders proved incapable of bringing peace to the war-torn country. The power-sharing arrangement that was brokered by Pakistan under the Peshawar Accord ³³⁰ totally broke down after Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who was offered the position of Prime minister, refused to share power with Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani who became President in June 1992, and Ahmad Shah Masood, his defense minister. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's decision to launch rocket attacks on Kabul ushered in a debilitating civil war in which the rival factions, divided mainly along ethnic lines Pashtuns in the south, Uzbeks and Tajiks in the north, and the Shi'a Hazaras in the center battled each other.

The internecine Afghan civil war not only dashed Pakistani hopes of gaining access to the six Central Asian Muslim Republics through a friendly Afghanistan, but also caused estrangement between President Burhanuddin Rabbani and Pakistani leaders. Following Rabbani's re-election as President in June 1994, Islamabad accused the Afghan leader of perpetuating his power illegally. The blunt statement made by Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali, Pakistan's foreign minister, that “*any thing that happens in Afghanistan after 28 June 1994 will have no legitimacy*” provoked anti-Pakistan protests in Kabul including rocket attacks on the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul.³³¹ The incident of the hijacking of a school bus by Afghan nationals, who were later shot dead by Pakistani commandos, further soured relations between Kabul and Islamabad. The Pakistan Embassy in Kabul was closed down and began functioning from Jalalabad. To 'spite' Pakistan, President Rabbani began flirting with New Delhi, a move that evoked bitter hostility from Islamabad.

The growing friction between Islamabad and the Rabbani regime in Kabul coincided with the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Steeped in a puritanical interpretation of Islam, the Taliban were the product of the network of private, rural-based madrassas (religious schools) in Afghanistan and the neighboring areas of Pakistan. Affiliated with the Deobandi movement in both countries, the Taliban leadership hailed mainly from the Pushtu speaking area of Kandahar.

³³⁰ VYACHESJAV BELOKRENITSKY, 'Russian-Afghan relations', in Gennandy Chufirin,[ed] Russia and Asia, **The Emerging Security Agenda**, London, Oxford University Press, 1999, p.199

³³¹ Michael Griffin, *Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan*, London, Pluto Press, 2001, p.2

Impressed by their success in suppressing unruly Mujahedeen Commanders and imposing peace in and around Kandahar, Islamabad decided to encourage the Taliban as an alternative to the troublesome Burhanuddin Rabbani regime which had established close links with the Indians.³³² To coordinate assistance to the Taliban, an Afghan cell was established in the Interior Ministry headed by General Naseerullah Babar, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's favorite grand uncle. Under General Babar's guidance, the ISI provided transportation, fuel, communications equipment and advice to the Taliban movement.

Pakistan's pro Taliban approach was underpinned by several considerations. First, by supporting the Taliban as a controlling force in Afghanistan, Islamabad hoped to achieve its goal of securing trade routes to Central Asia. Second, because of their rigid Islamic beliefs and harsh outlook, Taliban were perceived as an anti-secular and, by extension, an anti-Indian force that would help Pakistan secure its western borders. Third, a Taliban - controlled Afghanistan would give Pakistan strategic depth against a hostile India in the East. Fourth, a Taliban-controlled friendly Afghanistan could provide a base where Kashmiri militants could be trained.³³³

Impelled by this mixture of geo-economic and geo-political considerations, Islamabad threw its strategic weight behind the Taliban as its proxy in the Afghan conflict. Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan created a power vacuum in Afghanistan, which Iran believed Pakistan, was trying to fill. Iran thus encouraged the Iran-based Shiaa refugees organizations to demand 25 percent representation in the elected institutions and in any future government in Afghanistan. These Shiaa demands were forcefully rejected by the pro Pakistan Sunni resistance organizations in Peshawar, on the ground that the Shiaa constituted only 12 percent of Afghanistan population.

During Khomeini era Iran's foreign policy was dominated by ideological considerations, but after his death in 1989, Tehran attached greater importance to the interest of the state and Persian nationalism in its foreign policy.³³⁴ This change in policy tremendously enlarged Iran's involvement in Afghanistan.

³³² Kamal Matinuddin, 'Pakistan's Policy Towards Afghanistan and Central Asia, in Ijaz Khan and Nasreen Ghufraan,[Ed], Pakistan Foreign Policy Regional Perspective, A Critique, Peshawar, Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar, 2000, p.105

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ K. Ramazani, 'Iran's Foreign Policy: Contending Orientations', The Middle East Journal 43, Spring 1989, p.202

In late 1991 Tehran embarked quietly on a new strategy in Afghanistan. Iran in 1991, signed an agreement with Tajikistan and Afghanistan's jamiat-i-Islami (Rabbani) for increasing cultural interactions between the Persian speaking Iranians, Afghan and Tajiks. It also decided to unite non-pushtun ethnic minority.³³⁵

In addition to establishing formal ties with Tajik Jamiat-e-Islami, Iran also connected the Ismaili Shias and Uzbeks in Afghanistan. Its efforts to form a coalition of anti Pushtun ethnic minorities met with success when Tajik Commander Ahmad Shah Masood, Uzbeks General Abdu Rashid Dostum, Ismaile Shiaa Commander Jaffer Naderi and Hazara Hizb Wahdat of Ali Maziari formed Northern alliance that brought down Dr. Najeebullah regime in Kabul days before scheduled transfer of Power to a UN selected team of neutral Afghans. Most members of this alliance had close relations with Iran, which gave Iran great leverage in Afghan affairs.³³⁶

The independence of the Central Asian states transformed the economic stakes in Afghanistan. The oil and gas-rich Central Asian states, in particular Turkmenistan, saw Afghanistan as a possible pipeline route to connect them to world markets without having to reverse US sanctions against Iran. Pakistan saw commercial and political connections to Central Asia via Afghanistan as key to the development of "strategic depth" in its confrontation with India. Pakistan also needed natural gas, and the Daulatabad field in Turkmenistan, just north of the Afghan border, was well positioned to be connected to the Pakistan national network via a pipeline through Herat and Qandahar to Baluchistan. This, in turn, placed Pakistan in opposition to Iran, which aspired to be the outlet to the south for the resources of the entire Caspian region, both Central Asia and the trans-Caucasus. The US began to define a national interest in promoting the national independence and economic diversification of the Central Asian and Caucasian states, without relaxing its sanctions on Iran. Pipelines through Afghanistan would nicely meet both goals. Various companies, including the US-based UNOCAL, the Saudi company Delta, and the Argentine firm Bidas, began negotiations with the Rabbani government and various de facto powerholders. Bidas paid the Rabbani government \$1 million for a

³³⁵ Anwar ul Haq Ahady, 'Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Conflict in Afghanistan' in: William Maley (Ed) *Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.¹²²

³³⁶ Ibid. p.122

contract signed in January 1996 awarding it the right to the pipeline route (none of which was then controlled by that government). There were reports of payoffs in Pakistan as well.³³⁷

The repercussions of Ahmad Shah Masood's activities in the north were felt in Central Asia as well. Because of his successful role in the resistance and the overthrow of the Dr. Najeebullah regime and strong resistance against Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Taliban, Ahmad Shah Masood was looked on there as a leader capable of unifying all Tajiks in a "greater Tajikistan." Although only a dream, the idea troubled President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan because a "greater Tajikistan" would mean destabilization in the region and the disruption of the existing borders. Since a million Tajiks live in Uzbekistan and a similar number of Uzbeks live in Tajikistan, and since the two countries have had ethnic problems between themselves, President Karimov became still firmer in his conviction in the sanctity of the existing borders and took measures aimed at curbing disrupting activities. One of the measures was Uzbekistan's backing of Rashid Dostum, who was supported in his stand against the Islamic radicals in creating troubles in Central Asia. It is unknown whether Uzbekistan had advised Rashid Dostum to join Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, but Burhanuddin Rabbani and his spokesman had alleged that "we found Uzbekistan participating in the confrontations" to overthrow our government.

The Northern alliance brought down Dr. Najeebullah regime, the alliance members had close relations with Iran, and the dominance which the alliance had in Burhanuddin Rabbani government gave Iran an opportunity to influence the process of policy formulation. Soon after the formation of Mujahedeen government, Pakistan realized that Iran had played a major role in the formation and success of Northern alliance whose dominance in Rabbani administration had tremendously increased Iranian influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan did not want direct confrontation with Ahmad Shah Masood and Burhanuddin Rabbani, but decided to strengthen Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and encouraged him to contest Ahmad Shah Masood and Burhanuddin Rabbani in Kabul. Because of new

³³⁷ Keen, David, *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars*, Adelphi Paper 320, London, Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998.

found military strength and backing from Iran, the Hazaras were able to extract major concessions from Sibghatullah Mojaddidi, the first Mujahedeen head of State, who agreed to award three ministerial portfolios, eight seats in Jihad Council and one seat in Leadership Council to Hazaras. The Hazaras were able to extract similar concession from Burhanuddin Rabbani, the second Mujahedeen transitional head of the State.³³⁸

In late July 1992, relations between Hazaras and Masood deteriorated and conflict erupted over the control of Kabul. Although Iran condemned the atrocities committed against Hazaras and provided material aid to victims of the fighting, it could not take clear position against Rabbani government. With the emergence of Taliban in November 1994, a conflict began with Iran, when in March 1995 Taliban defeated Hikmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami and Mazari's Hizb-e-Wahdat forces both allies of Iran in Southern and Western outskirts of Kabul, murdered Mazari and threatened to capture Kabul from Masood and Rabbani. Consequently Iran decided to cooperate with Rabbani and Masood in opposing Taliban. Rabbani and Masood welcomed this opportunity to improve relations with Iran. Iran had taken a public stand against Taliban and was willing to provide financial and military support to their opponents. Thus despite the fact that during 1993 and 1994, Masood had accused Iran of supporting opponents of Kabul regime (the Council of Solidarity, alliance of Hikmatyar, Mazari, Dostum and Mojaddidi), after March 1995 Iran developed very close relations with Kabul. This change of relations between Iran and Kabul added adherence to Iran's position in western Afghanistan, where Iran was supporting Ismail Khan's rule in Herat.

After the withdrawal of Soviet forces, Saudi Arabia was no longer concerned about the threat that Afghanistan posed to the security of the Persian Gulf. After signing of the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq in 1988, nor was the Saudi Arabian leadership worried about the challenge the Iran's Islamic revolution posed to it. From 1989, Saudi Arabia wanted to consolidate the influence that it had gained during 1980-88 and insisted on the establishment of a pro Saudi Arabia and pro Pakistan Islamic government in Kabul.³³⁹

³³⁸ Ziba Frazin Nia, "The Emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan", *Amu Daryya*: 4,1, (Spring) 1999: p.76

³³⁹ Barnett Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, No 5, winter 1989-90, pp.150-168

Saudi Arabia was not interested in self-determination for the people of Afghanistan, Riyadh, like Islamabad, believed that a military defeat of the Communist regime in Kabul would facilitate the realization of its objectives in Afghanistan. Thus from mid 1988 to 1991, Saudi like Pakistan insisted on the military resolution of the Conflict. With the down fall of Communist regime in 1992 there was intense struggle for power among various Afghan groups, the breakdown of the State and the continuation of civil war, which had strong ethnic dimension. In addition to intense rivalry for power among the Afghan groups, conflict among regional states reached a new height. Soon after the formation of the Mujahedeen government, both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan realized that Iran had played a major role in the formation and success of the Northern Alliance and whose dominance in the Rabbani administration had tremendously increased Iranian influence in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia did not want direct confrontation with Ahmad Shah Masood and Burhanuddin Rabbani, but decided to strengthen Gulbuddin Hikmatyar through Pakistan and encouraged him to fight Burhanuddin Rabbani government. During 1992 Saudi Arabia supported the Pushtuns, especially Hikmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami. The Middle East reported in 1993, that in the previous two years Saudi Arabia had spent two billion dollars in Afghanistan, with Hikmatyar as a major beneficiary.³⁴⁰

The Hazara Masood conflict, however, facilitated the Hazaras eventual alliance with Hikmatyar which was conceived despite the fact that during the first few months after collapse of the Communist regime, Pushtuns and Hazaras committed large-scale atrocities against each other. The Sunni Pushtun dominated Hezb-e-Islami and the Shiaa Hizb-e-wahdat were supported by regional rivals, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran. Similarly, the emergence of the Masood-Hazara conflict facilitated an alliance between Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf, the Pushtun leader of the pro Saudi Arabia Ittehad Islami, and Ahmad Shah Masood, the Tajik leader of Shura-e-Nizar, who was initially supported by Iran. In the conflict, Rashid Dostum, the Uzbek leader, changed sides a number of times. Although he supported Rabbani and Masood in 1992, in early 1993 he tilted towards Hikmatyar and the Hazaras. Dostum's conflict with Masood and Rabbani was due to his

³⁴⁰ Dailly 'The Middle East', june 1992, p.22

insistence on having a greater share of power in Kabul but not sharing power with Rabbani's and Masood's Party Jamiate-e Islami in northern Afghanistan.

In January 1994 Dostum, Hikmatyar, Mazari and Mojadiddi formed a united front against Rabbani and Masood. This alliance was extremely fragile and, in their struggle for power, most of the participants preferred opportunism to idealism. Ahmad Shah Masood and Burhanuddin Rabbani followed an anti Iran and anti fundamentalist strategy to gain support of the West and attack on Hazaras was one of the examples of his action. This situation brought Iran and Hikmatyar closer, despite the fact that before the outbreak of hostility between Masood and Hazaras, Iran had repeatedly criticized Hikmatyar's stand in the Afghan conflict, and Saudi Arabian and Pakistani support for Hikmatyar.

Similarly, to enhance its influence in Afghan affairs, Saudi Arabia tried to establish links with other forces beside Hikmatyar. Thus, Saudi Arabia provided financial support to Rashid Dostum, hoping to prevent an alliance between Rashid Dostum and Iran. It also cultivated relations with Ahmad Shah Masood and Burhanuddin Rabbani; Ahmad Shah Masood had openly criticized Iranian interference in Afghan affairs. Consequently, during 1993-94 Saudi Arabia provided \$150 million in aid to Burhanuddin Rabbani government.³⁴¹ After the rise of Taliban on the Political horizon of Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia fully supported Taliban and was one of the three countries, which recognized Taliban government including Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates.³⁴²

4.2.2 Impact of Civil war on Afghan state and society

The destructiveness of modern war is widely understood, but the war in Afghanistan had been uniquely and comprehensively destructive. Its impact on Afghanistan's population had been, if not unprecedented in a center of extraordinarily destructive conflicts, then certainly as enormous as that of any other conflict in the modern era. Throughout the years of war, the geographic and demographic factors led to the siltation of Afghanistan from the influence of the rest of the world and made resolution of its conflict a difficult matter. The plight of Afghanistan never stirred Western public opinion because the war

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² D. Sahari, Afghanistan and the Islamic World, Mujahid Wolas (newspaper), January-February 2, 1996.

itself seemed to fall outside of Western interests, and the Western media found it difficult to cover and explain Afghanistan was simply too remote and alien for many people in the West to care about it, and covering a war there had proved too arduous for most journalists.

The war in Afghanistan had been especially destructive of an entire nation and perhaps also, of a regional and even worldwide political order and ideology. To understand how the Afghanistan War had affected the country, there were three major areas of impact of war on Afghanistan, Physical destruction, Economic and political disarray and the rise of the Taliban.

The Afghan civil war during Burhanuddin Rabbani period totally destroyed the progress toward nation building, It also destroyed much of the country specially Kabul city. Nearly 50 thousand people were injured, more than 25000 were killed during four years of Burhanuddin Rabbani regime, and most of the residents of Kabul left the city. Massive destruction was wrought on the nation's infrastructure. Social and political institutions were destroyed or irrevocably altered, especially governmental institutions. The armed forces, political organizations, universities, the religious hierarchy, and the media all suffered in one war or the other. Similarly, power groups including the khans, urban capitalists, military officers, the intelligentsia, the Ulema, and tribal leaders could not survive the war unaffected. The entire framework of Afghan society was altered.³⁴³

The physical destruction of Afghanistan was the most obvious way in which the long war had affected the country. Furthermore, it is this physical destruction that underlies the rest of the changes wrought by the war. Physical destruction took two major forms: destruction of population, measured in numbers or percentages of people killed, wounded, and displaced by the war and destruction of property, measured in damage to infrastructure such as houses, other buildings, roads, bridges, orchards, and fields. The heavy use of mines throughout Afghanistan must also be taken into account, for they not only continue to cause death and injury but also made fields unusable.

³⁴³ Goodson P. Larry, *Afghanistan's Endless War*, University of Washington Press, Seattle and London, 2001, pp.91-107



(Source: www.RAWA.com.org)

Jangalak factory in Kabul was one of the most important plants in Afghanistan which destroyed during four years of civil war (1992-96).



(Source: www.RAWA.com)

Residential areas destroyed during the war by different groups (1992-96)



(Source: www.RAWA.com.org)

Residential areas of Macroyan in Kabul after the war (1992-96)

Although quantitative measures are always suspected in Afghanistan. Estimates of the physical damage did exist and were valid enough to give a sense of the comprehensiveness of the destruction. Population destruction was most obviously understood in terms of the numbers of people killed in the war, but it was also useful to consider those wounded and or displaced. As the publication *Refugees* put it: “In Afghanistan virtually everyone is a victim.”

Afghanistan’s displaced population had been the highest in the world since 1981, peaking at 6.2 million refugees in countries of first asylum in 1990, with more than 2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) during this time as well. Substantial repatriation had occurred since the fall of the communist government in 1992, but a stable population of 2.7 million refugee remained, primarily in Pakistan and Iran.³⁴⁴

In short, the direct effect of the Afghan War on the Afghan population had been stunning. Although all figures were estimates, some rougher than others, it was clear that more than 50 percent of Afghanistan’s population had been directly harmed by the war through death, injury, or displacement. If include the loss of family members in this category, it was unlikely that any Afghan had not been affected directly and tragically by the war. The level of destruction was even worse when the widespread damage to Afghanistan’s infrastructure taken into account.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

When the Mujahedeen finally took over the government in 1992 and then embarked on their Civil war, Afghanistan's cities, which had been spared much of the earlier destruction, became targets as well. As of early 1996, many buildings in Kabul had been reduced to rubble, including Darulaman palace, the ministry of defense, and entire residential quarters, large sections of Kandahar were in ruins, and for much of the late 1990s Herat suffered from a lack of electricity (except through the use of private generators). Smaller cities and towns faced similar problems.

Afghanistan's underdevelopment and isolated geographic characteristics also contributed to the depth of the property destruction. By comparison with many other countries, there was little to destroy in Afghanistan to begin with, and a war lasting for twenty years had provided ample opportunities for the various combatants to hit most of the worthwhile targets. For example, Afghanistan's limited major road network (basically the Ring Road) was degraded and destroyed by misuse, combat, and lack of main tenancy. Part of the Salang Tunnel was dynamited in May 1997; it was the entrance to the Panjshair Valley in October 1996.

The long Afghan War profoundly altered and in some cases even obliterated important components of Afghanistan's economic and political framework. For example, much of the economic infrastructure had been destroyed by war, including urban factories, power supply and transportation links, and important agricultural areas. Political institutions were affected less by the physical destruction of buildings but more by the targeting of individuals. The communist regime in Afghanistan eliminated the existing political elite in order to construct a new form of government built around a political party and an ideological system alien to Afghanistan, which in turn, had become obsolete. The changes had had sweeping and dramatic transformative effects on Afghanistan and merit careful examination.

Three major changes could be noted. First, the war had destroyed the prewar elites and the social system that supported them, leading to the development of new political elites (Mujahedeen and Taliban) that were founded on a newly prominent role for youths and

Islamist ideologues. Second, the war transformed the role of violence in society, even in non-combat situations. Not only did Afghan citizens become more injured to everyday violence, but also the collapse of governmental and social institutions made violence a more common means of settling disputes. The near anarchy that resulted was made possible by the proliferation of high technology weapons in the country; accordingly, it was dubbed “Kalashnikovization.” The continuation of the Afghan conflict long after the Soviet withdrawal had delayed the rebuilding of state institutions and maintained new elites in power, leaving Afghan society with a rudimentary political system that barely functioned. Third, the war also shattered the traditional Afghan economy that an opium heroin economic sector based on drug trafficking emerged to replace it.³⁴⁵

The spillover of arms from the Soviet and American pipelines and the profitability of the opium-heroin industry had promoted the Kalashnikovization of society in Afghanistan. This cult of violence produced by the local and regional proliferation of arms had deepened and exacerbated existing ethnic, linguistic, and religious cleavages. The rapidly developing narcotics industry, combined with traditional Pushtun political culture, encouraged resistance to disarmament during the tumultuous early 1990s. The result had been greater militarization and internal instability.

The power struggle that erupted among Mujahedeen leaders and some former supporters of the communist government (such as the Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum) after the fall of the communist regime in 1992, which then continued through 1993 and 1994, undermined whatever legitimacy these leaders had outside of their own local or regional basis of support and paved the way for the emergence of the Taliban. By the fall of 1994, Afghanistan had been free of communist rule of more than two years, but from almost the beginning of the post-Najeebullah era, squabbling among contender had degenerated into violence. Kabul laid in ruins, destroyed by the battle for its control between various forces most prominently those of President Burhanudin Rabbani and his military chief Ahmed Shah Masood against troops loyal to Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The capital was also partitioned, with different sectors controlled by different factions,

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

symbolic of the fragmentation of the country. The quality of government in different regions and cities varied widely, depending on the personal idiosyncrasies of local warlords and commanders, while you traveling in Afghanistan one would find check points everywhere, and the people of Afghanistan were fed up of the situation, were waiting for a new force and that new force was Taliban. Taliban arose from the Spin Boldak of Kandahar and within two years with their foreign support established control over 90 percent of Afghanistan.

In short, the dislodging of Burhanuddin Rabbani's government from Kabul was grounded in both domestic and exogenous factors. Internally, it faced a problem of political legitimacy from the start. The Peshawar Agreement, based on the method of elite settlement, provided Burhanuddin Rabbani with no broad power base or monopoly of force, on the basis of which his government could expand its rule beyond Kabul and a few ethno linguistically, affiliated provinces. At the same time Jamiat-e-Islami, which had functioned during the Soviet occupation as a combat and combat-support organization, not only lacked the necessary experience in the art of governance, but also harbored many internal divisions. Often its political and military wings could not coordinate their activities in support of a single leadership and common policy objectives. Personal rivalries within the party and between it and its allies elsewhere in Afghanistan, especially in Herat, proved to be extremely debilitating. However, nothing undermined its position more than the acrimonious relationship that developed between Rabbani and Pakistan. Islamabad's rejection of the Rabbani's government as one which was not prepared to subordinate itself to Pakistan's wider regional interests, and its persistent attempts to influence Afghan politics through cross border ethnic clienteles, led to active Pakistani intervention in Afghanistan with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as the instrument. Iran another important actor in the region had the interest to capture Afghanistan marked and had access to Central Asian States market and oil industries, so there was clash of interests between Iran and Pakistan. On the other hand, lack of interests of super powers in matters of Afghanistan and role of UN not to fully engage itself in the civil war affected country and made it difficult for the government to rule. This deprived

Burhanuddin Rabbani government of the opportunity that it needed to consolidate, and eventually exacerbated the conditions for its dislodgement from Kabul by Taliban.

After Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan had become connected to drug trafficking and the training of terrorists. Because of the absence of a central government and the openness of its borders, “thousands of Islamic radicals, outcasts, visionaries and gunmen from some 40 countries had come to Afghanistan to learn the lessons of jihad, to train for armed insurrection, to bring the struggle back home.” Also, Afghanistan was the source of “roughly a third of the heroin reaching the United States and the West” Afghan farmers had long grown opium poppies, which required only small landholdings and offered high monetary returns; the absence of suitable substitute crops and the lack of other sources of livelihood had also led farmers to the cultivation of poppies. These traditional compulsions had been exacerbated by the presence of millions of mines in the country, which had greatly reduced the amount of arable land and thereby forced Afghan farmers to grow more opium poppies than at any time before; the opium was then sold to dealers who processed it further into hard drugs for sale abroad.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

In late April 1992, the fall of the Soviet installed Dr. Najeebullah government in Kabul and the success of Mujahedeen, led by Commander Ahmad Shah Masood, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, in taking over the capital Kabul opened a painful phase in the history of Afghanistan. The removal of Dr. Najeebullah regime finally vindicated the Afghan's popular resistance to the attempted imposition of Soviet style socialism.

The Mujahedeen take over was welcomed by many Afghan's in the expectation of returning their war ravaged country to peace and order, however, their expectations were soon to be confounded, for Mujahedeen victory quickly turned sour, making their rule a continuation of the warfare of the proceeding years with further tragic losses for the Afghan people.

Afghanistan had experienced many critical periods in the past. The nineteenth century witnessed the transition of rule from the Sadozai³⁴⁶ to the Mohammadzai dynasty, as well as the three Anglo-Afghan wars. Although each crisis lasted a long time, in every case Afghanistan finally emerged as a nation-state. During the critical days of Burhanuddin Rabbani, if wars abound, so do peace efforts. Because of widespread opposition to the war and to foreign interference, the peace movement was gaining momentum. Even the ill-disposed neighbors approach the Afghan problem in the name of peace, whatever their real intentions. "You can hire an Afghan but you cannot buy him." So far the efforts of these neighbors had been aimed at setting up an Afghan government amenable to them. The multiplicity of neighbors hindered efforts to monopolize the Afghan issue and tended to promote the state of equilibrium among them that was likely to ensure Afghan statehood. No group had emerged to advocate separatism. The rise of such a movement, particularly if incited by outsiders, was likely to become more

³⁴⁶ Sadozai is one of the largest, oldest and most sophisticated tribes, it has the greatest number of divisions and off shoots and they inhabit both the wild mountains of Dir Swat and the fertile plains of Mardan. In Afghanistan, they are settled in Kandahar areas.

menacing to the integrity of Afghanistan's major Muslim neighbors. A stable, independent, nonaligned, and friendly Afghanistan was to their advantage.³⁴⁷ After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan had become once again the most important link between South and Central Asia. These considerations and the fact that despite the odds, the Afghans had remained loyal to their fatherland were signs that a nation-state was going to be instituted in Afghanistan. Most important, unlike the nineteenth century, the era was marked by the presence of the United Nations. This organization had been especially concerned with the territorial integrity, national sovereignty, and nonaligned status of Afghanistan from the time the Soviet Union invaded it.

Thus, the legacy of the war not only ravaged Afghanistan without a functioning national government but also a culture of guns, drugs, and terrorism that was as poisonous to others as it is to Afghans. The world governments had a moral responsibility to the Afghans, and it was time for them to assist in transforming the poisonous culture into a healthy one by permitting the Afghans to institute a national government. They could do, if regional powers were persuaded to keep their hands off Afghan affairs. Specifically, had world governments discouraged Russia from printing unsupported banknotes for Kabul and encouraged Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Uzbekistan to cease supporting their Afghan surrogates illegally, the war in Afghanistan would have ended long before. The Afghans would have been able to set up a government for themselves in accordance with their conventions, preferably under UN supervision. By helping to establish such a government, the world governments, among other things, could have secured millions of men and women throughout the world from the dangers of the poisonous culture.³⁴⁸

The immediate cause of the failure of Rabbani government was entry into Kabul of more than twenty thousand armed men belonging to eleven groups, some of which were in conflict with each other. These men entered the city even before the new government had taken its seat there. The groups clashed almost immediately. After the expulsion of the Hizb-e-Islami (Hikmatyar) from the city, intergroup clashes

³⁴⁷ Goodson, P. Larry, *Afghanistan's Endless War*, University of Washington Press, Seattle and London, 2001 pp.91-120

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

ceased for a while, but the militias as well as the Islamic warriors engaged in looting, burglary, kidnapping, and rape.

The warring groups alone exhibited restraint; others, that was, the militias of Rashid Dostum, the Supervisory Council (Masood), the Islamic Unity (Sayyaf), the Hizb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar), Hizb-e-Wahdat (Ali Mazari) and the Islamic Union (Rabbani), played havoc with the helpless people of Kabul. But each of these six groups had its share in the destruction of the city and the killing and displacement of hundreds of thousands of its inhabitants. In the history of Afghanistan, there was no group of people who had, in the course of their struggle for power, destroyed the capital city of their own country the way these groups did. Evidently, their leaders cared more for securing state power than for their city and its inhabitants. Had it not been so, once the Soviet invaders had been expelled and the regime of their puppets overthrown, they would have opted for a *modus Vivendi*, at least, among themselves. After the destruction they had wrought by their policies, they should have given up politics, as men and women who respect moral values do. They would then have immortalized the heroism, which the people of this great nation had shown in frustrating the designs of a superpower on their country.³⁴⁹

Much depended on Ahmad Shah Masood as the key military figure in the new state, but in the complicated environment of Kabul this internationally known commander of the resistance period found himself embroiled with conflicting groups and interests; thus taxed, he failed to establish law and order. Consequently, the Rabbani government failed to bring peace to the city. The government failed because it failed to restrain the unruly-armed bands in the first place. It failed because, strictly speaking, it was not a government: it was actually a commission established principally by foreigners in the name of Peshawar Accord and Islamabad Accord, to transfer power in the course of two months and four months, a short period for such a difficult task. It failed because the groups constituting it did not cooperate with it.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

They could not even restrain their own warriors. The Rabbani government thus failed in its early critical stage.

The failure was the result primarily of the absence of an alternative government, which should have been set up during the resistance period. Of course, leaders of the Afghan jihad groups were divided on this issue for various reasons; as leader of one faction said, “(The leadership) of every group tries to grab power by force, and then use it as it pleases.” However, the host government of Pakistan and other donors of the resistance period i.e., Islamic world, USA and European countries did not seriously work toward establishing an alternative government, particularly at a time when the Soviet Union had disappeared and the situation seemed ripe for the setting up of such a government. At no time did Pakistan exert influence on Afghan leaders to work for an alternative national government. On the contrary, it disappointed Afghan nationalists, royalists, and community and tribal elders when they worked for such a government. Pakistan, instead, concentrated on the Sunni Islamic groups, and even then it pursued a policy of favoritism by distributing among them weapons, logistics, and cash that it received from donor countries. The absence of an alternative national government to replace the crumbling regime, one strong enough to ensure order and security in the initial critical stage was the underlying cause of the destruction of the city and of the momentous failure of the post-Najeebullah government.

The destruction and the failure can properly be understood when the scene where it was played out is considered. By 1992 Kabul had assumed the features of a cosmopolitan city whose three million inhabitants had adopted different lifestyles and held various ideologies and beliefs. Although the secular rule of the communists, especially the relatively relax rule of Dr. Najeebullah, had in theory followed a policy of conformity, it had in fact encouraged this trend toward diversity. Kabul was largely a modern city with liberated women working side by side with men. Females outnumbered males in Kabul. It differed in many respects from the tradition-bound countryside. The latter was medieval in features, and the difference between the two,

the result of uneven development, became still sharper during the resistance period. Kabul had been run by urban and urbanized persons, most of whom were communists, while the countryside was in the grip of the Islamic groups whose leaders opposed secularism and imposed the puritanical ways of Islam in their domains. The two had become worlds apart. The warriors entered Kabul and they treated the Kabulis as if they were beings from a different planet, an attitude that led to the destruction of Kabul.³⁵⁰

Kabul had indeed suffered widespread destruction. The modern parts of the city Macroriyan, Wazir Akbar Khan Maina, the city center, Sher Shah Maina, Mir Wais Maidan, Khushal Maina had been largely destroyed, and the rest partly. While the northern part of the city, that is, Khair Khana, had suffered the least, the eastern parts laid in total ruin. Factories, workshops, stores, and shops had been looted and destroyed. Vendors offered the necessities of life for sale in mobile stalls. The city had no running water, no public transport, no electricity, and no postal service. Educational institutions, including Kabul University and Polytechnic were closed and professors and teachers had either fled to the provinces or abroad, mainly to Pakistan. Those who had remained sold produce to make a living. Thus, after the former professors were sent back to Kabul to govern, the incumbent professors and the students were not allowed to teach and learn. Instead, armed men were let loose on the university campus, where they destroyed, killed, and burned. Most public and private libraries had been looted, and their contents burned or sold in Pakistan. Hit by a rocket (or rockets), Kabul Museum caught fire, and its countless artifacts, some of which were the unique relics of remote ages, had been destroyed, looted, or smuggled out of the country. The whereabouts of the golden artifacts of Tilla Tapa, the fascinating crown of the Kabul Museum's rich contents, were unknown. Thousands of homeless families lived in public buildings, mosques, and schools. A larger number had found accommodation with relatives and friends. Probably about 50 percent of the population had fled to the countryside where they or their fathers had come. Even Khalqies and Parchamies who had been expelled from the countryside and who had no known criminal record had gone to the places of their birth, and their

³⁵⁰ Interview of Dr. Bashar, An expert on Afghan affairs settled in US, with the author.

relatives and villagers had accepted them back. About two hundred thousand of the inhabitants of Kabul had escaped to Jalalabad and Peshawar. In Jalalabad they lived in tents provided by the United Nations in the nearby desert of Sarshahi amidst snakes, scorpions, and insects. In Peshawar, the destitute women among them beg and prostitute themselves for subsistence. Those killed from April 1992 to September 1996 were said to number in thousands, but the actual number is many times higher, as this figure is based only on hospital reports. Uncounted numbers of people had been injured. Many families had been split, and their members; separate destinies had taken them to different places, where they did not know each other's whereabouts. The people who lived in Kabul were those who either did not want to leave, what may come, or those who were without the means to do so. All this was allowed to happen to a people who were the first to rise in masse against the Soviet occupiers and their puppets, as had been described. Afghanistan would long feel the effects of the destruction of Kabul as the nation's main political, industrial, commercial, administrative, and cultural center the place where people from all over the country had mingled and begun the move earlier in the century toward detribalization, secularization, national solidarity, and modern ways of life. For the moment, as one observer stated, "Nowhere in Kabul is life safe; everyone is afraid of everyone else. In early November 1993, by the order of a commander, no fewer than fourteen men were thrown from the second floor of a mosque in the Qarabagh district for not praying. Two of them died on the spot. Political terrorism, the kidnapping of wealthy persons for money and of women for sexual abuse, and burglary were features of life in Kabul. The warriors of the Islamic groups, especially the warriors of Rashid Dostum and Wahdat, had committed all those acts. An analyst noted: "Since there is no effective legal authority in the country, those who possess guns, money, and fighters call the shots."

During resistance period, rural Afghanistan was severely damaged, the agricultural system disrupted, and millions of mines placed throughout the land, while more than five million Afghans fled abroad. Conversely, in that period the city of Kabul swelled; when the Islamic state was set up there, it was the dwelling place for about three million people. The destruction that it had suffered since then was bound to adversely affect the future of Afghanistan as an independent nation-state.

To expect Afghanistan to be a country with a government constituted by the participation of its own citizens, capable of extending its rule throughout the land and conducting its domestic and foreign policy independently remained a dream for the Afghans. The changed correlation of forces of society, the absence of a national government, the disjointedness of the country, the bickering among the contenders for power, foreign interference in Afghan affairs, all these militated against the reemergence of an independent nation-state. The educated and bureaucratic middle class, many of whose members had fled abroad, had become insignificant. The secular-minded community and tribal elders likewise had been weakened. "In days of Burhanuddin Rabbani rule in Afghanistan the groups of clergy, community elders, intelligentsia, and the military could be seen." The laity, the commanders, and the Islamic fundamentalist groups or, to put it differently, bearded men, veiled women, and armed warriors constituted the principal characters of Afghan society.

In particular, the young generation had changed. The war "had almost totally changed the culture of the Afghans under the age of thirty, who knew nothing but war, its ravages, and the power of the gun." With no education and no career to pursue, the Kabul youth were, like mercenaries, sitting idly in military posts "addicted to hashish (chars), heroine, sadism, and other kinds of moral degradation." Also, as a result of the prevailing anarchy in Kabul, the value the Afghans cherished most had been hurt beyond imagination: Because the Gilamjum militia had injured people's dignity and honor, adults wished not to have new babies, and when they wanted them they prayed God to give them ugly ones. Women hated themselves for being attractive. Most provincial officials were illiterate. After the advent of the Islamic state, unprofessional and illiterate persons headed most of the departments except the judiciary department, which was headed by a professional one. Even the head of the education department was illiterate. As commanders of the resistance period, they distributed the posts among themselves on the strength of the sword.

The economic deterioration was more phenomenal. The extremely low rate of productivity and the super rate of inflation (in 1995-96 one U.S. dollar equaled 3500 Afghanis; in 1992 the ratio was 1 to 1,200) were hurting all. Those who could grab felt free to do so. "Because of the absence of the central government, commanders, heads of political parties, and tribal elders (of the frontiers areas), backed up by external powers, derived abundant incomes from opium, custom dues, smuggling, and the theft of natural resources."³⁵¹

The commanders and the heads of the groups were the main actors in Afghan politics. But they followed conflicting and unattainable goals, and since they were prone to following foreign advice, their politics was anything but compromise. They agreed to disagree; when persuaded by others, they might agree on a formula, but then they would undo it. Besides, as opposition leaders they had all along pursued policies, the essence of which was to contradict, defeat, and destroy in order to dominate. With these policies they succeeded over the communists and the Soviet invaders, but it was unlikely they would triumph over each other. None was strong enough by itself to come out on top. Likewise, personal ambitions, the Islamism of some, and the ethnic nationalism and religious sectarianism of others had put them at loggerheads not only with each other but also with the bulk of Afghans. They resembled the communists, whose revolutionary ideology turned them into intolerant creatures. As ideological politics failed the latter, it might also frustrate the former. The politics of coalitionist was a sign of this trend. It might be the beginning of a new culture of pluralistic politics. The trend could be understood when it is borne in mind that Afghanistan had no theocratic order in the past, to say nothing of radical Islamism, which was only a new current. Also, Afghanistan's political structure, although far from perfect, was not exclusive to a particular ethnic group. On the contrary, in modern Afghanistan an ethnic dynasty ruled principally with the help of persons drawn from various ethnic groups. In fact, because of the extensive practice of intergroup marriages, the spread of bilingualism, the recent emphasis on Islamic

³⁵¹ M. Shindanday, "The Tyrannized and Powerless Afghans," *Writers' Union of Free Afghanistan*, 20 July 6, 1994.

values, and the introduction of communistic values, ethnicity had lost much of its traditional sharpness, although it was still a dominant force.³⁵²

The armed groups were strong, deriving strength from their organizations, the vast arsenal of modern weapons at their disposal, and the backing of their foreign patrons. But their manpower had thinned, as noted. Many of those who were fighting for them were mercenaries, some even foreign mercenaries. The continuation of war politics was bound to weaken the groups further, discredit them further with their compatriots, and made them still more receptive to their foreign patrons. Already they had become unpopular. For “during their time Afghanistan had been looted more than when the British and the Soviets had occupied it. Besides, these armed groups had injured the dignity and honor of a nation.” The people had become so tired of the war that they hated even iron. Still, the armed groups remained adamant in their stands, and this rigidity was likely to perpetuate the crisis. The reverend Moulavi of Tarakhel even held that “as long as they (the leaders of the groups) were on the scene, the Afghan crisis will not be resolved.”³⁵³

In short, the dislodging of Burhanuddin Rabbani government from Kabul by Taliban in September was grounded in both domestic and exogenous factors. Internally, it faced a problem of political legitimacy from the start. The Peshawar Accord, based on the method of elite settlement, provided Rabbani with no broad power base or monopoly or force, on the basis of which his government could expand its rule beyond Kabul and a few ethno linguistically affiliated provinces. At the same time Jamiate-e-Islami, which had functioned during the Soviet occupation as a combat and combat support organization, not only lacked the necessary experience in the art of governance, but also harbored many internal divisions. Often its political and military wings could not coordinate their activities in support of a single leadership and common policy objectives. Personal rivalries within the party and between it and

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ William Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2002, p.206

its allies elsewhere in Afghanistan, especially in Herat, provide to be extremely debilitating.

However, nothing undermined its position more than the acrimonious relationship between Burhanuddin Rabbani government and neighboring countries. Islamabad's rejection of the Rabbani government as one which was not prepared to subordinate itself to Pakistan's wider regional interests, and its persistent attempts to influence Afghan politics through cross border ethnic clienteles, led to activate Pakistani intervention in Afghanistan with Gulbudin Hekmatyar as the instrument. On the other hand, Iran for its own interests some time supported one group or another to compete its interests. This deprived Burhanuddin Rabbani government of the opportunity that it needed to consolidate, and eventually exacerbated the conditions for its dislodgement from Kabul by Taliban in September 1996.

APPINDIXES

Glossary

<i>Abdur Rahman</i>	<i>Known as the “Iron Amir”, he ruled Afghanistan from 1880 to 1901 and was chiefly responsible for transforming it into a State.</i>
<i>Afridi</i>	<i>A tribe located in Eastern Afghanistan and near Peshawar, Pakistan, its territory includes Khyber Pass.</i>
<i>Ahmadzai</i>	<i>An important clan of the Ghilzai tribes.</i>
<i>Amanullah</i>	<i>King of Afghanistan during 1919-1929. He initiated the third Anlgo Afghan War in 1919 that led to Afghanistan’s Independence.</i>
<i>Amir</i>	<i>Commander, Ruler, Prince.</i>
<i>Amir ul Moemineen</i>	<i>Commander of the faithfuls, the title adopted by Mulla Omar of the Taliban in 1996.</i>
<i>Ashrar</i>	<i>‘sinful’, those who spread sedition or discord</i>
<i>Badal</i>	<i>Blood Revenge (A theme of Pushtunwali).</i>
<i>Baluch</i>	<i>An ethnic group located in Southwestern Afghanistan, in eastern Iran, and especially in Balochistan Province of Pakistan.</i>
<i>Barakzai</i>	<i>A major subtribe of the Durrani Pushtuns, the Barakzai have provided Afghanistan’s King in 1835.</i>
<i>Basmachi (Ashrar)</i>	<i>Out law, Bandit. The Basmachi rebellion against the USSR occurred in Soviet Central Asia in the 1920’s and early 1930’s. The Russian called the Central Asian resistance fighters of that time as Basmachis, or badmashes, to try to convince people that they were no more than criminals. The word was also used by the Afghan Government and its Soviet advisors during the 1980’s to refer to the Mujahideen as Ashrar.</i>
<i>Burqa</i>	<i>Traditional covering of Pushtun woman from head to toe.</i>
<i>Buzkashi</i>	<i>The national sport of Afghanistan, it originated on the Northern Turkestan plains and in Central Asia. The game involves teams of</i>

	<i>horsemen competing to lift the carcass of a calf and ride with it to a designated spot while the other riders attempt to stop him.</i>
<i>Durand line</i>	<i>The 2,450 km border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Durand line was established in 1893 and is named after Sir Mortimer Durand, the foreign secretary of the British Indian government.</i>
<i>Dagarwal</i>	<i>Brigadier.</i>
<i>Dari</i>	<i>An Afghan dialect of the Persian language, spoken throughout Afghansitan, especially by Tajiks, Aimaq and Qizilbash.</i>
<i>Durrani</i>	<i>A major Pushtun tribe based in southwestern Afghanistan, since Ahmad Shah Durrani founded Afghanistan in 1840's.</i>
<i>Treaty of Gandomak</i>	<i>A treaty signed in 1879 between the Afghan's and the British Raj, meant to conclude the Second Anglo Afghan war, Under its terms the British gained control over Afghanistan's foreign affairs. Afghans viewed it as a national humiliation.</i>
<i>Ghazni</i>	<i>A strategic town and province between Kabul and Kandahar that was the scene of much fighting in the first two Anglo Afghan wars.</i>
<i>Ghilzai</i>	<i>A major Pushtun tribe of eastern and northern Afghanistan.</i>
<i>Hanafi</i>	<i>One of the four major schools of Sunni Islamic law, it is dominant in Afghanistan.</i>
<i>Hazara</i>	<i>A major ethnic group of Central Afghanistan, the Hazara people is generally Shiaa, Speaks Hazaragi and have Mongoloid racial features.</i>
<i>Hindu Kush</i>	<i>The Central mountain range of Afghanistan that splits the northern part of the country from the south. The name traditionally has been translated as "Hindu Killer" which reflects the fact that the range is viewed as the dividing line between South and Central Asia.</i>
<i>Huns</i>	<i>Conquering people of an ancient Central Asia, Mongoliod in appearance, they may have been ancestors of some present day ethnic groups of Central Asia.</i>
<i>Hijrat</i>	<i>Migration under Islamic principles.</i>

<i>Jihad</i>	<i>Holy struggle.</i>
<i>Jirga</i>	<i>A Pushtun council or assembly of elderly males.</i>
<i>Khalq</i>	<i>Meaning “masses” this was one of the two major factions of the Afghan Communist Party, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan.</i>
<i>Khel</i>	<i>Sub tribe.</i>
<i>Khushal Khan</i>	<i>The famous Afghan warrior poet who led the Pushtun in revolt against Moghuls (1613-1689).</i>
<i>Khurd Zabitan</i>	<i>Sub Inspector.</i>
<i>Kushan</i>	<i>A Buddhist Kingdom that flourished during the first two centuries BC in areas of present day Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia.</i>
<i>Khyber Pass</i>	<i>Historic Pass through the present day Khyber Tribal Agency in Pakistan to the Afghan border.</i>
<i>Kareez</i>	<i>Underground canals for irrigation.</i>
<i>Khan</i>	<i>A Land lord.</i>
<i>Madrasah</i>	<i>Islamic religious School or College.</i>
<i>Malik</i>	<i>Local leader, Head of village in Afghan society.</i>
<i>Moulavi</i>	<i>Also Aalim, this is a madrasah graduate, or religious teacher/scholar.</i>
<i>Mulla</i>	<i>Local religious leader, priest.</i>
<i>Mohammad Zai</i>	<i>A clan of the Barikzai Durrani that has provided Afghanistan’s Kings since 1826.</i>
<i>Mujahedeen</i>	<i>People engaged in holy war.</i>
<i>Nikah namah</i>	<i>Marriage Contracts.</i>
<i>Panah</i>	<i>Refuge (A tradition of Pushtun society when someone is taking shelter in someone’s home or area he will be safe).</i>
<i>Parcham</i>	<i>Meaning “banner” this was one of the two factions of Communist Party of Afghanistan, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan.</i>
<i>Pushtun</i>	<i>A major ethnic group in Afghanistan and Pakistan.</i>
<i>Powindas</i>	<i>Nomads.</i>

<i>Pushtunistan</i>	<i>Pushtun areas situated on the Pakistan side of the Pak-Afghanborder (Known as Durand line).</i>
<i>Pushtunwali</i>	<i>Pushtun code of Honor.</i>
<i>Sadoza</i>	<i>A major sub tribe of the Popolzai Pushtun.The Sadozai provided Afghanistan's Kings from 1747 to 1818.</i>
<i>Safavid</i>	<i>Persian Empire (1501-1732) contemporaneous with the Moghl Empire of India. The Safavids ruled parts of Western Afghanistan.</i>
<i>Sour revolution</i>	<i>The name given to the PDPA's successful 1978 coup. Also called the April Revolution.</i>
<i>Shabnama</i>	<i>"Night letters" or antigovernment leaflets distributed clandestinely at night by the Mujahedeen and more recently by opponents of the Taliban.</i>
<i>Shariah</i>	<i>Islamic law taken from the Holly Quran and Sunnah.</i>
<i>Shura</i>	<i>Advisory council.</i>
<i>Shiaa or shism</i>	<i>A heterodox Islamic sect that believes Hazrat Ali, Son in Law of the Prophet Mohammad (Peace Be Upon him), and Ali's descendents to be the rightful leaders of the Islamic community.</i>
<i>Sunni or Sunnism</i>	<i>A major, orthodox Islamic sect that accepts all the early Caliphs, or Islamic leaders.</i>
<i>Tajik</i>	<i>A major ethnic group of Northeastern Afghanistan, also found in Tajikistan. The Tajik speaks Dari, and consists of both Sunni and Shiaa.</i>
<i>Uzbek</i>	<i>A major ethnic group of Afghanistan, also found in Uzbekistan, The Uzbeks speak Turkic dialects, are Sunni and have Mongoloid racial features.</i>
<i>Wahabi</i>	<i>Puritanical interpretation of Islam by Ibn Abdul Wahab.</i>

Major Actors in Afghan History

The following are brief sketches of some of the major organizations and persons of importance in Afghanistan during the last twenty-five years of the twentieth century:

ORGANIZATIONS

Harakat-I Inqilab-I Islami (Movement of the Islamic Revolution)

One of the seven major Mujahedeen parties based in Peshawar during the 1980's, this was one of three "moderate" parties and was headed by Moulavi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi. It acquired a large following in the early 1980's especially in the South and among Madrasah teachers and students. Many of Taliban Leaders had affiliations with this party.

Harakat-I Islami (Islamic Movement)

Shiekh Asif Mohseni led this Shia group during the 1980's. This group received support from both the Hazara and Qizilibash population.

Hezb-I-Islami (Islamic Party, Hikmatyar faction)

One of the seven major Mujahedeen parties based in Peshawar during the 1980's, this was one of four "fundamentalist" parties and was headed by Engineer Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. It received support from the Ghilzai and smaller Pushtun tribes. Hezb Islami was one of the severe opponents of Rabbani Government; Hezb Islami was driven out from the battle field by the Taliban in 1996.

Hezb-I Islami (Islamic Party, Khalis group)

One of the seven major Mujahedeen Parties based in Peshawar during the 1980's, this was one of four "fundamentalist" parties and was headed by Moulavi Yunus Khalis. It was smaller, more localized and more moderate than Hekmatyar faction. Its support came primarily from eastern Afghanistan.

Hezb-i-Wahdat (Unity party)

The major Shiaa resistance parties were pushed into creating this umbrella organization by Iran in 1989. During the subsequent decade, Wahdat became a major player in Afghanistan's internal power struggle, operating from its home base in Hazarajat. Hezb-i-Wahdat splintered in 1988 after the Taliban victories in Mazar-i-Sahrif and Bamiyan.

Ittehad-i-Islami Bara-yi Azadi Afghanistan (Islamic Union for the Freedom of Afghanistan)

One of the seven major mujahedeen parties based in Peshawar during the 1980s, this was one of the four "fundamentalist" parties. It was headed by Abdur Rasool Sayyaf and drew heavily on Saudi sources of funding. After the fall of the Dr. Najeebullah government, Ittehad fought against the Shiaa Hezb-i-Wahdat but joined the Northern Alliance against the Taliban following their takeover of Kabul in 1996.

Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Society)

One of the seven major mujahedeen parties based in Peshawar during the 1980s, this was one of four "fundamentalist" parties and was headed by Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani. Unlike the other Peshawar resistance parties, jamiat was composed primarily of northern minorities and had the war's most famous commanders Ahmad Shah Masood of Panjshair valley and Ismail Khan of Herat. Rabbani became acting president in the summer of 1992, following the fall of Najeebullah and the short stint in office of Sibghatullah Mojaddidi, and thereafter he refused to give up the position. jamiat fought against the mujahedeen groups over the control of Kabul from 1992 until 1995. Since being driven into the northeastern Afghanistan in 1996, it has fought under various umbrella labels (Northern Alliance, United Front) against the Taliban.

Jabha-i-Milli Nejat (National Liberation Front, or NLF)

One of the seven major mujahedeen parties based in Peshawar during the 1980s, this was one of the three "moderate" parties and was headed by Professor Sibghatullah Mojaddidi. He drew on his traditional family and Naqshbandiyya Sufi linkages to create this rather small party. It plays no combat role in Afghanistan today.

Mehaz-i-Milli Islami-yi Afghanistan (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, or NFA)

One of the seven major mujahideen parties based in Peshawar during the 1980s, this was one of the three "moderate" parties and was headed by Pir sayed Ahmad Gailani. He drew on his traditional family and Qadiriyya Sufi linkages to create this rather small party. It plays no combat role in Afghanistan today.

People's Democratic Party Of Afghanistan (PDPA)

This was Afghanistan's Communist party, formed in 1965. Divided into two bitterly opposed factors, Khalq (Masses) and Parcham (Banner), it ruled Afghanistan from 1978 to 1992, the last two years after changing its name to Hezb-i-Watan. Led by Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, Khalq ruled in 1978_1979. After the soviet invasion, Babrak Karmal took over until 1986, followed by his fellow Parchami Najeebullah until 1992.

Sazman-i-Nasr-i Islam-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Victory Organization of Afghanistan)

A Khomeinist Hazara group.

Shura-i-Inqilab-i-Ittefaq-i-Islami Afghanistan (Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Union of Afghanistan)

Headed by the Hazara religious leader Sheikh Sayed Ali Beheshti, this organization controlled the Hazarajat from 1979 to 1982.

Taliban (Religious Students)

This Islamist movement of former mujahedeen, Madrassa teachers, and religious students appeared in South Western Afghanistan 1994 and by 2001 controlled 90 to 97 percent of Afghanistan. It is headed by the reclusive Mullah Omar Akhund.

Hezb-i-Watan (Homeland)

Name for the PDPA from 1990 to 1992.

PERSONALITIES

Abdali, Ahmad Shah.

Ahmad Shah Abdali, later known as Ahmad Shah Durrani, was the founder of modern Afghanistan. Before being elected king in 1747, Abdali was a cavalry general under the Persian emperor Nadir Shah. After Nadir Shah's assassination, he captured a caravan with booty coming from India, this provided him the financial backing he needed to become king. During his reign, he built a vast empire that extended from Eastern Persia (Iran) to northern India, and from the Amu Darya to the Indian Ocean. Abdali was also a brilliant Pushtu poet. He died in 1772, possibly as a result of skin cancer. Afghans refer to him as Ahmad Shah Baba (Ahmad Shah, the father).

Abdulla Abdulla.

Belongs to Jamiate-e-Islami. Foreign minister in the Karzia administration.

Abdur Rahman.

Amir of Afghanistan from 1880-1901. Known as Bismark of Afghanistan

Amanulla Khan.

Third son of Habibulla Khan, King of Afghanistan from 1919-1929, forced to abdicate

Amin, Hafizullah (1929-1979)

Khaqi communist president of Afghanistan in late 1979, he was assassinated by the Soviet Special Forces during the 1979 Soviet Christmas invasion. Amin was a Kharruti Ghilzai from paghman.

Daoud, Sardar Mohammad (1909-1973)

Sardar Daoud Khan overthrew his cousin King Mohammad Zahir Shah, and abolished the monarchy in Afghanistan. He then proclaimed himself the president of the Republic of Afghanistan in July 1973. Before that, Daoud Khan served under King Mohammad Zahir, holding various positions including Prime Minister. Sardar Daoud was a strong

supporter of Pashtunistan, and worked towards reform and modernization. He encouraged the abandonment of the veil by Afghan women, and their participation in the building of a progressive and modern Afghanistan. He ruled until he was assassinated in 1978 (Saur Revolution). Afterwards, Marxists took power in Kabul.

Dostam, Abdul Rashid

Dostum is a former Communist General who switched sides to help the Mujahedeen bring down Dr. Najeebullah's Russian supported government.

Dost Muhammad Khan.

Amir of Afghanistan from 1826 to 1839, and, after brief period of exile, ruled from 1843 to 1869.

Gilani, Pir Sayed Ahmad

Gailani is the head of Mahaz-i-Milli-Islami (National Islamic Front). He was a strong supporter of the former Afghan king Mohammad Zahir.

General Malik

Ethnic Uzbek, Dostum's deputy who led rebellion against him in 1997.

General Fahim

Ahmad Shah Masood's deputy. After Masood's assassination in September 2001, Fahim became the most powerful element in the Northern Alliance.

Habibulla Khan

Son of Abdurrahman Khan, Amir of Afghanistan from 1900 to 1919

Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, originally from Baghlan, is the head and founder of Hezbi Islami. Hekmatyar, first studied at the military academy, then in 1968, he switched to the engineering department of Kabul University. Although Hekmatyar is sometimes referred

to as "Engineer Hekmatyar", he never graduated from Kabul University with a degree in engineering. Nevertheless, he is more outspoken than any other figure in Afghan politics. Before becoming a "devout" Muslim and getting into Islamic politics, Hekmatyar was put in prison for killing a Maoist student. He then fled to Pakistan and founded Hezb-e-Islami. Historians claim that in 1975, Hekmatyar instigated the anti-Adour insurrection in Panjshair. Hezb members and Hekmatyar refute his Communist background, and they consider it an insult. Hekmatyar has been accused by almost every other political party of being a puppet of Pakistan and the United States. The truth is that while he has received numerous aids from Pakistan and America, he was always working for himself. He used the Pakistanis and the Americans as they used him. It is also true that he had close connections with the ISI of Pakistan, and that he was extensively trained by them. Pakistani officials at that time described Hekmatyar as being a power hungry, cunning, and a ruthless fanatic who would do anything to be on top. Many of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's detractors believe that Hekmatyar wants Afghanistan to be governed according to his parties ideology, and he will not let anyone or anything stand in his way. Even though Hekmatyar's Hezbi-e-Islami received millions of dollars worth of military and financial aid from the United States, they still failed to liberate Afghanistan from the Communists. In fact, many Afghan political analysts accuse Hekmatyar of killing more Mujahedeen members than Communists. When the Communist regime fell in Kabul, Hekmatyar and his party were invited by the new Mujahedeen government to take part and help build an Islamic government in Afghanistan. Hekmatyar was offered the Prime Minister's position, and he refused it. He labeled the Mujahedeen government as being unislamic, and not what the people wanted. As most political analysts predicted, Hekmatyar emerged as one of the most formidable enemies of the Islamic government, created by Mujahedeen leaders such as Burhanuddin Rabbani. Hekmatyar refused to discuss power sharing with other political parties and launched several unsuccessful efforts to seize power by force in Kabul. Hekmatyar's rocket attacks created tremendous hardships for the ordinary people of Kabul, and inflicted heavy material losses to the government and people. Some analysts may even say that because of Hekmatyar's aggression against the Islamic government of Afghanistan, the government was weakened so much that the Taliban militia had a tremendous advantage when they started their campaign against the

government. Hekmatyar continued to enjoy the support of some Arab and Pakistani in his war against the government. There were even Pakistani and Arab volunteers fighting for him against the government. Hekmatyar launched his campaign against the government under the name of driving out "communist militias", but by the end of the 1992, he not only dropped this demand but he also struck a deal with Dostum (Former Communist) and Hezb-e-Wahdat to form a common front against the government. Dostum and Hezb-e-Wahdat were Hekmatyar's former enemies. Rocket attacks on Kabul, and alliances with forces of the former regime (Khalqies and Dostum) degraded Hekmatyar in the eyes of the ordinary Afghan. Hekmatyar's cries for the formation of a pure Islamic government have taken on an air of self-parody. In the beginning of 1993, Hekmatyar again was offered the seat of Prime Minister, and this time he accepted. He served as Prime Minister from March 1993, until January 1994. In early 1994, Hekmatyar, not satisfied with his power with the government aligned himself once again with Dostum to topple Rabbani's Islamic government; they failed. Nevertheless, the government of Afghanistan tried again to settle peacefully with Hekmatyar. His rocket attacks had almost completely destroyed Kabul, and the government was really weakening as a result of holding back Hekmatyar's aggression. At last, in June of 1996, Hekmatyar once again accepted the position of Prime Minister. In late 1996, the Taliban, overran Kabul and forced Rabbani and Hekmatyar to flee north.

Ismaiel Khan.

Mohammad Ismail Khan is the Minister of Energy and Water in Hamid Karzai's government. Before joining Karzia Government, Ismael Khan served as the governor of Herat province during Rabbani government. While Kabul was struggling, Ismael Khan achieved wonders in terms of reconstruction with the city of Herat. He brought about security, built numerous schools and provided opportunities for small businesses to flourish. Because of these achievements, he is well loved by the people of Herat. Ismael Khan was also an important member of UNIFSA, and a hero of the Afghan resistance against the Soviets. Interestingly enough, he was captured by both the Communists during the Soviet war as well as by the Taliban, and, he managed to escape from both of them.

Karmal, Babrak (1929-1998)

Babrak Karmal was a Soviet puppet. He was President from 1979 till the Soviets finally grew tired of him and replaced him with Dr. Najeebullah in 1986. He was a founding member of the PDPA (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan), and served as its secretary general. After differences with other important members, he led his own faction of the PDPA known as Parcham. When he was replaced by Dr. Najeebullah, Karmal left to live in Moscow, he returned to Afghanistan in 1991, only to leave once more. He eventually died in Moscow of liver disease on December 3, 1996. His body was brought back to Afghanistan and buried in Hairatan. Karmal's origins are unclear, he claimed to be a Pushtun, but one Afghan historian wrote that Karmal might actually have Kashmiri roots.

Khalis, Maulavi Yunus

Khalis was the head of the Islamic Party (Hezbe Islami-Khalis). Khalis played an important role in Afghanistan's anti-communist war. In October of 2003, the Pakistani newspaper, reported that Khalis had joined the Taliban's fight against the US and International forces in Afghanistan. Shortly afterwards, Khalis went into hiding and was not heard of until his son announced his death on July 19, 2006. Khalis was 87. Anwar ul-Haq Mujahid, Khalis's son, has taken over the party's leadership.

Masood, Ahmad Shah

Ahmad Shah Masood was born in 1953 in the Jangalak district of Panjshair. He played one of the most important roles in Afghanistan's modern history. To his admirers, he is known as the "Lion of Panjshair", a name given to him for his successes as a military commander during the war against the Soviet occupation. In fact, his fight against the Soviets was so well known that the Wall Street labeled him as the "Afghan who won the cold war". After the Communists were defeated, Masood's troops were the first Mujahedeen group to enter Kabul, and help establish a Mujahedeen government. He served as President Burhanuddin Rabbani's Defense Minister, and engaged in numerous battles to prevent Rabbani's rivals such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar from taking over the

government. Eventually, Rabbani's government fell, and the Taliban took over the capital. Masood and his allies pulled their forces north and worked on defending the north and the central regions from being completely taken over by the Taliban. Masood was chosen as the military leader of UNIFSA when on September 9, 2001, two days before the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, Masood was killed. He was the victim of an Al Qaeda suicide attack. The attackers posed as television journalists, setting off a bomb packed inside their video camera.

Mazari, Abdul Ali.

Abdul Ali Mazari was the head and co-founder of Hezb-e-Wahdat. Hezb-e-Wahdat, is a Shiaa' political party that was formed from a coalition of several political parties after the Soviet withdrawal. The government of Iran is believed to have played a key role in its formation. Mazari considered his organization as one of the three main groups who played a key role in defeating the communist regime led by Dr. Najeebullah. Mazari was born in 1946, in the village of Nanwai, Charkent District, Balkh Province. He studied in private religious schools in Mazar-i-Shariff, Qum (Iran), and Najaf (Iraq). After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Mazari founded the Nasr Party. When Wahdat was formed from the merger of nine Shiaa' factions, Mazari became the leader. Mazari claimed that Hazaras formed 25 percent of the population of Afghanistan, and that Hezb-e-Wahdat was their representative. He demanded one fourth of the cabinet seats for his party. When Burhanuddin Rabbani, President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, refused to give the Ministry of National Security to a nominee of that party, Khuday Dad Hazar, Mazari became extremely angry and pledged to topple Rabbani's government. Mazari who had formed an alliance with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Dostum against the Rabbani government began to negotiate with the Taliban as soon as Hekmatyar retreated from Kabul. He tried hard to avoid military confrontation with the Taliban, and hoped that the war between the Taliban and the Rabbani government would provide him with an opportunity for survival. Soon, Mazari invited the Taliban to occupy the frontline positions held by his fighters. Things turned sour when the Taliban started to disarm Mazari's men as soon they reached West Kabul. This resulted in clashes between Taliban and the followers of Mazari. Mazari was captured by Taliban on March 12, and was

taken to Charasyab, the Taliban base 25 kilometers south of Kabul. A Western journalist photographed Mazari with tied hands and feet. On March 13, 1995, Mazari along with nine of his followers were murdered by Taliban. Taliban said Mazari and nine other leaders of his party were being taken to Kandahar on board a helicopter when he snatched one of his captor's guns, and wounded the pilot of the helicopter. The plane made an emergency landing near Ghazni and in the gun battle which followed, Mazari, nine other leaders of Wahdat, and six Taliban guards were killed. The Taliban's version of Mazari's death was disputed by the leaders of Wahdat. They accused Mullah Borjan, the commander of the Taliban in Charasyab, of torturing and killing Mazari.

Mohammadi, Maulavi Mohammad Nabi

Head of Harkat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami during the 1980s, Mohammadi is a Pashtun from Logar who supported the Taliban. He was a member of Parliament in 1960s.

Mojaddidi, Sibghatullah

Head of the Naqshbandiyya Sufi order and the NLF, formerly a Professor of theology who was educated at Al Azhar University in Egypt. He is a Pashtun who has often been a compromise choice as leader of the squabbling mujahedeen governments. He was the first post Najeebullah president for two months in 1992. Mojaddedi is the head and founder of a group known as the National Liberation Front of Afghanistan (Jabha-e Melli-ye Nijat-e Afghanistan). Mojaddedi also served as the first President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan after the Communists were defeated and a Mujahedeen government was set up in 1992. In December 2003, he served as the chairman of the Loya Jirga that approved Afghanistan's new constitution. On March 16, 2005, President Karzai appointed Mojaddedi as the chairman of the Afghan National Commission for Peace in Afghanistan. The commission's objective is to promote reconciliation. In a press conference held on May 9, 2005 in Kabul, Mojaddedi announced that participation in the reconciliation process is open to all Afghans, including Mullah Omar (head of the Taliban) and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Both Mullah Omar and Hekmatyar are on the US most wanted list. Mojaddedi's announcement contradicted President Hamid Karzai's earlier statement that those whose hands are red with the blood of innocent Afghans,

including Mullah Omar and Hekmatyar, would be excluded from the reconciliation process. President Karzai distanced himself from Mojaddedi's remarks, and a US military spokesman cast doubt on Mojaddedi's assertion that the commission was authorized to offer a general amnesty to such figures as Mullah Omar and Hekmatyar. On May 11th, Mojaddedi retracted his statement. He claimed that his remarks were misconstrued by the media, and that it was up to the Afghan nation to pardon or punish Mullah Omar and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Mojaddedi was quoted as saying: "If they accept Afghanistan's new basic law and give up fighting, they may be forgiven. But personally speaking, I can't let them off because I don't have the right."

Dr. Najeebullah (1947-1996)

Dr. Najeebullah was born in 1947, and had a degree in Medicine from Kabul University after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; Dr. Najeebullah was placed as the head of KHAD, the Afghan version of the KGB. It was KHAD's task to eradicate the opposition, and provide military intelligence. As head of KHAD, Dr. Najeebullah was known for barbarism, and brutality. KHAD was set up with extensive Soviet assistance. Like, Babrak Karmal, Dr. Najeebullah was a member of the Parcham faction of the PDPA. Eventually, in 1986, after replacing Babrak Karmal, the Soviet Union installed Dr. Najeebullah as President. He remained president for 6 years, until Mujahedeen forces finally defeated him in 1992. Prevented from fleeing the country, he took refuge in the UN compound in Kabul. He lived in the compound until September 1996, when Taliban troops captured the city from Ahmad Shah Masood. When Kabul was captured, the Taliban almost immediately executed Dr. Najeebullah and his brother, and then they hanged their lifeless bodies in the center of the city

Omar Akhund, Mullah

Considered by his followers to be Amir ul-Moemineen (Commander of the Faithful), Omar is the reclusive head of Taliban. A commander with Nabi Mohammadi's Harkat during the 1980s, Omar is a Hotaki Ghilzai Pushtun from the Kandahar area.

Rabbani, Burhanuddin

Burhanuddin Rabbani, the former president of Islamic state of Afghanistan and one of the major figures in the anti-Taliban northern alliance, was born in 1940 in Badakhshan, a province of Afghanistan. After graduating from Abu-Hanifa, he went to Kabul University to study Islamic law and theology, and later did his masters degree in Islamic Philosophy from the university of Al-Azhar in (Cairo) Egypt. In 1968, Rabbani returned to Afghanistan, where the high council of jamiat-i-islami of Afghanistan asked him to organize the Kabul University students. Later in 1972, he was selected as the head of Jamiat-i-Islami of Afghanistan. In the Spring of 1974, the police came to Kabul University to arrest Rabbani for his pro-Islamic stance, but he managed to evade arrest. Later, he shifted his base to Pakistan where he started to re-organize the Islamic movement. Subsequently, in 1978, when a communist regime came to power in Afghanistan, the Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan, under the leadership of Rabbani, decided to fight for the rights of the people of Afghanistan, and for the cause of Islam, against the pro-Russian regime of Kabul. In 1992, when the mujahedeen overthrew the Najeeb government, the last communist government in Afghanistan, Rabbani was appointed as the President of the Islamic state of Afghanistan. He was ousted in 1996 when the Taliban gained control of Kabul.

Sayyaf, Abdur Rasoul

Sayaf is the head of Tanzim-e Dahwat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (Afghanistan's Islamic Mission Organization). His party used to be known as Ittihad-i-Islami Barai Azadi Afghanistan (Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan). His party registered the new name with the Ministry of Justice on April 25, 2005. Sayaf has been in an alliance with former President Rabbani's Jamiat-e Islami ever since the Soviet war. A Kharruti Pushtun like both Hekmatyar and Hafizullah Amin, Sayyaf heads the Ittehad-i-Islami. He had strong ties with the Arab supporters of the mujahedeen during the 1980s and early 1990s, but very few Afghan mujahedeen or commanders affiliated with him.

Taraki, Nur Mohammad (1917-1979)

Taraki was an important member of the Khalq faction of the PDPA. After the Saur

revolution, which left Mohammad Daoud Khan dead, Taraki became the president of the Revolutionary Council, prime minister of the country, and secretary general of the PDPA. During Taraki's hold on power, numerous anti-Communist revolts occurred throughout the country, and he failed to subdue them. Taraki and Hafizullah Amin worked together to greatly weaken the Parcham faction of the PDPA. Eventually, on September 14, 1979, Taraki himself was killed by Amin.

Zahir Shah

King of Afghanistan from 1933 to 1973, he was overthrown in a bloodless coup by his cousin Mohammad Daoud while the King was on a foreign official visit.

Text of Geneva Accords³⁵⁴

Declaration Between The US and The USSR on International Guarantees

Signed at Geneva April. 14, 1988.

Entered into force May 15, 1988.

The Governments of the United States of America and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Expressing Support that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have concluded a negotiated political settlement.

Designed to normalize relations and promote good-neighborliness between the two countries as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region. Wishing in turn to contribute to the achievement of the objectives that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have set themselves, and with a view to ensuring respect for their sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment; undertake to invariably refrain from any form of interference and intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and to respect the commitments contained in the bilateral agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the principles of mutual relations, in particular on non-interference and non-intervention; urge all states to act likewise.

³⁵⁴ <http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/>

Bilateral agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the principles of mutual relations, in particular on non-interference and non-intervention

The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the high contracting parties, desiring to normalize relations and promote good-neighborliness and co-operation as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region, considering that full observance of the principle of non-interference and non-intervention in the internal and external affairs of states is of the greatest importance for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the fulfillment of the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations, reaffirming the inalienable right of states freely to determine their own political, economic, cultural and social systems in accordance with the will of their peoples, without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever, mindful of the provisions of the charter of the United Nations as well as the resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the principle of non-interference and non-intervention, in particular the declaration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among states in accordance with the charter of the United Nations, of 24 October 1970, as well as the declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention and interference in the internal affairs of states, of 9 December 1981, have agreed as follows:

Article I

Relations between the high contracting parties shall be conducted in strict compliance with the principle of non-interference and non-intervention by states in the affairs of other states;

Article ii

For the purpose of implementing the principle of non-interference and non-intervention each high contracting party undertakes to comply with the following obligations:

- (1) To respect the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, security and non-alignment of the other high contracting party, as well as the national identity and cultural heritage of its people;

- (2) To respect the sovereign and inalienable right of the other high contracting party freely to determine its own political, economic, cultural and social systems, to develop its international relations and to exercise permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, in accordance with the will of its people, and without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever;
- (3) To refrain from the threat or use of force in any form whatsoever so as not to violate the boundaries of each other, to disrupt the political, social or economic order of the other high contracting party, to overthrow or change the political system of the other high contracting party or its government, or to cause tension between the high contracting parties;
- (4) To ensure that its territory is not used in any manner which would violate the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and national unity or disrupt the political, economic and social stability of the other high contracting party;
- (5) To refrain from armed intervention, subversion, military, occupation or any other form of intervention and interference, overt or covert, directed at the other high contracting party, or any act of military, political or economic interference in the internal affairs of the other high contracting party, including acts of reprisal involving the use of force;
- (6) To refrain from any action or attempt in whatever form or under whatever pretext to destabilize or to undermine the stability of the other high contracting party or any of its institutions;
- (7) To refrain from the promotion, encouragement or support, direct or indirect, of rebellious or secessionist activities against the other high contracting party, under any pretext whatsoever, or from any other action which seeks to disrupt the unity or to undermine or subvert the political order of the other high contracting party;
- (8) To prevent within its territory the training, equipping, financing and recruitment of mercenaries from whatever origin for the purpose of hostile activities against the other high contracting party, or the sending of such mercenaries into the territory of the other high contracting party and accordingly to deny facilities, including financing for the training, equipping and transit of such mercenaries;

- (9) To refrain from making any agreements or arrangements with other states designed to intervene or interfere in the internal and external affairs of the other high contracting party;
- (10) To abstain from any defamatory campaign, vilification or hostile propaganda for the purpose of intervening or interfering in the internal affairs of the other high contracting party;
- (11) To prevent any assistance to or use of or tolerance of terrorist groups, saboteurs or subversive agents against the other high contracting party;
- (12) To prevent within its territory the presence, harboring, in camps and bases or otherwise, organizing, training, financing, equipping and arming of individuals and political, ethnic and any other groups for the purpose of creating subversion, disorder or unrest in the territory of the other high contracting party and accordingly also to prevent the use of mass media and the transportation of arms, ammunition and equipment by such individuals and groups;
- (13) Not to resort to or to allow any other action that could be considered as interference or intervention.;

Article iii

The present agreement shall enter into force on 15 may 1988.

Article IV

Any steps that may be required in order to enable the high contracting parties to comply with the provisions of article ii of this agreement shall be completed by the date on which this agreement enters into force.

Article V

This agreement is drawn up in the English, Pashtu, and Urdu languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail. Done in five original copies at Geneva this fourteenth day of April 1988.

Bilateral agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the voluntary return of refugees

The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the high contracting parties, desiring to normalize relations and promote good-neighborliness and co-operation as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region, convinced that voluntary and unimpeded repatriation constitutes the most appropriate solution for the problem of afghan refugees present in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and having ascertained that the arrangements for the return of the Afghan refugees are satisfactory to them, have agreed as follows

Article I

All Afghan refugees temporarily present in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall be given the opportunity to return voluntarily to their homeland in accordance with the arrangements and conditions set out in the present agreement.

Article ii

The government of the Republic of Afghanistan shall take all necessary measures to ensure the following conditions for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees to their homeland;

- (a) All refugees shall be allowed to return in freedom to their homeland;
- (b) All returnees shall enjoy the free choice of domicile and freedom of movement within the Republic of Afghanistan;
- (c) All returnees shall enjoy the right to work, to adequate living conditions and to share in the welfare of the state;
- (d) All returnees shall enjoy the right to participate on an equal basis in the civic affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan. They shall be ensured equal benefits from the solution of the land question on the basis of the land and water reform
- (e) All returnees shall enjoy the same rights and privileges, including freedom of religion, and have the same obligations and responsibilities as any other citizens of the Republic of Afghanistan without discrimination.

The government of the Republic of Afghanistan undertakes to implement these measures and to provide, within its possibilities, all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.

Article iii

The government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall facilitate the voluntary, orderly and peaceful repatriation of all Afghan refugees staying within its territory and undertake to provide, within its possibilities, all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.

Article IV

For the purpose of organizing, coordinating and supervising the operations, which should effect the voluntary, orderly and peaceful repatriation of Afghan refugees, there shall be set up mixed commissions in accordance with the established international practice. For the performance of their function the members of the commissions and their staff shall be accorded the necessary facilities, and have access to the relevant areas within the territories of the high contracting parties

Article V

With a view to the orderly movement of the returnees, the commissions shall determine frontier-crossing points and establish necessary transit centers. They shall also establish all other modalities for the phased return of refugees, including registration and communication to the country of return of the names of refugees who express the wish to return.

Article VI

At the request of the governments concerned, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will cooperate and provide assistance in the process of voluntary repatriation of refugees in accordance with the present agreement. Special agreements may be concluded for this purpose between UNHCR and the high contracting parties

Article VII

The present agreement shall enter into force on 15 may 1988. At that time the mixed commissions provided in article IV shall be established and the operations for the voluntary return of refugees under this agreement shall commence.

The arrangements set out in articles **IV** and **V** above shall remain in effect for a period of eighteen months. After that period the high contracting parties shall review the results of the repatriation and, if necessary, consider any further arrangements that may be called for.

Article VIII

This agreement is drawn up in the English, Pashtu, and Urdu languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail. Done in five original copies at Geneva this fourteenth day of April 1988

Agreement on the interrelationships for the settlement of the Situation relating to Afghanistan

1. The diplomatic process initiated by the Secretary General of the United Nations with the support of all governments concerned and aimed at achieving, through negotiations, a political settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan has been successfully brought to an end;
2. Having agreed to work towards a comprehensive settlement designed to resolve the various issues involved and to establish a framework for good neighborliness and co-operation, the government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
3. The government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan took part in the negotiations with the expressed conviction that they were acting in accordance with their rights and obligations under the charter of the United Nations and agreed that the political settlement should be based on the following principles of international law:
 - a) The principle that states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;
 - b) The principle that states shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;

- c) The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, in accordance with the charter of the United Nations;
- d) The duty of states to co-operate with one another in accordance with the charter of the United Nations;
- e) The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
- f) The principle of sovereign equality of states;
- g) The principle that states shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the charter of the United Nations;

The two governments further affirmed the right of the Afghan refugees to return to their homeland in a voluntary and unimpeded manner.

4. The following instruments were concluded on this date as component parts of the political settlement;

A bilateral agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the principles of mutual relations, in particular on non-interference and non-intervention; a declaration on international guarantees by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; a bilateral agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the voluntary return of refugees;

The present agreement on the interrelationships for the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan

5. The bilateral agreement on the principles of mutual relations, in particular on non-interference and non-intervention; the declaration on international guarantees; the bilateral agreement on the voluntary return of refugees; and the present agreement on the interrelationships for the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan will enter into force on 15 May 1988. In accordance with the timeframe agreed upon between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic there will be a phased withdrawal of the foreign troops, which will start on the date of entry into force mentioned above. One half of the troops will be withdrawn by 15 August 1988 and the withdrawal of all troops will be completed within nine months.

6. The interrelationships in paragraph 5 above have been agreed upon in order to achieve effectively the purpose of the political settlement, namely, that as from 15 May 1988, there will be no interference and intervention in any form in the affairs of the parties; the international guarantees will be in operation; the voluntary return of the refugees to their homeland will start and be completed within the timeframe specified in the agreement on the voluntary return of the refugees; and the phased withdrawal of the Foreign troops will start and be completed within. The timeframe envisaged in paragraph 5. It is therefore essential that all the obligations deriving from the instruments concluded as component parts of the settlement be strictly fulfilled and that all the steps required to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the instruments be completed in good faith.
- 4 To consider alleged violations and to work out prompt and mutually satisfactory solutions to questions that may arise in the implementation of the instruments comprising the settlement representatives of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall meet whenever required. A representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations shall lend his good offices to the parties and in that context he will assist in the organization of the meetings and participate in them. He may submit to the parties for their consideration and approval suggestions and recommendations for prompt, faithful and complete observance of the provisions of the instruments. In order to enable him to fulfill his tasks, the representative shall be assisted by such personnel under his authority as required. On his own initiative, or at the request of any of the parties, the personnel shall investigate any possible violations of any of the provisions of the instruments and prepare a report thereon. For that purpose, the representative and his personnel shall receive all the necessary co-operation from the parties, including all freedom of movement within their respective territories required for effective investigation. Any report submitted by the representative to the two governments shall be considered in a meeting of the parties no later than forty-eight hours after it has been submitted.

The modalities and logistical arrangements for the work of the representative and the personnel under his authority as agreed upon with the parties are set out in the memorandum of understanding which is annexed to and is part of this agreement.

- 5 The present instrument will be registered with the secretary-General of the United Nations. The representatives of the parties to the bilateral agreements and of the states-guarantors, who have signified their consent with its provisions, have examined it. The representatives of the parties, being duly authorized thereto by their respective governments, have affixed their signatures hereunder. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was present. Done, at Geneva, this fourteenth day of April 1988, in five original copies each in the English, Pashtu, Urdu and Russian languages, all being equally authentic. In case of any dispute regarding the interpretation the English text shall prevail.

Memorandum of Understanding

Basic requirements

- (a) The parties will provide full support and co-operation to the representative of the Secretary-General and to all the personnel assigned to assist him;
- (b) The representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel will be accorded every facility as well as prompt and effective assistance, including freedom of movement and communications, accommodation, transportation and other facilities that may be necessary for the performance of their tasks. Afghanistan and Pakistan undertake to grant to the representative and his staff all the relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations.;
- (c) Afghanistan and Pakistan will be responsible for the safety of the representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel while operating in their respective countries;
- (d) In performing their functions, the representative of the Secretary-General and his staff will act with complete impartiality. The representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel must not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan

and Pakistan and, in this context, cannot be used to secure advantages for any of the parties concerned.

Mandate

The mandate for the implementation-assistance arrangements envisaged in paragraph 7 derives from the instruments comprising the settlement. All the staff assigned to the representative of the Secretary-General will accordingly be carefully briefed on the relevant provisions of the instruments and on the procedures that will be used to ascertain violations thereof.

Modus operandi and personnel organization

The Secretary General will appoint a senior military officer as deputy to the representative, who will be stationed in the area, as head of two small headquarters units, one in Kabul and the other in Islamabad, each comprising five military officers, drawn from existing United Nations operations, and a small civilian auxiliary staff.

The deputy to the representative of the Secretary-General will act on behalf of the representative and be in contact with the parties through the liaison officer each party will designate for this purpose.

The two headquarters units will be organized into two inspection teams to ascertain on the ground any violation of the instruments comprising the settlement. Whenever considered necessary by the representative of the Secretary-General or his deputy, up to 40 additional military officers (some 10 additional inspection teams) will be redeployed from existing operations within the shortest possible time (normally around 48 hours).

The nationalities of all the officers will be determined in consultation with the parties.

Whenever necessary the representative of the Secretary General, who will periodically visit the area for consultations with the parties and to review the work of his personnel, will also assign to the area members of his own office and other civilian personnel from the United Nations Secretariat as may be needed. His deputy will alternate between the two headquarters units and will remain at all times in close communication with him.

Procedure

(a) Inspections conducted at the request of the parties

- (I) A complaint regarding a violation of the instruments of the settlement lodged by any of the parties should be submitted in writing, in the English language, to the respective headquarters units and should indicate all relevant information and details.;
- (ii) Upon receipt of a complaint, the deputy to the representative of the Secretary General will immediately inform the other party of the complaint and undertake an investigation by making onsite inspections, gathering testimony and using any other procedure which he may deem necessary for the investigation of the alleged violation. Such inspection will be conducted using headquarters staff as referred to above, unless the deputy representative of the Secretary General considers that additional teams are needed. In that case, the parties will, under the principle of freedom of movement, allow immediate access of the additional personnel to their respective territories;
- (iii) Reports on investigations will be prepared in English and submitted by the deputy representative of the Secretary-General to the two governments, on a confidential basis. (A third copy of the report will be simultaneously transmitted, on a confidential basis, to United Nations headquarters in New York, exclusively for the information of the Secretary General and his representative.) In accordance with paragraph 7, a report on an investigation should be considered in a meeting of the parties not later than 48 hours after it has been submitted. The deputy representative of the Secretary-General will, in the absence of the representative, lend his good offices to the parties and in that context he will assist in the

organization of the meetings and participate in them. In the context of those meetings the deputy representative of the Secretary General may submit to the parties for their consideration and approval suggestions and recommendations for the prompt, faithful and complete observance of the provisions of the instruments. (Such suggestions and recommendations will be, as a matter of course, consulted with, and cleared by, the representative of the Secretary-General.)

b) Inspections conducted on the initiative of the deputy

Representative of the Secretary-General, in addition to inspection requested by the parties, the deputy Representative of the Secretary-General may carry out on his own initiative and in consultation with the representative inspections he deems appropriate for the purpose of the implementation of paragraph if it is considered that the conclusions reached in an inspection justify a report to the parties, the same procedure used in submitting reports in connection with inspections carried out at the request of the parties will be followed.

Level of participation in meetings

As indicated above, the deputy representative of the Secretary General will participate at meetings of the parties convened for the purpose of considering reports on violations. Should the parties decide to meet for the purpose outlined in paragraph 7 at a high political level, the representative of the Secretary-General will personally attend such meetings.

Duration

The deputy to the representative of the Secretary-General and the other personnel will be established in the area not later than twenty days before the entry into force of the instruments. The arrangements will cease to exist two months after the completion of all timeframes envisaged for the implementation of the instruments.

Financing

The cost of all facilities and services to be provided by the parties will be borne by the respective governments. The salaries and travel expenses of the personnel to and from the area, as well as the costs of the local personnel assigned to the headquarters units, will be defrayed by the United Nations.

U.S. Statement

The United States has agreed to act as a guarantor of the political settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan. We believe this settlement is a major step forward in restoring peace to Afghanistan, in ending the bloodshed in that unfortunate country, and in enabling millions of Afghan refugees to return to their homes.

In agreeing to act as a guarantor, the United States the following:

- (1) The troop withdrawal obligations set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the instrument of inter-relationships are central to the entire settlement. Compliance with those obligations is essential to achievement of the settlement's purposes, namely, the ending of foreign intervention in Afghanistan and the restoration of the rights of the Afghan people through the exercise of self determination as called for by the United Nations charter and the United Nations General assembly resolutions on Afghanistan;
- (2) The obligations undertaken by the guarantors are symmetrical. In this regard, the US has advised the Soviet Union that the U.S. retains the right, consistent with its obligations as guarantor, to provide military assistance to parties in Afghanistan. Should the Soviet Union exercise restraint in providing military assistance to parties in Afghanistan, the U.S will exercise similar restraint.
- (3) By acting as a guarantor of the settlement, the United States does not intend to imply in any respect recognition of the present regime in Kabul as the lawful government of Afghanistan.

Statement by Under Secretary Cordovez of April 8, 1988

I am authorized to state, at this time, that throughout the negotiations it has been consistently recognized that the objective of a comprehensive settlement implies the broadest support and immediate participation of all segments of the Afghan people and that this can best be ensured by a broad-based Afghan government. It was equally recognized that all questions relating to the government in Afghanistan are matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of Afghanistan and can only be decided by the Afghan people themselves.

The hope was, therefore, expressed that all elements of the Afghan nation, living inside and outside Afghanistan, would respond to this historic opportunity. At this crucial stage, all concerned will, therefore, promote the endeavors of the Afghan people to work out arrangements for a broad-based government and will support and facilitate that process.

TABLE OF GENEVA PROXIMITY TALKS, 1982-1987

ROUND	PERIOD
First	16 th to 24 th June 1982;
Second	11 th to 22 nd April 1983, and 12 th to 24 th June 1983;
Third	24 th to 30 th August 1984;
Fourth	20 th to 25 th June 1985;
Fifth	27 th to 30 th August 1985;
Sixth	16 th to 19 th December 1985;
Seventh	5 th May to 23 rd May 1986;
Eight	31 st July to 8 th August 1986;
Ninth	25 th February to 9 th March 1987, and 8 th to 11 th Sep. 1987;
Tenth	2 nd March to 18 th April 1988.

Text of Peshawar Accord³⁵⁵

The Peshawar Accord (April 1992)

1. It was decided that a 51 person body, headed by Hazrat Sahib Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, would go inside Afghanistan so that they could take over power from the present rulers of Kabul, completely and without any terms and conditions during the two months period. The head of this body will also represent the President ship of the State during these two months. After this period, this body will remain as an interim Islamic Council, along with the Transitional State and Hazrat Sahib will hold its Chairmanship. The period of this Council will also be for four (4) months;
2. It was decided that Professor Rabbani would remain as the President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan and the head of the Leadership Council for four (4) months. He will commence his work officially at the time when the two months of the transfer of power will be elapsed;
3. The above-mentioned period will not be extended even by a day;
4. The Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet will be appointed from the second grade members of the Tanzeemat, on the discretion of the heads of the Tanzeemat;
5. The Prime Minister ship was assigned to the Hizb-e-Islami, Afghanistan;
6. The Deputy Prime Minister ship and the Ministry of Interior, to Ittehad-e-Islami, Afghanistan;
7. The Deputy Prime Minister ship and the Ministry of Education, to Hizb-e-Islamic of Maulavi Khalis;
8. The Deputy Prime Minister ship and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the National Islamic Front;
9. The Ministry of Defense to Jamiat-e-Islami, Afghanistan;
10. The Supreme Court to Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami Organization;
11. It was also decided that the Leadership Council, in addition to making the division of appointments in the Ministries, will also determine

³⁵⁵ <http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/>

Ministries for Hizb-e-Wahdat, Shura-e-Etelaf (Council of Coalition)
Maulavi Mansoor and other brothers;

12. The total period of this process will be six months. As regards to Transitional Government, the Islamic Council will make unanimous decision. The period of this Transitional Government will be two (2) years;

Text of Islamabad Accord³⁵⁶

Afghan Peace Accord (Islamabad Accord 1993)

Given our submission to the will of Allah Almighty and commitment to seeking guidance from the Holy Quran and Sunnah, recalling the glorious success of the epic Jihad waged by the valiant Afghan people against foreign occupation, desirous of ensuring that the fruits of this glorious Jihad bring peace, progress and prosperity for the Afghan people, having agreed to bringing armed hostilities to an end, Recognizing the need for a broad-based Islamic Government in which all parties and groups representing all segments of Muslim Afghan society are represented so that the process of political transition can be advanced in an atmosphere of peace, harmony and stability, committed to the preservation of unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, recognizing the urgency of rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan and of facilitating the return of all Afghan refugees, committed to promoting peace and security in the region, responding to the call of Khadim Al-Harain Al-Sharifain His Majesty King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz to resolve the differences among Afghan brothers through a peaceful dialogue, appreciating the constructive role of good offices of Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and his sincere efforts to promote peace and conciliation in Afghanistan, recognizing the positive support for these efforts extended by the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, who have sent their Special Envoys for the conciliation talks in Islamabad, having undertaken intensive intra-Afghan consultations separately and jointly

³⁵⁶ <http://www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/>

to consolidate the gains of the glorious Jihad, all the parties and groups concerned have agreed as follows:

To the formation of a Government for a period of 18 months in which President Burhanuddin Rabbani would remain President and Eng. Gulbedin Hikmatyar or his nominee would assume the office of Prime Minister. The powers of the President and Prime Minister and his cabinet which have been formulated through mutual consultations will form part of this Accord and is annexed; The Cabinet shall be formed by the Prime Minister in consultations with the President, and leaders of Mujahedeen Parties within two weeks of the signing of this Accord; The following electoral process is agreed for implementation in a period of not more than 18 months with effect from 29 December 1992:

- (a) The immediate formation of an independent Election Commission by all parties with full powers;
- (b) The Election Commission shall be mandated to hold elections for a Grand Constituent Assembly within eight months from the date of signature of this Accord;
- (c) The duly elected Grand Constituent Assembly shall formulate a Constitution under which general elections for the President and the Parliament shall be held within the prescribed period of 18 months mentioned above. A defense Council comprising two members from each party will be set up to, *inter alia*,
 - (a) Enable the formation of a national army;
 - (b) Take possession of heavy weapons from all parties and sources, which may be removed from Kabul and other cities and kept out of range to ensure the security of the Capital;
 - (c) Ensure that all roads in Afghanistan are kept open for normal use;
 - (d) Ensure that State funds shall not be used to finance private armies or armed retainers;
 - (e) Ensure that operational control of the armed forces shall be with the Defense Council. There shall be immediate and unconditional release of

all Afghan detainees held by the Government and different parties during the armed hostilities;

All public and private buildings, residential areas and properties occupied by different armed groups during the hostilities shall be returned to their original owners. Effective steps shall be taken to facilitate the return of displaced persons to their respective homes and locations.

An All Party Committee shall be constituted to supervise control over the monetary system and currency regulations to keep it in conformity with existing Afghan banking laws and regulations.

A cease-fire shall come into force with immediate effect. After the formation of the Cabinet, there shall be permanent cessation of hostilities.

A Joint Commission comprising representatives of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and of all Afghan parties shall be formed to monitor the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities.

In confirmation of the above Accord the following have affixed their signatures hereunder, on Sunday, 7 March 1993 in Islamabad, Pakistan.

(Signed)

Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani

Engineer Gulbaddin Hikmatyar

Moulavi Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi (With my reservation about the president time)

Professor Sibghatullah Mujjadidi (With my reservation about the president time)

Pir Syed Ahmed Gaillani

Engineer Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai

Sheikh Asif Mohseni

Ayatullah Fazil

Division of Powers Preamble

The President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan is the Head of State and symbol of unity and solidarity of the country and shall guide the affairs of the State in accordance with Islamic laws and the principles laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.

- I. The Prime Minister shall form the Cabinet in consultation with the President and present the names to the President, who shall formally announce the Cabinet and take its oath. The Cabinet shall operate as a team under the leadership of the Prime Minister and shall work on the principle of collective responsibility.
- II. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall regularly act in close consultation with the President on all-important issues.
- III. The President and the Prime Minister shall act in consultation with each other and shall try to resolve differences, if any, through mutual discussion. In case any issue remains unresolved, it should be decided by a reference to a joint meeting of the President and the Cabinet.
- IV. All major policy decisions shall be made in the Cabinet, to be presided over by the Prime Minister, Ministers, Deputy Ministers and Ministers of State would be individually and collectively responsible for the decisions of the Government.
- V. The formal appointment of the Chiefs of the Armed Forces shall be made in accordance with the existing practice and after mutual consultation.

Powers of the President

- VI. The President shall have the following powers and duties:
 - (a) Appointment of Vice-President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan;
 - (b) Appointment and retirement of judges of the Supreme Court, the Chief Justices, in consultation with the Prime Minister and in accordance with the provisions of the laws;
 - (c) Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the country in the light of the objectives and structure of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan;

- (d) Declaring war and peace on the advice of the Cabinet or the Parliament;
- (e) Convening and inaugurating the Parliament according to Rules;
- (f) Consolidating national unity and upholding the independence, neutrality and the Islamic character of Afghanistan and the interests of all its citizens;
- (g) Commuting and pardoning of sentences according to the Shariah and the provisions of law;
- (h) Accrediting heads of Afghanistan's diplomatic missions in foreign States, appointing Afghanistan's permanent representatives to international organizations according to the normal diplomatic procedures and accepting the letters of credence of foreign diplomatic representatives.
- (I) Signing laws and ordinances and granting credentials for the conclusion and signing of international treaties in accordance with the provisions of law;
- (j) The President may, at his discretion, delegate any of his powers to the Vice- President, or to the Prime Minister;
- (k) In the event of the death or resignation of the President, the presidential functions shall be automatically entrusted to the Vice-President, who shall deputize till the new President is elected under the Constitution;
- (l) Granting formal permission to print money;
- (m) The President may call an extraordinary meeting of the Cabinet on issues of vital national significance, which do not fall in the routine governance of the country;

Powers of the Prime Minister

VII. The Prime Minister and his Cabinet shall have the following duties and powers:

- (a) Formulation and implementation of the country's domestic and foreign policies in accordance with the provisions and spirit of this Accord and the provisions of law;
- (b) Administering, coordinating and supervising the affairs of the ministries, and other departments and public bodies and institutions;

- (c) Rendering executive and administrative decisions in accordance with laws and supervising their implementation;
- (d) Drafting of laws and formulating rules and regulations;
- (e) Preparing and controlling the State budget and adopting measures to mobilize resources to reconstruct the economy and establish a viable and stable monetary, financial and fiscal system;
- (f) Drafting and supervising implementation of the socio-economic and educational plans of the country with a view to establishing a self-reliant Islamic Welfare State;
- (g) Protecting and promoting the objectives and interests of Afghanistan in the world community and discussing and negotiating foreign treaties, protocols, international agreements and financial arrangements;
- (h) Adopting measures to ensure public order, peace, security and Islamic morality and to ensure administration of justice through an independent and impartial judiciary;

In confirmation of the above Accord, the following have affixed their signatures hereunder, on Sunday, 7 March 1993 in Islamabad, Pakistan.

1. Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani, Jamiat-e-Islami, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
2. Engineer Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, Hizb-e-Islami
3. Moulavi Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi, Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami
4. Prof. Sibghatullah Mujjadidi, Jabha-e-Nijat-e-Milli (With my reservation about the president time)
5. Pir Syed Ahmad Gaillani, Mahaz-e-Milli
6. Engineer Ahmed Shah, Ahmadzai Ittehad-e-Islami
7. Sheikh Asif Mohseni, Harkat-e-Islamic
8. Ayatullah Fazil, Hizb-e-Wahdat-e-Islami

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books:

Adamic, Ludwig W, Afghanistan 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History, Berkely, University of California Press, 1967.

Ahmed, Sayed Salahuddin, Foreign Policy of Pakistan: a Critical Study, Karachi, Comprehensive Books Service, 1996.

Ahmad, Mushtaq , Pakistan at the Cross Roads, Karachi, Royal Book Co, 1985.

Anwar, Raja , The Tragegy of Afghanistan: A first hand account, London and Newyork Veso Press, 1988.

Amin Saikal and William Maley [Ed.], The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Amin, M, Shahid, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal, Karachi, Karachi Press, 2000.

Anthony, Arnold, Afghanistan's Two Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq, Stanford, Hoover Institutions Press, 1993.

Arnold, Fletcher, Afghanistan: High way of Conquest, Ithaca and New York, Cornell University Press, 1976.

Bradsher, Henry S, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, Durham, Duke Unversity Press, 1983.

Balance, O, Edgar, Afghan Wars: Battles in a Hostile Land 1839 to the Present, Oxford University Press, 2003.

Burke, S, M, and Lawarence Ziring, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis, Karachi, Oxford Univetsity Press, (Second Edition) 1990

Carew, Tom, JIHAD The Secret War in Afghanistan, London, Mainstream Publishing, 2000.

Chopra, V,D (Ed), Afghanistan: Geneva Accords and After, New Delhi, Patriot Publishers, 1988.

Cordevez, Diego, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal, N.Y, Oxford University, Press, 1995.

Cronin, Richard, Afghanistan after the Soviet Withdrawal :Contenders for Power, Washington D. C, Congressional Research Service, May 1989.

- Dupree, Louis, Afghanistan, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1980.
- Elliott, G.J, The Frontier 1839-1947, London, Call ell Press, 1968.
- Rahman, Fateh-ur, and Bashir Qureshi, Afghans Meet Soviet Challenge, Peshawar, Institute of Regional Studies, 1981.
- Fletcher, Arnold, Afghanistan Highway of Conquest, New York, Cornell University Press, 1966.
- Ghani, Abdul, A Brief Political History of Afghanistan, Lahore, Najaf Publishers, 1989.
- Ghaus, Abdul Samad, The Fall of Afghanistan, Washington Toronto, Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988.
- Gregorian, Vartan, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, California, Stanford University Press, 1969.
- Griffiths C, John, Afghanistan, London, Pall Mall Press, 1967.
- Griffiths, C.John, Afghanistan Key to a Continent, Colorado USA, West view Press, 1981.
- Hussain, Dr.Riffat, The Anatomy of a Conflict: Afghanistan and 9/11, Lahore, Rolli Publications, 2002.
- Haman, Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination, London, Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Hammond,T,Thomas, Red Flag over Afghanistan, Colorado, West view Press Boulder, 1986.
- Hodson ,V.H, The Great Game, London, Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Hussain, Syed Shabbir and, Absar Hussain Rizvi, Afghanistan Whose War, Islamabad, Mashrique Foundations, 1987.
- Jalalzai, Musa Khan., The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Sectarian Impacts on Diplomacy, Lahore, Dua Publications, 2000.
- Jalazai, Musa, Khan, The Pipeline War in Afghanistan, Lahore, Maktaba Jadeed Press, 2000.
- Jalalzai, Musa, Khan, The Foreign Policy of Afghansitan, Lahore, Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2003.
- Khan,M.Raiz, Untying the Afghanistan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal, Lahore, Progressive Publishers, 1993.

Khan,Zulfiqar,Ali, Air Chief Marshal (Retd.), Pakistan's Security: The Challenge and Response, Lahore, Progressive Publications, 1988.

Macrory, Patrick [Ed.], Lady Sale the First Afghan War, London, Longman Green and Co Ltd, 1969.

Magnus, Ralph and Eden, Nabby, Afghanistan, Mulla, Marx and Mujahid, India, Harper Collins, 1988.

Matinuddin, Kamal, The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan: 1994-97, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1999.

Mc CAULEY, Martin, Afghanistan and Central Asia: A Modern History, London, Pearson Education Limited, 2002.

Mousavi, Sayed Askar, The Hazaras of Afghanistan: An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study, London, Curzon Press, 1998.

Murshed, S. Iftikhar, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years, Englan, Newton Printing London, 2006.

Newell, Nancy Pea Body and Richard S Newell, The Struggle for Afghanistan, London, Cornell University Press, 1981.

Noelle, Christine, State and the Tribe in Nineteenth Century Afghanistan, London, Curzon Press, 1997.

Rashid, Ahmed, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, London, Yale University Press, 2002.

Roy, Oliver, Afghanistan: From Holly War to Civil War, Princeton University Press, 1995.

Roy, Oliver, Islam and the Resistance in Afghanistan, New York, Cornel University Press, 1995.

Roy, Olivier, The Failure of Political Islam, London, I.B.Touris, 1994.

Rozen, Barry,M, Iran Since the Revolution: Internal Dynamics, Regional Conflict, and the Superpowers, New York, Columbia University Press, 1985.

Rubin, Barnett, R, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State, London, Yale University Press, 1995.

Shahi, Agha, (Ed), Paksitan's Security and Foreign Policy, Lahore, Progressive Publications, 1988.

Sipols, Vilnis, The Road to the Great Victory Soviet Diplomacy 1941-45, Moscow, Progressive Publishers, 1984.

Sufi, Juma Khan, Afghanistan: A Chronological Fact Sheet 1600-2004, Khost (Afghansitan), Intependent Cultural Society, 2005.

Ram, Samay Maj Gen, The New Afghanistan Pawn of America, India, New Delhi, Manas Publications, 2004.

Mehta, S. Jagat, The March of Folly in Afghanistan in 1978-2001 and 9/11, New Delhi, Roli Publications, 2002.

Tahirkheli, Shirin, Soviet Moves in Asia, Lahore, Feroze Sons, 1979.

William, Maley [Ed.], Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban, Lahore, Vanguard, 1998.

Yousaf, Mohammad, and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story, Lahore, Jang Publishers, 1992.

Zaidi, S.H, The Taliban Venture and the Lessons for Pakistan, in Pakistan Horizon Karachi, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs (PIIA), Vol. 54, No. 4, October 2001.

Articles:

Bernstein, Carl, Arms for Afghansitan, the New Republic of Afghanistan, July 18, 1981.

Dr. Sher Zaman Taizai, Afghanistan: Confusion of fusion and diffusion, the daily Frontier Post, Peshawar, August 5, 1992.

Dupree, Louis, The Marxist Regimes and the Soviet Presence in Afgahnsitan: An Ages-old culture responds to the late twentieth century Aggression, August 1981.

Fullerton, Jhon, A rift among Rebels, Far Eastern Economic Review, October, 1982.

Jawad, Nassim, Role of the International Community in Future Afghanistan, Defense Journal, Karachi, (monthly), Urdu Bazar Karachi, vol: xvii, no: 9, 1991.

Marwat, Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim, Pakistan's Strategic role in the Afghan crisis, Pakistan, Peshawar, Journal of Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 1993

Marwat, Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim, The impact of Afghan crisis on the North-West Frontier Province, Emerging Central Asia and Pakistan, Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, July 24-28, 2002.

Effendi, Yahya, Muhammad, The Historical Dimensions of the Ethnic Complexity and Internal Cohesion in Afghanistan, Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, summer, 2002.

Sultana, Razia, Changing perception of US-Afghan Relations: An Appraisal, Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, summer, 2002.

Latendresse, Simon, The Border as Strategy: The Case of the Afghans in Peshawar, Islamabad, Policy Perspectives, volume 4, January-June 2007.

Hussain, Rifaat, Pakistan's Relations with Afghanistan: Continuity and Change, Islamabad, Strategic Studies, vol.xxii, winter 2002

Hilali, A.Z, Geo-Political Importance of Afghanistan, Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, winter 1993.

Khan, Azmat, Hayat, Afghanistan After the Soviet Withdrawal: An Appraisal, Area Study Center, University of Peshawar, winter 1988.

Taizi, (Dr.) Sher Zaman, Afghanistan from Najib to Mojaddedi, Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, summer 1996.

Hilali, A.Z, Afghanistan: A Multi Ethnic and Multi Lingual Society, Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, winter 1990.

Khan, Azmat, Hayat, The Afghanistan Problem: Its Impact on Pakistan, Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, summer 1989.

Khan, Mohammad, Bashir, The Soviet Invasion and the Uprising and Growth of the Afghan Mujahedeen, Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, summer 1994.

Mazari, Dr.Shereen, The Collapse of the Soviet Empire: Impact Upon Pakistan's Regional Environment, Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, summer 1992.

Abbasi, Abdur Razzaq, Khan, The fall of the Soviet System In USSR and its Impact on the Region, Area study Centre, University of Peshawar, winter 1992.

Sabit, Abdul, Jabar, Causes of Continuation of Afghan war, The daily News, Frontier Post, December 1988.

Unpublished Sources:

Hussain, Wahid, The Afghan Crisis and its implications for Pakistan, Unpublished MA thesis, Pakistan Study Center, University of Peshawar, 1988-89

Gufran, Nasreen, The Politics of Repatriation: A Case Study of Afghan Refugee Repatriation from Pakistan 1989-2003, Unpublished Ph D Dissertation, Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar, 2004.

Khan, Ijaz, An Analysis of Pakistan Foreign Policy Decision Making with special References to Pakistan's Post September 11, 2001 Afghan Policy and its impact on the region, Unpublished Ph D Dissertation, Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar, 2004.

Khan, Adnan, Sarwar, The Geneva Accords on Afghanistan: Pakistan's Perspective, Unpublished Ph D Dissertation, Areas Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 1999.

Taizia, Dr. Sher Zaman, Life Sketch of Dr. Najibulla, Unpublished Thesis, University of Peshawar, 1986.

Khan, Dilshad, The Afghan Refugees in NWFP, Unpublished MA Thesis, Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 1999-2001.

Personalities Interviewed:

1. Maj. Gen (R) Naseerullah Khan Babar, An expert on Afghan affairs, Peshawar, May 28, 2005
2. Rahimullah Yousafzai, An expert on Afghan affairs and Bureau Chief of The News International, Peshawar, June 3, 2005
3. Lt. General (R) Hamid Gul, ex-DG ISI, Rawalpindi, June 29, 2005

4. Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Aamir, Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, Nowshera, July 28, 2005
5. Mohammad Sediq Cahakary, Minister of information and Technology of Rabbani Cabinet, August 20, 2005
6. Dr Bashar, An expert on Afghan affairs living in US, Peshawar, February 20, 2006
7. Col, Sultan Imam, Ex ISI Col, Rawalpindi, March 27, 2006
8. Brig (R) Muhammad Anwar Khan, Director General A.T.D.C Ministry of Foreign Affairs Islamabad, Pakistan, May 21, 2006

Newspapers:

Afghan Daily. Afghan News Network
Afghan Times. Afghan News Network
Kabul Times. Afghan News Network
Daily 'Dawn' Islamabad
The Frontier Post Peshawar, Pakistan
The Muslim Islamabad, Pakistan
The Nation Islamabad, Pakistan

Websites:

[_www.afghan.com](http://www.afghan.com)
www.afghandaily.com
www.areu.org.pk
www.bbc.com
www.cnn.com
www.hrw.org
www.refugee.com
www.afghanhistory.com

Important political and military figures of Afghanistan's recent history



Mohammad Zahir Shah (1933-73)



Sardar Mohammad Daud (1973-78)



Mohammad Taraky
(1979)



Hafizullah Amin
(1979)



Babrak Karmal
(1980-86)



Dr. Najeebullah
(1986-1992)



Sibghatulla Mujjadidi (1992)



Burhanudin Rabbani (1992-96)



Ahmad Shah Masood



Gulbodin Hikmatyar



Abdul Rashid Dostom



Abdul Ali Mazari

