How Chinese spies seek state secrets with LinkedIn ‘headhunters’

At first glance, the LinkedIn profile of the recruitment headhunter looked unremarkable.

Beneath a glossy headshot, Amanda Qiu declared that, as chief executive of the Chinese-based firm BP-YR Executive Search, she “connected visionary companies with world-class talent”.

However, MI5 said on Tuesday that Qiu, along with another supposed recruiter, Shirly Shen, had been operating accounts controlled by China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) to make contact with individuals in parliament.

In a security notice circulated to MPs, the agency said the pair were using LinkedIn to “conduct outreach at scale” on behalf of Chinese intelligence.

MI5 outlined a familiar playbook. The MSS, it said, was willing to offer “large financial incentives for seemingly low-level information” as it built relationships. It identified “high-priority targets” in British politics and cultivated those one step removed from them.

“Parliament staff, economists, think tank employees, geopolitical consultants and those working alongside [the government] have been targeted for their network, including MPs and members of the House of Lords,” it said.

Despite Qiu’s claimed seniority and more than 500 LinkedIn connections, including figures in the Conservative Party, the Tony Blair Institute and big corporations, her profile displayed clumsy uses of artificial intelligence, including posts where she failed to delete the prompt “suggested hashtags”. Images accompanying her updates also appeared to be AI-generated, including a book pictured with its cover printed across its centre pages and another balanced at an improbable angle.

Last year Qiu contacted James Price, a former Tory special adviser, offering part-time work for a “think tank expert”. She claimed to represent a Chinese battery company and described herself as a “professional hunter”.

“Hi James, glad to friend you,” she wrote, before outlining a consultancy role that “won’t take much of your time”. She linked to a website for a Chinese lithium-battery firm. When Price asked what PBG stood for, Qiu replied with a detailed corporate description.

Price ignored the approach. “I received then a long and dull message about a battery company in China, took it to be either spam or something more malicious, and never engaged again,” he said. “It’s very worrying that the Chinese Communist Party have the resources and intent to try to engage even former special advisers, let alone MPs and senior civil servants. I hope the government is wise to the extreme threat the CCP represents.”

The unsolicited approaches sent by both accounts were typically in broken English, contributing to the sense that the profiles might be automated spam. Those who “connected” with Qiu or Shen — including people in big companies and Westminster-linked organisations — would, MI5 warned, have had no reason to assume they were interacting with intelligence officers.

• China targeting MPs with ‘large financial incentives’, MI5 warns

Shen claimed to be co-founder of an organisation called the Internship Union and presented as a global “headhunter” with access to Chinese investment funds. Security officials noted the pair showed a conspicuous and unexplained interest in British politics.

Qiu also advertised a role seeking political “insiders”, writing that candidates could be an expert or an “ ‘insider’ regarding either politics or the economy within your country”. Applicants were told they should have experience in government, academia or think tanks and would be expected to produce up to ten reports a year on policies affecting foreign businesses.

Those targeted included a staff member in the office of Neil O’Brien, the Conservative MP and head of policy for Kemi Badenoch, the party leader. O’Brien has previously been sanctioned by Beijing. Three months ago the aide received a message from Shen in broken English. The aide did not reply.

Neil O’Brien, Conservative MP, confirmed that his staff had been contacted by Qiu and Shen

“Hi, my name is Shirly, a global headhunter,” the message said, offering remote consultancy work and praising the aide as “so excellent”.

O’Brien wrote on X: “UK universities are cancelling research because of Chinese pressure but Labour cancelled the law designed to stop this. China spied on MPs but Labour collapsed the trial. When are we going to wake up?”

Luke de Pulford, executive director of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, said the tactic was “very common” and “low cost and high impact” for Beijing. “They are sending tens of thousands of messages to people,” he said. “If one or two come back then it’s worth it to China.”

• The ‘China spies’ wanted to divide hawks like me — and it worked

According to MI5, targets are first approached as freelance consultants producing “geopolitical reports” for Chinese companies — some genuine, others fictitious. “Officers use false personas on websites such as LinkedIn, which they use to spot and approach targets,” it said. From the outset officers are particularly interested in “non- public” and “insider” insights as well as in understanding networks, to identify potential sources of information.

China uses “external headhunters”, individuals living in China, to make the initial point of contact. MI5 said Qiu and Shen were examples of two such individuals. If they succeeded in contacting a target they were referred to an “officer” in the MSS, who would pose as a manager or a client from the chosen company. “A target will then be commissioned to write an initial report,” MI5 said. “Following this a tasking relationship begins.”

Security officials said MI5’s decision to name the individuals served two purposes: to identify MPs, peers or parliamentary staff who may have been drawn in; and second, to issue what one senior government figure described as a “clear message to Beijing that we know what you are doing”. Whether such exposure deters future activity, they added, “remains to be seen”.